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A B S T R A C T
Scientific models are important, if not the sole, units of science. This thesis addresses
the following question: in virtue of what do scientific models represent their target
systems? In Part i I motivate the question, and lay out some important desiderata
that any successful answer must meet. This provides a novel conceptual framework
in which to think about the question (or questions) of scientific representation. I then
argue against Callender and Cohen’s (2006) attempt to diffuse the question.
In Part ii I investigate the ideas that scientific models are ‘similar’, or structurally
(iso)morphic, to their target systems. I argue that these approaches are misguided,
and that at best these relationships concern the accuracy of a pre-existing representa-
tional relationship. I also pay particular attention to the sense in which target systems
can be appropriately taken to exhibit a ‘structure’, and van Fraassen’s (2008) recent ar-
gument concerning the pragmatic equivalence between representing phenomena and
data. My next target is the idea that models should not be seen as objects in their own
right, but rather what look like descriptions of them are actually direct descriptions of
target systems, albeit not ones that should be understood literally. I argue that these
approaches fail to do justice to the practice of scientific modelling. Finally I turn to the
idea that how models represent is grounded, in some sense, in their inferential capac-
ity. I compare this approach to anti-representationalism in the philosophy of language
and argue that analogous issues arise in the context of scientific representation.
Part iii contains my positive proposal. I provide an account of scientific representa-
tion based on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as. The result is a highly
conventional account which is the appropriate level of generality to capture all of its
instances, whilst remaining informative about the notion. I illustrate it with reference
to the Phillips-Newlyn machine, models of proteins, and the Lotka-Volterra model of
predator-prey systems. These examples demonstrate how the account must be under-
stood, and how it sheds light on our understanding of how models are used. I finally
demonstrate how the account meets the desiderata laid out at the beginning of the the-
sis, and outline its implications for further questions from the philosophy of science;
not limited to issues surrounding the applicability of mathematics, idealisation, and
what it takes for a model to be ‘true’.
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‘... In that Empire, the Art of Cartography at-
tained such Perfection that the map of a single
Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the
map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province.
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer
satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck
a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the
Empire, and which coincided point for point
with it. The following Generations, who were
not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their
Forebears had been, saw that that vast map was
Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was
it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies
of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West,
still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map,
inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the
Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines
of Geography.’
Jorge Luis Borges, On Exactitude in Science.
Part I
W H AT ’ S T H E P R O B L E M O F S C I E N T I F I C
R E P R E S E N TAT I O N ?
1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
It’s 1953 and economists in the Central Bank of Guatemala are topping up the wa-
ter tank in their recently purchased Phillips-Newlyn machine, a system of pipes and
reservoirs with water flowing through it. The land reform act (Decree 900) passed in
Guatemala the previous year had redistributed unused land to local farmers. US corpo-
ration Wrigley’s, one of the largest buyers of Guatemalan chicle gum, had announced
that it would stop imports from Guatemala in protest against the land reform. The
economists working in the Central Bank are worried about a politically motivated de-
crease in foreign demand for Guatemalan goods, and want to know what effect such
a decrease would have on the national economy, given that their currency is pegged
to the US dollar. They adjust the machine to account for the macroeconomic condi-
tions in Guatemala and proceed to let the machine reach equilibrium. They close a
valve marked ‘exports’ and watch what happens. The effect of this is that the flow
marked ‘income’ starts falling, and in order to keep the level of the tank marked ‘for-
eign held balances’ constant, water flows out of the machine into the spare tank. This
provides the sought-after indication of the effects of falling exports on the Guatemalan
economy.1
Wait. What the economists were manipulating were the valves and tanks of a hy-
draulic machine that pumped water from reservoir to reservoir. How could manipulat-
ing such a machine tell them anything about the Guatemalan economy? The answer, I
think, is that the machine is (and was) a model that represents the Guatemalan economy.
It’s 1957 and John Kendrew is sitting at his desk threading a ‘sausage’ of plasticine
through a system of vertical rods. The shape of the sausage is determined by the elec-
tron density data that he and his team at Medical Research Council Unit for Molecular
Biology at the University of Cambridge had recently collected from crystallised sam-
ples of whale myoglobin. Once he’s done, Kendrew looks at the shape of the sausage
1 See Phillips (1950) for the original presentation of the model; Morgan and Boumans (2004) and Morgan
(2012, Chapter 5) for a useful philosophical introduction; and Aldana (2011) and Stevenson (2011) for
discussions about the the Guatemalan Central Bank’s use of their Phillips-Newlyn machine. I discuss the
example in more detail in Chapter 9.
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Figure 1: The Phillips-Newlyn ma-
chine on display (public do-
main)3
Figure 2: Kendrew’s ‘sausage model’
of myoglobin (Science Mu-
seum)4
and observes that it twists and turns back on itself; it’s folded in a particular pattern
that is highly difficult to explain in English. He concludes that myoglobin has a partic-
ular tertiary structure, and remarks that ‘the arrangement seems to be almost totally
lacking in the kind of regularities which one instinctively anticipates, and is more com-
plicated than has been predicated by any theory of protein structure’ (1958, 665).2 He
goes on to win the Nobel Prize in chemistry for his work in determining this structure.
Wait. Kendrew was looking at a lump of plasticine. How could investigating the
shape of such an object tell him anything about the tertiary structure of a microscopic
protein molecule? The answer again is that the object is a model that represents myo-
globin.
It’s 1926 and Vito Volterra wants to understand why the First World War had the
impact it did on the relative proportion of predator and prey fish in the Adriatic
Sea. More precisely, before the First World War there was a certain proportion of
predator to prey fish sold in the Italian fish markets. During the war fishing decreased
significantly, which led to a higher proportion of predator to prey (i.e. light fishing
favoured the predators). After the War, where fishing increased to pre-War levels, the
proportion of predator to prey returned to its pre-War level. Volterra wanted to know
why the change in fishing levels, which, at least prima facie affected predator and prey
2 See Kendrew et al. (1958) for his original discussion of the model, and de Chadarevian (2004) for a useful
philosophical discussion. The example is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
4 Available here https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MONIAC.jpg#/media/File:MONIAC.jpg.
4 Available here http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/HoMImages/Components/799/79987_3.png.
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at the same rate, led to the change in proportions in the fish markets.5 He writes down
the following coupled non-linear differential equations:
dV
dt
= αV − (βV)P (1)
dP
dt
= γ(βV)P− δP (2)
He writes t = time; V = size of the prey population; P = size of the predator population;
α = the intrinsic growth rate of the prey; δ = intrinsic death rate of the predators; and
β and γ are prey capture rate and rate at which each predator converts captured
prey into more predator births respectively (the ‘phase space’ of these equations is
illustrated in figure 4 and explained in more detail in Chapter 10). He notices that
the equations have two solutions where dVdt =
dP
dt = 0. First where P = V = 0, and
second where αV = (βV)P and δP = γ(βV)P. The second is his primary interest.
He calculates that although it is unstable, it corresponds to the mean values of P and
V over an indefinitely large amounts of t. Letting Pˆ and Vˆ denote these values and
ρ = Pˆ
Vˆ
he derives the following equation:
ρ =
αγ
δ
(3)
He argues that heavy fishing corresponds to lower values of α and higher values of δ,
which means that heavy fishing corresponds to lower values of ρ, and thus higher rel-
ative size of prey population with respect to predator population. He thus concludes
that pre-First World War fishing activity led to higher prey to predator ratios, and thus
more prey in the Adriatic fish markets, and the decrease in fishing activity associated
with the First World War led to higher predator to prey ratios.
Wait. Volerra was writing down mathematical equations and then finding solutions
to them. He was investigating how changing real valued parameters in mathematical
functions affected the values of such functions. How could this tell him anything
about fish populations in the Adriatic Sea? Again, this is because he constructed a
model that represents the fish populations.
It’s 1987 and Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Weisenfeld are interested in systems that
exhibit what they call ‘self-organised criticality’ (SOC): systems that have the tendency
to evolve to complex states without the need to fine-tune their initial conditions.6
5 See Volterra (1926, 1928) for his original discussion. See Weisberg (2007); Weisberg and Reisman (2008);
Weisberg (2013) for useful philosophical discussions that I draw upon here. The example is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 10. It’s worth noting that equations 1 and 2 below were proposed independently
by Alfred Lotka (1925).
6 See Bak et al. (1987) for their original discussion and Bak (1996) for an accessible introduction to SOC
and the uses of models like the one discussed below. My discussion is greatly informed by Frigg (2003),
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They consider the following scenario: take a flat surface and add sand (grain by grain)
randomly across it in an attempt to build a a sandpile. As the pile grows, the addition
of extra grains causes local motion. As it continues to grow, a state is reached where
the pile is a critical size and adding more sand somewhere on the surface leads to sand
falling off the edge elsewhere. In this state, the addition of a sand grain at a point can
cause an avalanche that affects the entire pile and avalanches of all sizes can occur
throughout the pile. The state is ‘critical’ in the sense that local events can affect the
system in its entirety, and ‘self-organised’ in the sense that no deliberate effort is made
to ensure the system arrives in such a state, and it will arrive in such a state regardless
of the specific ways in which the grains are added.
To understand such a system, Bak, Tang and Weisenfeld reasoned as follows: con-
sider a two dimensional lattice with a coordinate system such that tuples of the form
(nx, ny) denote a cell in the lattice, where nx, ny ∈ N, where N is some finite subset
of N. There are N2 of these cells. Each cell (nx, ny), is assigned an integer Z(nx, ny)
(at the ‘edges’, i.e. wherever nx = 0, ny = 0, nx = N, or ny = N, they stipulate that
Z(nx, ny) = 0 is constant). This is illustrated in figure 3. At t = 0 let Z(nx, ny) = 0
for all (nx, ny). As t increases in discrete values, randomly chose a cell (nx, ny) and
increase Z(nx, ny) by 1 : Zt+1(nx, ny) = Zt(nx, ny) + 1. Call this the ‘addition of a sand
grain’ to the cell. Define a threshold K such that for all cells (nx, ny) and values of t, if
Zt(nx, ny) ≥ K the following occurs (unless the event occurs at the edge of the lattice,
in which case the ‘grain’ is lost):
Zt+1(nx, ny) = Zt(nx, ny)− 4
Zt+1(nx ± 1, ny) = Zt(nx ± 1, ny) + 1
Zt+1(nx, ny ± 1) = Zt(nx, ny ± 1) + 1
Call this a ‘toppling event’. If such an event yields an additional toppling event on
any of (nx ± 1, ny) or (nx, ny ± 1), then the process of choosing cells at random and
increasing their Z value by 1 is paused until the toppling events have yielded a stable
lattice (i.e. a lattice where Z(nx, ny) < K for all (nx, ny)). The gap between a toppling
event and reaching a stable state where ‘grains’ are added to the system again is called
an ‘avalanche’.
Let the system run for enough time, and it turns out that once the lattice is crowded
enough (there are enough cells whose Z value is close to K), increasing the value
of Z for some cell (nx, ny) can have dramatic effects throughout the lattice. Indeed
who provides a philosophical introduction to SOC and a careful consideration of how models based on
the idea work.
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Figure 3: A two dimensional lattice
representing two grains of
sand at (3, 3) (Frigg, 2003,
616)
Figure 4: Phase space of the Lokta-
Volterra model (Weisberg
and Reisman, 2008, 133)
increasing the value of Z for one cell can yield every other cell in the lattice to be
affected. For each avalanche, denote its size by s and its duration by d. It turns out
that the number of avalanches whose size is s (denoted by N(s)), and the number of
avalanches whose duration is d (denoted by N(d)) obey a power law:7
N(s) = s−a and N(d) = d−b where a and b are real valued constants.
Bak, Tang and Weisenfeld conclude that, when trying to build a sandpile, they will
observe analogous behaviour. Once the actual sand reaches a certain height, the addi-
tion of one grain will cause the pile to topple, causing avalanches whose effects may
be felt throughout the sandbox. And if they were to count the number of avalanches
at a certain size (or of a certain duration), then they would observe that they obeyed
the same power law.8
Wait. Bak, Tang and Weisenfeld were reasoning about two dimensional lattices,
where integers were assigned to cells, and they defined a simple rule of distributing
integers across adjacent cells when K was reached. How could that tell them anything
about sandpiles? Sandboxes are not discrete lattices, and grains of sand are not inte-
gers assigned to cells. It should be of no surprise that, again, I think this is because
they constructed a model that represents a sandpile.
In each of these examples scientists used a model to represent a system in the world,
what I call a ‘target system’. These are not isolated cases. In general, models play a
central role in contemporary science. Scientists construct models of elementary par-
ticles, molecules, biological populations, individual decision makers, and economies.
These models are used to build particle colliders and bridges, to synthesise medicines,
7 The fact that they obey a power law turns out to be a hallmark of SOC states.
8 See Bak (1996, Chapters 3,4) for discussions of actual experiments inspired by the model.
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and set government budgets. Models are studied in order to gain knowledge and
understanding about the parts, or features, of the world that they represent. If we
are to understand how models are used to learn about the world, then we need to
understand how they come to represent. This is the central question that I address in
this thesis: in virtue of what do scientific models represent their target systems?
1.1 motivations
1.1.1 Why models matter
Philosophers of science didn’t use to think that models were important units of sci-
ence. The so-called ‘received’, or ‘syntactic’, view of scientific theories took theories
to be linguistic entities, usually formalised in a predicate logic, which represent the
world linguistically. Predicates refer to physical properties (or sets of entities in their
extensions), particular entities are named, and sentences are constructed which can
be either true or false depending on the nature of the world. The positivists who
subscribed to this view under-emphasised the importance of models, and where they
were discussed, assigned them a heuristic role at best. Carnap claimed that ‘the dis-
covery of a model has no more than an aesthetic or didactic or at best heuristic value,
but it is not at all essential for a successful application of the physical theory’ (1938,
210), and Hempel remarked that ‘all reference to analogies or analogical models can
be dispensed with in the systematic statement of scientific explanations’ (1965, 440).
Things started changing in the 1960s. Starting with the work of Suppes (1969a,b,
2002), and followed by van Fraassen (1980, 1989, 2008) and Suppe (1989), along with
Giere (1988), Lloyd (1994), Da Costa and French (1990, 2003), French and Ladyman
(1997), and others, the so-called ‘semantic’ view of theories emerged as the dominant
position in the philosophy of science. Rather than construing scientific theories as sets
of sentences, adherents to the semantic view urge us to treat them as collections of
models instead. And although the supporters of the semantic view held, and continue
to hold, various different accounts of the precise nature of the models (many of which
are detailed in Part ii of this thesis), what they have in common is a rejection of the
idea that scientific representation is a linguistic matter. At their heart, scientific theories
are taken to be collections of objects – mathematical structures; state or phase spaces;
abstract entities; and so on – that represent the world, rather than names, predicates,
words, and sentences, in formal (or informal) languages.
Independently of the semantic view, philosophers have emphasised the role that
models play in scientific practice. Originating from the likes of Black (1962), Hesse
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(1963), and Achinstein (1968), through Cartwright (1983, 1999), Cartwright et al. (1995),
and delivering the ‘models as mediators’ view subscribed to, in various forms, by
the contributors to Morgan and Morrison (1999), philosophers of science who find
‘rational reconstructions’ distasteful have pointed out that the practice of science is full
of scientists using models to represent specific parts of the world. Linguistic theories
might provide general laws, or principles, that govern the natural world, but in order
to represent anything specific, be it the fall of a banknote from the top of St Stephen’s
Cathedral or the behaviour of quarks inside a Baryon, scientists construct models. If
philosophers of science are to take the practice of science seriously, then they best
account for how models represent. On the models as mediators view, theories are not
to be identified with collections of these models, nor eschewed altogether in favour
of them. Rather, models are taken to ‘mediate’ between abstract theories and target
systems.
The models as mediators view is the most prominent alternative to the semantic
view of theories. But despite their differences, both accounts share an commitment to
models being, if not the only, then at least a central, way in which science represents
the world. And again, despite the differences in what models are taken to be, they are
primarily seen as non-linguistic. This raises a question. Whereas the positivists could
appeal to work in the philosophy of language (and logic) to provide an account of how
sentences represent – in terms of denotation, reference, satisfaction, truth, and so on
– these do not straightforwardly carry over to explain the representational capacity of
models. This is the primary motivation for this thesis. If science represents via models,
then how do models represent? An answer to this question has to be given if either of
the views outlined above are to be at all viable.
1.1.2 Realism vs. anti-realism
I think that philosophers in general should be interested in how models represent.
Philosophers of language have spent decades arguing about how words represent;
philosophers of mind focused on mental states for at least as long; and aestheticians
have investigated the nature of representation in art for thousands of years. Scientific
models are just another kind of thing that we use to represent the external world. They,
along with related representations like maps, diagrams, and graphs, deserve the same
attention philosophers have given to names, sentences, mental states, and works of
art.
For those not convinced, there are also reasons internal to the philosophy of sci-
ence that motivate why the question of scientific representation needs answering. The
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standard definition of scientific realism is split into three separate theses (Psillos, 1999;
Chakravartty, 2015):
metaphysical : The world exists, organised in a certain way, mind independently.
semantic : Our scientific theories are to be interpreted at face value as truth condi-
tioned descriptions of the world.
epistemic : Mature and predicatively successful theories are approximately true.
The metaphysical thesis makes no reference to what science provides as representa-
tions of the world. According to the semantic thesis, scientific theories are ‘truth-
conditioned descriptions’, and if the epistemic thesis is correct, these descriptions are
true. Such a definition of scientific realism inherits from the syntactic view the idea
that scientific theories are linguistic entities, since it is linguistic entities that have truth
conditions, and are the sorts of things that can be true. Of course what it means for a
sentence to be true is a question that deserves addressing.9 But by and large, philoso-
phers of science can push this question off to philosophers of language, or engage
in philosophy of language themselves if they prefer to provide an account of scien-
tific truth that diverges from the everyday notion of truth applied to non-scientific
statements.
But models are not descriptions, at least in any straightforward manner. Nor are
they obviously the sorts of things that can be true or false. So as it stands, the semantic
and epistemological theses of scientific realism are simply inapplicable to models. This
leaves us with three options. Option one is to define realism solely in terms of scientific
theories, and construe theories linguistically, ignoring what it would mean to adopt a
realist or anti-realist stance towards models. Option two is to provide an account of
scientific models according to which they are truth-apt descriptions when interpreted
at face value. Option three is to reinterpret scientific realism in such a way as to make
it applicable to models, without taking them as truth-apt.
Given the discussions in the previous section, I don’t think the first approach is
satisfactory. Even if theories should be construed linguistically, models remain impor-
tant representational units of science, and so a definition of realism that remains quiet
about them is not a fully general account. Both of the latter two approaches are viable
options. The account of scientific representation I provide in Part iii does not take
models themselves to be truth-apt, and as such I don’t think that the second option
is the right way to think about scientific realism. Indeed the majority of philosophers
working on modelling accept that, strictly speaking, models are not the sorts of things
9 Should we subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth for scientific statements? A deflationary theory?
Something else entirely? Related questions are discussed in Chapter 8.
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that can be true or false, even though they might ‘tell’ us things about the world.10 So
my preference is for the third option: to provide a general account of realism that does
not make reference to the notion of truth, or of a description.
What would such an account look like? The following is a naı¨ve first attempt:
metaphysical : The world exists, organised in a certain way, mind independently.
semantic : Our scientific models are to be interpreted at face value as more or less
accurate representations of the world.
epistemic : Mature and predicatively successful models are approximately accurate.
With the exception of some remarks about the ‘structure’ of the world in Chapter 6,
I have little to say about the metaphysical thesis. Similarly, although I discuss the
question of when models are accurate representations at various points throughout
this thesis, as I argue in Section 1.3, before investigating what it means for a model
to be an accurate representation of its target system, we have to understand how they
represent their target systems in the first place. So in order to understand the semantic
and epistemic thesis of realism in the context of model-based science, we need to get
clear about in virtue of what scientific models represent their target systems. This is a
primary motivation of this thesis. For want of space I cannot develop a definition of
realism as applied to scientific models here, but my hope is that the account I provide
will clear the ground for further research in this area. What is important to remember
is that, without an account of scientific representation, we do not have a clear grasp
of what the scientific realism/anti-realism distinction amounts to in the context of
model-based science. And as such, I would expect philosophers of science to see the
motivation for addressing the question.
1.2 outline and methodology
1.2.1 Outline
The thesis is split into three parts. Part i is composed of two chapters. In Chapter 1 I
situate the question of scientific representation in the broader philosophical landscape.
I also disentangle a number of issues that are twisted together in the literature on
scientific representation. The result is a number of questions and key desiderata that
any successful account should answer and meet. These provide a novel lens through
which to investigate scientific representation, broadly construed, and serve to provide
10 An exception is Ma¨ki (2011) who argues that models can be truth-valued. I discuss his views in further
detail in Chapter 4.
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the conceptual framework on which this thesis rests. In Chapter 2 I argue that, contra
Callender and Cohen (2006), there is a special problem of scientific representation, and
that it cannot be easily answered by a blunt appeal to the intentions of model users.
Part ii of this thesis is a detailed investigation into the accounts of scientific represen-
tation currently available in the literature. In Chapter 4 I address the time-honoured
view that models represent in virtue of being similar to their targets (a view associated
with Giere (1988, 2004, 2010), Ma¨ki (2009), and Weisberg (2013) amongst others). In
Chapter 5 I consider a popular version of this view that specifies the similarity in terms
of structural properties of models and their targets (a view associated with Da Costa
and French (1990), French (2003), French and Ladyman (1997, 1999), Suppe (1989), Sup-
pes (1969a), and van Fraassen (1980, 2008) amongst others). In Chapter 6 I address the
metaphysical question concerning ‘the structure’ of the world. Both the similarity and
structuralist views take seriously the idea that scientific models are ‘model-systems’
in their own right, in the sense that they mediate our understanding of our target
systems. In Chapter 7 I investigate an opposing view that takes the descriptions and
equations that are used to present scientific models to directly represent their target
systems instead (Levy, 2015; Toon, 2010a, 2012). Finally, in Chapter 8 I address the
family of accounts that are closest to my own (Contessa, 2007; Frigg, 2010a; Hughes,
1997; Sua´rez, 2004, 2015). Such accounts emphasise the inferential role that models
play in generating predictions and hypotheses about their target systems. But in order
to understand how this role relates to their representational status, it is necessary to
address much broader philosophical questions concerning the relationship between
representation and inference in general.
Part iii is devoted to a positive proposal concerning the nature of scientific represen-
tation. In Chapter 9 I develop Goodman’s (1976) and Elgin’s (1983; 1996; 2009; 2010)
account of pictorial representation in the scientific framework. The result is what I call
the DEKI account of scientific representation. Models are interpreted in the appropriate
manner. They denote their target systems and exemplify certain features which may
then be translated by a model key into features to be imputed onto their target systems.
The result is a highly conventional account of scientific representation which operates
at the appropriate level of generality to capture all of its instances, whilst remaining
informative about the notion. In Chapter 10 I further illustrate how the account works
and analyse it through the conceptual lens provided earlier in the thesis. Finally, in
Chapter 11 I offer some concluding remarks.
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1.2.2 Methodology
To set the tone for the rest of this thesis, it’s useful to outline the philosophical method-
ology I use to approach the question of scientific representation. The way I see it, sci-
entific representation is a sub-species of representation in general. Just as sentences,
propositions, names, mental states, works of art, photographs, and maps represent
states of affairs, name-bearers, subjects, or terrains, scientific models represent their
target systems (although perhaps they do so in a somewhat different manner). And
if philosophers of science are to get to grips with scientific representation, then they
should draw on the rich tradition of investigating the nature of representation in other
domains.
Such a view is, perhaps, not very fashionable these days. Compared to the 20th
Century, contemporary philosophy of science has distanced itself from other areas of
philosophy, the philosophy of language in particular. This is, in some sense, a good
thing. It has allowed philosophers of science to get to grips with the complex philo-
sophical issues facing practising scientists without worrying too much about what
some might call ‘philosophical navel gazing’. And it has instilled a healthy respect in
its practitioners for an understanding of science that goes beyond using toy examples
to illustrate seemingly substantial claims about the nature of the natural world.
But at the same time there is the danger of getting so focused on the messy details
of science that the philosophical questions are lost. This is especially pertinent here,
given that the questions I am addressing in this thesis are stated at such a level of
generality that they cross scientific fields. As such, the examples I use to illustrate
various positions are drawn from diverse areas of science, and are simple enough to
be accessible to an educated layperson. This is not work on the philosophy of any
particular science, but rather one in the general philosophy of science.
Moreover, it is a firmly philosophical work rather than a case-study driven inves-
tigation of scientific practice. And as such I draw heavily throughout on works in
aesthetics investigating the nature of pictorial representation and, to a lesser extent,
work in the philosophy of language investigating the nature of denotation (or refer-
ence) and truth. I come at the question of scientific representation in the same way
that others have come at the question of ‘how does a picture represent its subject?’ or
‘how does a name denote its bearer?’. My hope is that the result is a piece of work
that addresses a fundamental question about how we represent the world in a philo-
sophically sophisticated manner, and at the same time pays due respect to practising
science.
In addition to this broad philosophical approach, throughout this thesis I take a
specific attitude on how to address questions surrounding scientific models. Many
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discussions of models focus primarily on their ontology (see, for example Frigg (2010b)
and the views I discuss in Chapter 7): what is a harmonic oscillator? What is an
infinitely large population of interbreeding rabbits? In general, what are these models
that, as Hacking (1983, 216) elegantly puts it, we hold ‘in our heads rather than our
hands’? And then only once an answer to this question has been provided does the
question of scientific representation get addressed.
My approach is the opposite. My primary interest is in the semantic, or epistemo-
logical questions, that arise for scientific models. I want to figure out in virtue of what
they represent, and how they can be used to learn about the world. This is not to
say that the ontological question is ignored entirely. Indeed as I argue in the next
section, various accounts of scientific representation constrain, at least to some extent,
what sorts of entities models must be. For example, if one thinks that models repre-
sent their targets in virtue of being isomorphic to them, then it better be the case that
scientific models are the sorts of things that can enter into isomorphisms in the first
place. However, it is not the case that an account of scientific representation needs to
fully determine the ontology of models. As I suggest in Chapter 10, the account that
I provide in this thesis is compatible with multiple different ontological accounts of
scientific models. Although I think the ontological questions are interesting in their
own right, they are not my primary focus here.
Finally, I do not wish to claim that all models are representations – in fact the ac-
count of scientific representation I offer in Part iii is explicitly designed to account for
models without target systems – nor that representation is the only function of mod-
els. Various authors working on the topic of scientific modelling have emphasised that
models play a variety of different roles. Knuuttila (2005) points out that the epistemic
value of models is not limited to their representational function and develops an ac-
count that views models as epistemic artifacts which allow us to gather knowledge
in diverse ways; Hartmann (1995) discusses the role that models play in the develop-
ment of theories; Peschard (2011) investigates the way in which models may be used
to construct other models and generate new target systems; and Bokulich (2009) and
Kennedy (2012) present non-representational accounts of model explanation (although
see Reiss (2012) and Woody (2004) for more general discussions about the relationship
between representation and explanation). My premise is the more modest one: at least
some models represent their target systems, and these representational relationships
play some role in how we learn about the world. I do not think that either of these
claims are controversial, nor that they conflict with the aforementioned discussions.
Moreover, I am not addressing everything that could be called ‘scientific represen-
tation’. Scientists represent the world with models, but they might also do so with
graphs and diagrams (see Perini (2005a,b, 2010) for discussions of this sort of rep-
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resentation); with tree rings and disease symptoms, or more generally things like
thermometer readings and litmus paper colours which are usually described as mea-
surements rather than models (see Tal (2015) for an introduction to measurement);
and indeed, if one does not want to identify theories with models, then with scientific
theories as well (see Winther (2015) for an introduction to the structure of scientific
theories). With the exception of the discussion of scientific data in Chapter 6, I have
little to say about these other forms of representation. And thus my use of the term
‘scientific representation’ is something of a misnomer. ‘Model representation’ would
be more accurate, but I sacrifice accuracy for style and follow the literature in using
the former phrase instead. As long as the reader keeps in mind that my focus is on
how models represent, I do not think any confusion will arise.
1.3 conceptual framework
Models represent their target systems, a part, or feature, of the world. My primary
interest in this thesis is in what makes this the case. In virtue of what do scientific
models represent their target systems? This is what Frigg calls ‘the enigma of repre-
sentation’ (2006, 50) and Sua´rez calls the ‘constitutional question’ (2003, 230; 2010, 93;
2015, 38) concerning scientific representation. To get to grips with this problem it’s
useful to consider the same problem in the context of pictorial representation. When
seeing Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign poster, designed by Shepard Fairey, we
immediately recognise that it depicts a man in a suit and tie. Why is this? Per se the
poster is just ink distributed across a rectangular sheet of paper, or, if viewed on a
computer screen, a collection of pixels. How does this come to represent something
else, something external to itself?
Similarly, consider the Phillips-Newlyn machine, a collection of pipes, reservoirs,
and valves through which water is pumped. Guatemalan economists were able to
manipulate the machine in order to generate a prediction about what would happen
to the economy if there was a decrease in foreign investment into the country. But how
could a change in water levels in one of the machine’s reservoirs represent what was
going on in the Guatemalan economy? How did the machine come to represent the
economy, something external to itself?
Likewise, before being representations of particles, molecules, chemical reactions,
and populations, models are equations, mathematical structures, fictional scenarios, or
material objects in their own right. The problem then, is what turns these entities into
11 Available here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Barack_Obama_Hope_poster.jpg#/media/File:
Barack_Obama_Hope_poster.jpg.
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Figure 5: Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign poster (Fairey)11
representations of something beyond themselves? It’s customary to phrase questions
like this in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and I adopt this approach in
this thesis. However, such a philosophical approach to analysing concepts has had
some bad press in recent years (see Laurence and Margolis (1999) for an overview), so
it’s worth briefly defending it here. I phrase the question of scientific representation
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for three reasons.
Firstly, with the notable exceptions of van Fraassen (2008), Hughes (1997) and Sua´rez
(2004, 2015), whose views are discussed with reference to this approach in Chapters 6
and 8, the majority of philosophers working on the topic have adopted this practice.
Thus, for ease of presentation of their views in Part ii, adopting the same framework
proves useful.
Secondly, the standard arguments against such an approach is that concepts are, in
some sense ‘fuzzy’. Should we classify the offspring of a tiger and a lion as falling
under the extension of our concept of tigers, or lions, or both? It’s not clear. But if
these concepts can be strictly delineated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions,
then there is a fact of the matter about this, and this seems to conflict with how we
think about the world. However, at least when it comes to scientific representation, I
am not too interested in the boundary cases. Even with respect to clear instances of
things that fall under the concept of scientific representation – a Newtonian model of
the celestial orbits, the Phillips-Newlyn machine, ball-and-stick models of molecules –
we do not have a clear answer to in virtue of what they represent their target systems.
These central instances are the focus of my analysis here. Once we understand how
1.3 conceptual framework 26
they represent, then we can start worrying about whether the necessary and sufficient
condition approach is too strict.
Thirdly, and relatedly, I think framing the question in this way is pragmatically
justified. Even if it turns out that analysing the concept of scientific representation like
this is misguided, this does not imply that it has no value whatsoever. Perhaps the
concept of knowledge does not admit necessary and sufficient conditions. But this is
not to say that attempts to provide them have told us nothing about it. We have learnt
much about the nature of belief justification from exploring Gettier cases and the like.
Moreover, the approach has the significant benefit of adding precision to the way we
think about the concept, at least in the first instance.
With this in mind, the central question concerning scientific representation is the
following: what fills in the blank on the right-hand-side of the following biconditional:
a model M represents a target system T if and only if (cf. Frigg, 2003, 14)? For
reasons that will become clear soon, I call this the Epistemic Representation Question, or
ER-Question for short. By and large I remain silent about the scope of T. I understand
the phrase ‘target system’ liberally to include parts of the world that models repre-
sent, including, but not limited to, particular objects, features, events, mechanisms,
processes, states, and states of affairs. However, in answering the ER-question I also
provide an account of what turns an object (mathematical structure, fictional scenario,
material object and so on) into a model.
What conditions of adequacy must any answer to this question meet? I think the
most important one is the following. Models allow us to (attempt to) learn about their
target systems; they are, in some sense, informative about them. This is not to say that
everything we learn from a model must be true, indeed as discussed below, models
frequently provide us with false hypotheses about their targets, but they at least allow
for the possibility of learning. They provide us with hypotheses, which may be right
or wrong, about what their target systems are like, what features their target systems
do, or do not possess.12
Swoyer (1991) introduced the phrase ‘surrogative reasoning’ to describe this aspect
of using scientific models, and – with the notable exception of Callender and Cohen
(2006) whose views are discussed in the next section – there is widespread agreement
on this point. Bailer-Jones emphasises that models ‘tell us something about certain fea-
tures of the world’ (2003, 59, original emphasis); Bolinska (2013) and Contessa (2007)
both call models ‘epistemic representations’; (Frigg, 2006, 51) sees the potential for
learning as an essential explanandum for any theory of representation; Liu (2013) em-
phasises that the main role for models in science and technology is epistemic; Morgan
12 By ‘hypotheses’, I mean any claim about the target system, not just observable predictions.
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and Morrison take models to be ‘investigative tools’ (1999, 11); Sua´rez (2003, 2004,
2015) submits that models licence specific inferences about their targets; and Weis-
berg (2013, 150) observes that the ‘model-world relation is the relationship in virtue of
which studying a model can tell us something about the nature of a target system’. As
such, since this aspect of modelling is so tightly linked to their representational ability,
I take it that any acceptable answer to the ER-question must account for the possibil-
ity of using models to learn about their targets. I call this the Surrogative Reasoning
Condition.
This immediately poses an additional problem. Although models can be used to
learn about their targets, they are far from unique in this respect. A picture provides
us with information about its subject: Barack Obama wears a suit, for example. Sim-
ilarly a map allows us to generate hypotheses about its target terrain: the distance
between Brixton and King’s Cross is less than 6 miles, the A1 connects Newcastle and
London, and so on. In general many kinds of representation provide us epistemic
access to their targets or subjects, despite not being reasonably classed as ‘models’,
and hence it would not be surprising if conditions which satisfied the learning condi-
tion apply to these sorts of representations as well. This is a problem for an analysis
of scientific representation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions because if
something that is not prima facie a model (for instance a map or a photograph) satis-
fies the conditions, then one either has to conclude that the account fails because it
does not provide sufficient conditions, or that first impressions are wrong and other
representations (such as maps or photographs) are in fact scientific representations.
Neither of these options are particularly appealing, and for this reason I broaden my
scope from the representation relationship that holds between models (proper) and
their targets, to what Contessa (2007) calls ‘epistemic representation’. The ER-problem
then, is what are the necessary and sufficient conditions on things like models, maps,
photographs, and pictures, representing their targets and subjects. In my thesis I
primarily restrict my focus to scientific models, but it is an interesting further question
to what extent the accounts discussed and proposed apply to these other kinds of
epistemic representations.
My view, which I don’t argue for here, is that by and large they do. But this invites
a further question: can scientific models be demarcated from other epistemic rep-
resentations, and if so, how? For obvious reasons, I call this the Demarcation Problem.
Callender and Cohen (2006, 69, 83) raise this problem and then immediately raise scep-
tical doubts about our ability to answer it. By and large, in the literature on scientific
representation, authors commonly provide examples, such as maps (Contessa, 2007;
Frigg, 2010b) and pictures (Elgin, 2010; French, 2003; Frigg, 2006; Sua´rez, 2004; van
Fraassen, 2008) to illustrate their approach. This implicitly suggests that they either
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haven’t considered the question, or that they share Callender and Cohen’s scepticism
that it can be answered. But this is by no means a neutral position, and as such, it
deserves to be made explicit whether such accounts entail that scientific models can
be demarcated from other epistemic representations. I do this throughout Part ii. And,
following the aforementioned authors, I draw on similar examples of non-scientific
epistemic representations to illustrate my own preferred account in Part iii.
Even if there is no sharp line between scientific and non-scientific epistemic repre-
sentations, it is clear that even for paradigmatic examples of scientific models, not all
of them represent their target systems in the same way. In the case of visual represen-
tations this is clear: an Egyptian mural, a two-point perspective ink drawing, a stylised
stencil portrait, an architectural plan, and a tube map represent their respective targets
in different ways. This pluralism is not limited to visual representations. Not all model
representations seem to be of the same kind either. Woody (2004) argues that chem-
istry as a discipline has its own ways to represent molecules, and this is very different
to the way that physicists represent them (using Schro¨dinger’s equation or approxima-
tions thereof). Differences in style can also appear in models from the same discipline.
As Frigg (2006, 50) points out, Weizsa¨cker’s liquid drop model represents the nucleus
of an atom in a different manner to the Bohr model. A scale model of a ship in a tank
seems to represents an actual ship in a way that is different from how a mathematical
fluid dynamical model does. Or the Phillips-Newlyn machine and Hicks’ IS-LM equa-
tions both represent economies, but they do so in very different ways. Following Frigg
(2006, 50) I call this the Problem of Style.13 I take it that categorising scientific models
by style, like categorising pictures, is rather fluid. Different styles may come into ex-
istence as scientific fields grow and develop. As such, I doubt that an exhaustive list
of clearly defined styles can be given. However, this is not to say that nothing can be
said about how models that clearly represent their respective targets in diverse ways
differ with respect to their style. The aforementioned discussion demands some im-
portant caveats about how I have phrased the ER-problem. I want to be clear that the
phrasing in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions does not demand that epis-
temic representation is, in any sense, a homogeneous concept. The conditions given
can be disjunctive, which would allow for multiple styles to have their own particular
conditions. Or stated at a level of generality that models in different styles can satisfy
them in different ways (by satisfying different, more concrete, conditions for example).
Or, if one were to take a strong stance on the demarcation condition, the ER-problem
would be answered by providing different sets of conditions for scientific and non-
scientific representation, without discussing what they have in common (essentially
13 Sua´rez (2003, 231-232) uses this observation as an argument – which he calls the ‘argument from variety’
– against various answers to the ER-problem.
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separating the ER-problem into two distinct problems). I would count all of these as
satisfactory answers to the problem, and as such asking it in this way does not build
in any substantial requirements.
The next important problem associated with the topic of scientific representation
concerns in virtue of what they are accurate representations of their target systems.
Even if it is established that a model represents its target, there is an additional ques-
tion regarding whether it does so accurately.14 I call this the problem of specifying
the Standards of Accuracy. In principle, answering the ER-problem might not entail
anything about how these are to be specified. However, many of the accounts of sci-
entific representation discussed in Part ii are highly ambiguous between answering
the ER-problem, and providing standards of accuracy on preexisting representational
relationships between models and their targets. As is shown there, it is important to
untangle these two questions, if we are to provide a clear account of scientific repre-
sentation.
The problem goes hand in hand with another desideratum on a successful answer
to the ER-problem. Any specification of in virtue of what scientific models represent
their target systems should allow for the Possibility of Misrepresentation. One motiva-
tion for this condition is clear: look at the history of science for examples of models
that misrepresent their target systems. Thomson’s plum pudding model of the atom
represents atoms, but does so inaccurately: it represents the positive charge of an atom
as uniformly ‘smeared out’, rather than concentrated in the atomic nucleus. But in or-
der for the model to inaccurately represent the atom, it has to represent it in the first
place. In general, for a model to be a misrepresentation – i.e. to represent its target
inaccurately – it has to represent it in the first place.
A second motivation for this condition is more conceptual. In discussions of rep-
resentation in other fields of philosophy, it is often made explicit that any account of,
say, linguistic, mental, or even genetic representation has to allow for the possibility of
misrepresentation. Fodor’s (1990) ‘disjunction problem’ charged at informational or
teleosemantic accounts of mental content explicitly relies on the fact that any account
of belief has to allow for the possibility of false beliefs. Plausibly, the same requirement
is used by the later Wittgenstein when he argues against the possibly of a private lan-
guage (Wittgenstein 1953; cf. Kenny, 1973/2006, 141-159). In order for a term ‘S’ to
name a sensation, there must be some standards under which it is appropriate for the
speaker to use the term ‘S’. Since these standards don’t exist in the case of a private lan-
14 To avoid confusion further down the line, it’s worth noting that an answer to this question may make
reference to the purposes of the model user in the modelling context, and that, at least as I use the notion,
accuracy of scientific representation, unlike representation itself, might be the sort of thing that admits a
degree.
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guage – in order to ascertain whether they are met they are compared to the memory
of the sensation, i.e. the memory of the meaning of ‘S’ which is ‘as if someone were to
buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true’
(Wittgenstein, 1953, 265) – Wittgenstein concludes that such a language cannot exist.
But in invoking these standards the possibility of a term being applied inappropriately
is clearly relied upon. Again, in order to represent the sensation, it must be the case
that ‘S’ can misrepresent it.
For reasons related to these arguments it is now common to explicitly require that
any account of representation allow for the possibility of misrepresentation. For exam-
ple, Stich and Warfield (1994, 6-7) demand that any account of mental representation
allow for this, and in their discussion of the ‘genetic code’ Sterelny and Griffiths (1999,
104) require that any account of the representational capacity of genes allow for the
possibility that they misrepresent the phenotype that they eventually generate. Since
I see no reason why these considerations do not apply in the case of scientific rep-
resentation as well, I take it that any answer to the ER-problem must allow for the
possibility of a model misrepresenting its target.15
A further issue tied up with the question of scientific representation stems from the
highly mathematical nature of many (if not most) scientific models. Even if they are
not purely mathematical entities – whether that means they should not be identified
with syntactic equations or mathematical structures – their mathematical aspects seem
to directly contribute to their representational capacity. As such, when investigating
how they represent their target systems, we run up against what Wigner called the ‘un-
reasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences’; namely the questions
of how mathematics applies to the physical world, and why it is so successful. These
questions, in the context of this thesis, amount to the questions of how mathematical
models represent their target systems, and how they do so accurately.
Surprisingly, with the exception of Bueno and Colyvan (2011) and Pincock (2012),
there has been little attempt to bridge the gap between the literature on the appli-
cability of mathematics and discussions of scientific representation. This should be
rectified, and in this thesis I hope to make at least a modest attempt to do so. In
Part ii I explain how the existing accounts of the latter explain the applicability of
mathematics, and in Part iii I offer some suggestions about how my account could be
used to help understand how mathematics applies to the world. Of course, I do not
expect that an account to the ER-problem will fully solve Wigner’s puzzle. Indeed
as I outline in Part iii, it turns out that there are various ways of accommodating the
15 This approach of sharply distinguishing between the question of in virtue of what models represent their
targets, and in virtue of what they do so accurately, is also found in Sua´rez (2004); Contessa (2007); and
Frigg (2006, 2010a). For a dissenting voice see Bolinska (2015).
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mathematical nature of scientific models in my account of scientific representation,
and narrowing down which of these ways serves to provide the ‘correct’ account of
how mathematics applies to the real world is not something I can do in this thesis.
Nevertheless, I do expect that any successful account of scientific representation will,
at the very least, account for mathematical models in such a way as to help explain
how their mathematical aspects contribute to their representational capacities. I call
this the Applicability of Mathematics condition.
Finally, and relatedly, in answering all of the above questions, it is clear that any
account of scientific representation will run up against the question of what models
are, ontologically speaking. Are they equations, structures (and if so, set theoretical,
group theoretical, category theoretical, or what?), fictional scenarios, abstract objects,
descriptions, or something else entirely? I call this the Problem of Ontology. While
some authors develop an ontology of models, the accounts discussed, and ultimately
rejected, in Chapter 7 abandon an understanding of models as ‘things’ and push a
programme that can be summed up in the slogan ‘modelling without models’ (Levy,
2015). As noted in the previous subsection, many philosophers of science working on
the question begin by investigating their ontology before moving onto the problems
discussed in this section. My approach is the opposite. But this is not to say that I
remain silent on the ontological questions entirely. In Part ii I point out that many
of the existing answers to the ER-problem place heavy constraints on the ontology of
(specifically non-physical) scientific models. They don’t, however, uniquely determine
this ontology. This is also the case for my own positive proposal, and in Part iii I
explicate how it is compatible with what I take to be the most plausible answers to the
ontological problem.
To sum up, I have argued that the following questions surrounding the question of
scientific representation should be carefully distinguished:
er-problem : Provide necessary and sufficient conditions of a model representing its
target.
demarcation problem : Demarcate scientific models from other epistemic repre-
sentations (or motivate why they should not be so demarcated).
problem of style : Account for the fact that different scientific models seem to rep-
resent their targets in different ways.
standards of accuracy : Provide standards of accurate epistemic representation.
problem of ontology : Help us understand what (specifically non-physical) mod-
els are, ontologically speaking.
Moreover, any successful account of scientific representation (in particular, an an-
swer to the ER-problem) should meet the following conditions:
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surrogative reasoning condition : Account for the fact that models, and epis-
temic representations more generally, can be used to attempt to learn about their
targets.
possibility of misrepresentation : Allow for the fact that a model may misrep-
resent its target system, i.e. represent it inaccurately.
applicability of mathematics : Help us understand how mathematical models
represent their target systems.
I do not claim that these problems and conditions should be addressed in order,
nor that they are independent of one another. Rather, I think that by distinguish-
ing between them, we arrive at a standpoint from which ‘the question’ of scientific
representation can be considered more carefully. Together, these problems and condi-
tions provide my theoretical framework with which to critically address the existing
accounts of scientific representation (Part ii), and moreover, I take as a significant at-
tribute of my own account that it clearly distinguishes between each of these problems,
and meets each of the conditions (Part iii).
2
I S T H E R E A S P E C I A L P R O B L E M O F S C I E N T I F I C
R E P R E S E N TAT I O N ?
Before addressing the more substantial accounts of scientific representation, it’s worth
first discussing Callender and Cohen’s claim that ‘there is no special problem about
scientific representation’ (2006, 67). After all, if this is the case there would be little
point in this thesis, or at the very least, it would not be a work in the philosophy of
science. Their argument comes in two parts. Firstly, they claim that scientific repre-
sentation is not different from ‘artistic, linguistic, and culinary representation’ (2006,
67), and that the representational capacities of all of these types of representation, in-
cluding scientific models, is ‘derivative from the representational status of a privileged
core of representations’ (2006, 70). They call this position ‘General Griceanism’. The
second part of their argument concerns how to account for the capacities of the deriva-
tive representations in terms of the core representations. The answer that they suggest
is that it suffices to stipulate that a derivative representation represents its target. I
address each of these claims in order.
2.1 general griceanism
Callender and Cohen characterise General Griceanism as follows:
‘The General Gricean holds that, among the many sorts of representational
entities (cars, cakes, equations, etc.), the representational status of most of
them is derivative from the representational status of a privileged core of
representations. The advertised benefit of this General Gricean approach
to representation is that we won’t need separate theories to account for
artistic, linguistic, representation [sic], and culinary representation; instead,
the General Gricean proposes that all these types of representation can be
explained (in a unified way) as deriving from some more fundamental sorts
of representations, which are typically taken to be mental states. (Of course,
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this view requires an independently constituted theory of representation
for the fundamental entities.)’ (2006, 70).
And since they group scientific models in the class of non-fundamental representa-
tions, this amounts to explaining scientific representation in two stages. Firstly, to
explain how scientific representation can be reduced (in some sense) to the more fun-
damental type of representation, and secondly, to provide an account of how the more
fundamental type works. According to them:
‘of these stages [...] most of the philosophical action lies at the second. The
first stage amounts to a relatively trivial trade of one problem for another:
you thought you had a problem of representation for linguistic tokens (or
whatever you take to be derivative representations)? Exchange it for a
problem of representation for mental states (of whatever you take to be
fundamental representations). This trade, in effect, just pushes back the
problem of representation by a single step. The second stage, in contrast,
amounts to a fairly deep metaphysical mystery.’ (2006, 73, emphasis added).
The outcome of this, at least from the perspective of philosophers of science interested
in the ER-problem, is that they can push any substantial answer to the question off
onto philosophers of mind (or philosophers, or scientists, working on whatever the
fundamental type of representation is taken to be).
I think there is an element of truth in General Griceanism. But at least as Callender
and Cohen state it, it does not suffice to either answer the ER-problem, or to dismiss it
as a significant problem. Let’s start with what we agree on. For the sake of argument,
I grant that, fundamentally, there is a privileged class of representations – mental
states perhaps – and that things like scientific models and epistemic representations
more generally gain their representational status at least in part in virtue of their
relationship with elements in this class. As I discuss in Part ii many of the more
developed answers to the ER-problem invoke the intentions of model users as playing
a vital role in establishing that models represent their targets.
But, even if one accepts that in order to explain how models represent their targets
we must invoke more fundamental representational entities, it does not follow, as
Callender and Cohen assert, that this explanation will be the same as the explanation
of how artistic, linguistic, or culinary representation derives from the privileged core of
representation. In fact, if one thought that the demarcation problem could be answered
in the positive – that scientific epistemic representation is fundamentally different from
non-scientific epistemic representation – then they may be tempted to account for this
difference precisely in what establishes their representational capacities.
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With respect to the demarcation problem, Callender and Cohen state:
‘We are not optimistic about solving [the demarcation] problem. And we
think it a virtue of our account that it allows one to see clearly that the
demarcation problem for representation just is an instance of the general
demarcation problem concerning the difference between science and non-
science’ (2006, 83).
Although this might be a virtue in one sense, it is a vice in the sense that it rules
out the approach outlined above. I’m not saying that this approach is the correct one;
rather, it bears noting that Callender and Cohen’s point is not entailed by a more mod-
estly stated version of General Griceanism. Just because the representational capacity
of non-fundamental representations depends on a privileged class of representations,
nothing is entailed about the nature of this reliance, nor that it is the same across
different types of non-fundamental representation.
Most importantly, the modest version of General Griceanism I accept certainly does
not entail that explaining the representational capacities of models in terms of more
fundamental representations amounts to a ‘relatively trivial trade of one problem
for another’. That there has to be some relationship between fundamental and non-
fundamental representations does not mean that this relationship can be trivially iden-
tified. The only reason that Callender and Cohen supply for why this might be the
case is that their preferred explanation of the relationship is a simple one: in order
for a non-fundamental representation to represent its subject or target, it suffices that
someone simply stipulate that this is the case. I call this position ‘Stipulative Fiat’.
2.2 stipulative fiat
Callender and Cohen claim that:
‘Can the salt shaker on the dinner table represent Madagascar? Of course it
can, so long as you stipulate that the former represents the latter. [...] Can
your left hand represent the Platonic form of beauty? Of course, so long as
you stipulate that the former represents the latter. [...] On the story we are
telling, then, virtually anything can be stipulated to be a representational
vehicle for the representation of virtually anything [...]; the representational
powers of mental states are so wide-ranging that they can bring about other
representational relations between arbitrary relata by dint of mere stipula-
tion. The upshot is that, once one has paid the admittedly hefty one-time
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fee of supplying a metaphysics of representation for mental states, further
instances of representation become extremely cheap’ (2006, 73-74).
The above quotation contains two important assertions. Firstly, (virtually) anything
can represent (virtually) anything, and secondly, that whenever something does rep-
resent something else, at least in the case of non-fundamental representations, this
is established in virtue of someone stipulating that this is the case. With respect to
the first claim, I agree. Things that function as models don’t do so in virtue of their
ontological status, and it would be a mistake to think that that some objects are, in-
trinsically, representations and other are not. This point has been made by others
too (including Frigg (2010a, 99), Giere (2010, 269), Sua´rez (2004, 773), Swoyer (1991,
452), and Teller (2001, 397)). With respect to the second, this is a significant claim
about how scientific models come to represent their targets. This is their answer to the
ER-problem:
stipulative fiat : A model M represents a target T if and only if a model user
stipulates that M represents T.
If correct, then Callender and Cohen would be justified in their claim that reducing
scientific representation to a more fundamental type of representation amounts to the
relatively trivial trade of one problem for another. But there are at least two signifi-
cant problems with this account. Firstly, it is unclear whether an act of stipulation in
general suffices to establish a representational relationship. Secondly, even if it did,
it’s certainly not the case that the sort of relationship thereby created is the sort of
relationship that holds between epistemic representations and their targets or subjects.
I address both of these concerns in order.
In order to investigate the relationship between stipulation and representation in
general, it is useful to turn to the philosophy of language. The pertinent question
there, is whether stipulation is sufficient to establish that a word or phrase denotes
whatever it denotes, or means whatever it means. In some cases, this seems to be
the case. In order to introduce a name into a language, it can suffice to use it to
‘baptise’ its bearer (Kripke, 1980), or to provide a stipulative definition for what it
means. But the position that stipulation, or the bare intentions of a user, suffice to
establish denotation or meaning in general is a much more controversial claim. It
faces the so-called ‘Humpty Dumpty’ problem, named in reference to Lewis Carroll’s
discussion of Humpty using the word ‘glory’ to mean ‘a nice knockdown argument’
(MacKay 1968 cf. Donnellan 1968). If stipulation is all that matters, then as long as
Humpty simply stipulates that ‘glory’ means ‘a nice knockdown argument’, then it
does so. And this doesn’t seem to be the case. Even if the utterance ‘glory’ could mean
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‘a nice knockdown argument’ – if, for example, Humpty was speaking a different
language – in the case in question it doesn’t, irrespective of Humpty’s stipulation.
In the contemporary philosophy of language the discussion of this problem focuses
more on the denotation of demonstratives and indexicals rather than proper names,
and there are various attempts to prop up existing accounts so as to ensure that a
speaker’s intentions successfully establish the denotation of demonstratives and in-
dexicals uttered by the speaker (Michaelson, 2013). Whatever the success of these
endeavours, their mere existence shows that successfully establishing denotation re-
quires moving beyond a bare appeal to stipulation, or brute intention. But if brute
intention fails to establish the appropriate representational relationships for demon-
stratives and indexicals – the sorts of things that they would seem most applicable
to – then it would suggest that they cannot do the work Stipulative Fiat requires
of them for establishing representational relationships in general. At the very least,
this suggests it needs to be developed if it is to explain how derivative representations
represent in virtue of more fundamental representations like intentions and mental
states.
Even supposing that stipulation were sufficient to establish that a model represents
its target, as an answer to the ER-problem it remains unsatisfactory. In particular, it
fails to meet the surrogative reasoning condition: even if it were the case that the
salt-shaker represented Madagascar in virtue of Callender or Cohen stipulating that
this is the case, this does not explain how the salt-shaker could be used to attempt
to learn about Madagascar. And if the salt-shaker was an epistemic representation
of Madagascar, then this would have to be the case. As Toon (2010a, 78-79) points
out, at best Stipulative Fiat would establish denotational relationships, and these
are weaker than the sort of representational relationship that holds between epistemic
representations and their subjects. The proper name ‘Napoleon’ represents Napoleon
in virtue of denoting him. But it represents Napoleon in a very different way to the
way in which a picture of Napoleon represents Napoleon.16 In the latter case, we can
use the picture to attempt to learn about the French general. In the former case, no
matter how we investigate the word ‘Napoleon’ we will not learn anything we didn’t
already know.
Supporters of Stipulative Fiat could try to mitigate the force of this objection in
two ways. First, they could appeal to additional facts about the object, as well as its
relation to other items, in order to account for surrogative reasoning. For instance, the
salt shaker being to the right of the pepper mill might allow us to infer that Madagas-
16 Bueno and French (2011) gesture in the same direction when they point to Peirce’s distinction between
icon, index and symbol and dismiss Callender and Cohen’s views on grounds that they cannot explain
the obvious differences between different kinds of representations.
2.2 stipulative fiat 38
car is to the east of Mozambique. Moves of this sort, however, invoke (at least tacitly)
a specifiable relation between features of the model and features of the target (simi-
larity, isomorphism, or otherwise), and an invocation of this kind goes beyond mere
stipulation.
Callender and Cohen’s preferred strategy is to push the epistemic aspect of scientific
models into the realm of ‘pragmatics’. It’s clear that Stipulative Fiat makes scientific
representation cheap, so in order to explain why scientists go to so much effort in
constructing scientific models – why bother when they could simply stipulate that the
clock on their desk represents the target system of interest? – Callender and Cohen
accept that different representations can be more or less useful in generating inferences
about their targets. But according to them:
‘the questions about the utility of these representational vehicles are ques-
tions about the pragmatics of things that are representational vehicles, not
questions about their representational status per se’ (2006, 75).
This, in effect, amounts to removing the surrogative reasoning condition from the
desiderata of an account of scientific representation, and as I have argued previously,
this aspect of models is one of the hallmarks of scientific representation, and divorcing
the two should not be done lightly. Models don’t just ‘inform us’ that their targets
have such and such features, they do this precisely by representing their targets as
having those features. It is by representing their targets in a particular manner that
they allow us to reason about their targets.
In order for their argument to go through, Callender and Cohen would first need to
motivate separating surrogative reasoning from the notion of representation – no such
argument is forthcoming in their discussion – and secondly, even if this were the case,
an explanation of surrogative reasoning would still be required. Even if it is related
to ‘pragmatic’ features of models, what these features are, and how they licence infer-
ences from models to targets, remains to be spelt out. Given my previous discussions
about the tight connection between representation and surrogative reasoning, I’m not
optimistic that this could be done without invoking, at least tacitly, the way in which
scientific models represent their targets.
So, to briefly summarise, I have argued that General Griceanism does not entail that
a relatively trivial trade of the question of scientific representation with the question of
how the more fundamental kinds of representations gain their representational capac-
ity. The answer to the ER-problem that they offer – Stipulative Fiat – would make
this trivial, but even if it accounted for some sort of representational relationship be-
tween models and their targets, it is ultimately unsuccessful in explaining the specific
2.2 stipulative fiat 39
kind of relationship that holds between models, and epistemic representations more
generally, and their targets.
Further, assuming that General Griceanism is correct, allowing for the fact that
things like the mental states and intentions of model users play a role in establishing
that a scientific model represents its target, developing an account of representation
that specifies precisely how they do this, and how they do this in such a way that al-
lows us to attempt to learn about targets from their models, is a difficult philosophical
task. And in light of Callender and Cohen’s discussion of the demarcation problem,
even if there is not a special problem of scientific representation, there is a special
problem of epistemic representation that remains to be addressed.
Part II
T H E FA I L U R E O F C U R R E N T A C C O U N T S
3
O V E RV I E W
The task for this part of my thesis is to critically evaluate the answers to the ER-
problem, and, where applicable, the other problems laid out in Chapter 1 that are
currently available in the literature.17 Articulated attempts to specifically address the
ER-problem only arose in the last 20 years or so. So from a philosophical point of
view the topic is relatively novel. However, many of the views discussed here have
ancestors found in two distinct discussions: aesthetics; and the original presentations
of the semantic view of theories. For this reason the following two chapters, which
discuss the role of similarity and structural similarity in establishing that models rep-
resent their targets, begin with brief simple presentations of their respective answers
to the ER-problem.18 These simple presentations are the primary targets of Frigg
(2006) and Sua´rez (2003), and I do not spend too much time rehearsing their argu-
ments here. Rather, I concentrate on developing more refined versions of answers
to the ER-problem that appeal to these similarities. The results, I think, are answers
that are more persuasive than even some adherents to those positions have made clear.
The confusion arises from thinking that similarity, of structure or otherwise, could
have anything to do with representation simpliciter. At best, they seem to be notions
that establish the accuracy of pre-existing representational relationships by supplying
standards of accuracy. However, I argue that they fail even there.
Just as answers to the ER-problem place constraints on the ontological status of
models, the structuralist account of scientific representation places constraints on the
ontological status of target systems. As such, in Chapter 6 I consider the metaphysi-
17 Although my arguments in this part of the thesis are, by and large, towards negative conclusions, it is
instructive to see precisely how the existing accounts of scientific representation fail. The lessons learnt
from these failures motivate my own answer to the ER-problem presented in Part iii.
18 Full references will be given in the relevant chapters; but the accounts I have in mind are associated
with Giere, Ma¨ki, and Weisberg with respect to similarity, and Suppe, Suppes, van Fraassen, and French
and his collaborators with respect to structural similarity. I don’t mean to imply here that any of these
authors currently subscribe to the naı¨ve version of their accounts. Their specific views will be discussed
in more detail in the coming chapters.
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cal question concerning ‘the structure’ of the world. I pay particular attention to van
Fraassen’s (2008) recent claim that, from the perspective of a model user, accurately
representing a target system and a data model extracted from such a system are ‘prag-
matically equivalent’.
The accounts discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, what I call the ‘Direct View’ (associated
with Toon and Levy, references to come) and ‘Inferentialism’ (primarily associated
with Sua´rez, but related views are proposed by Hughes, Contessa, and Frigg), are
much more recent additions to the debate, and as such have yet to be properly scruti-
nised. This is as good a time as any to rectify this. So let’s get started.
4
M O D E L S A N D S I M I L A R I T Y
In this chapter I critically evaluate accounts of scientific representation that rely on the
idea that, in some sense, scientific models are similar to their targets. The structure of
the chapter is as follows. I begin by outlining the similarity conception in its most basic
guise, and review the criticisms to which it has been subjected. I then move onto the
more developed versions, defended more recently by Giere (2004, 2010); Ma¨ki (2009,
2011); and Weisberg (2007, 2013), that, rather than relying on similarity tout court,
rely on the idea that targets and their models are ‘similar in the relevant respects, to
the appropriate degree’. I argue that the most plausible versions of these accounts –
plausible in the sense that they allow for the possibility of misrepresentation – relegate
similarity to a condition on accurate representation, rather than representation itself.
Moreover, I argue by means of examples, that we should be suspicious about whether
‘similarity’ is the appropriate notion, even there.
4.1 nai¨ve similarity
In its simplest guise, the similarity-based account of scientific representation provides
the following answer to the ER-problem:
similarity 1 : A scientific model M represents a target system T if and only if M
and T are similar to one another.
This answer to the ER-problem is beset with difficulties. But it is worth briefly out-
lining how it meets at least one of the conditions of adequacy laid out in Chapter 1.
The view offers an elegant account of surrogative reasoning. Similarities between a
model and its target can be exploited to carry over insights gained in the model to
the target. If the similarity between M and T is based on shared properties, then a
property found in M would also have to be present in T; and if the similarity holds
between properties themselves, then T would have to instantiate properties similar to
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M. Thus, from investigating the properties of M, scientists would be able to infer that
T had certain properties as well.
The account is also associated with a rejection of the demarcation problem. Given
how prominent the notion of similarity is in discussions of representations in non-
scientific contexts, it’s reasonable to suppose that this conception has universal aspira-
tions in that it is taken to account for representation across a broad range of different
domains. Paintings, statues, and drawings are said to represent by being similar to
their subjects.19 And recently Giere, one of the leading contemporary proponents
of the similarity view (although by no means currently committed to Similarity 1),
claimed that it covers scientific models alongside ‘words, equations, diagrams, graphs,
photographs, and, increasingly, computer-generated images’ (2004, 243 cf. 1996, 272,
and for further discussion Toon (2012, 249-250)). So the similarity view repudiates
the demarcation problem and submits that the same mechanism, namely similarity,
underpins different kinds of representation in a broad variety of contexts.
Despite this initial appeal, Similarity 1, is a non-starter as an answer to the ER-
problem. Its first major flaw is that it is unclear how models without targets fit into
the account. If models represent in virtue of being similar to their targets, then what
are we to say about target-less models, like Maxwell’s model of the ether (because
ether doesn’t exist), or populations with more than two sexes?20 With the exception
of Weisberg (2013, Chapter 7) adherents of the similarity account have had little to say
about such models. For the purposes of this chapter I do not pursue this argument
any further, since it applies to many accounts discussed in the coming chapters, and I
pay particular attention to it in Chapter 7.
Secondly, as Goodman (1972) pointed out, similarity has the wrong logical proper-
ties to ground representation. Similarity is reflexive and symmetric, yet representation
is neither.21 In general, epistemic representations do not represent themselves, and
that X represents Y does not in general ensure that Y represents X.
19 See Abell (2009) and Lopes (2004) for relatively current discussions of similarity – usually called ‘re-
semblance’ – in the context of pictorial representation. I take it that ‘similarity’ and ’resemblance’ are
synonyms
20 Interestingly, Weisberg (2013, Chapter 7) points out that, despite what Fisher thought when constructing
such models, there are some populations that could appropriately be deemed to consist of three sexes.
But the point remains that one could construct a five-sex population model, and the similarity account
would have little to say about it.
21 Note that in claiming that epistemic representation is not a symmetric relation (¬∀x∀y(Rxy → Ryx)), I
am not claiming that epistemic representation is either antisymmetric (∀x∀y((Rxy ∧ Ryx) → x = y)) or
asymmetric (∀x∀y(Rxy→ ¬Ryx)). Similarly, I am claiming that epistemic representation is not reflexive
(¬∀xRxx) rather than anti-reflexive (∀x¬Rxx).
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A partial answer to this objection is to claim that similarity is not symmetric. In
empirical studies, Tversky (1977) found that participants were far more likely to agree
with the claim that ‘North Korea is similar to China’ than the claim ‘China is similar
to North Korea’, and when moving to his preferred real valued measure of similarity
(discussed in more detail below), participants rated North Korea more similar to China
than they did China to North Korea. Or consider Poznic’s (2015) example of the
Rosemary’s baby in the Polanski film. The baby, fathered by the Devil, could be said
to be similar to its father. But we are less inclined to judge the Devil as similar to the
baby. And if similarity is not symmetric, then this allows for the possibility of models
being similar to their targets but not vice versa. Therefore, under this understanding of
similarity, Similarity 1 allows for the fact that model represent their targets, but not
the other way around.
Notice that even if correct, these considerations only concern symmetry, not reflex-
ivity. It remains (e.g. for Weisberg (2013) who uses Tversky’s account to answer the
ER-problem, and others) that similarity is a reflexive relation. Moreover, however the
issue of the logical properties is resolved, serious problems for Similarity 1 remain.
The first basic problem is that the notion of ‘similarity’ needs to be qualified. Intu-
itively, what is required for two objects X and Y to be similar to one another is that
they share some properties. But if this is all that is required then we are left with the
result that everything is similar to everything else, since everything shares some prop-
erty with anything else (Goodman, 1972). This can be easily seen under a extensional
understanding of properties – where a property P is identified with its extension (and
a two-place relation identified with the set of ordered pairs thus related, and so on) –
since with no restriction on what sets we consider we can easily construct shared prop-
erties for an arbitrary pair of objects X and Y. Simply consider the property of being
∈ {X, Y}. In fact, we can construct an uncountably infinite number of such properties.
Simply consider the properties of being ∈ {X, Y, i} for all i ∈ R.
Even if we deny that membership in these gerrymandered sets genuinely constitutes
a shared property, it remains to be seen how we can distinguish between ‘genuine’
properties and gerrymandered ones in such a way that avoids the conclusion that any
pair of objects are similar in some sense. For example any pair of objects presented to
me as potentially similar to one another would share the property of being presented
to James at a certain time t, being thought about by James at t, and so on. Alternatively,
any pair of earthbound objects share the property of being earthbound (which would
seem like a genuine property). Any pair of non-earthbound objects share the property
of not being earthbound. And any pair of objects such that one is earthbound and
the other is not, presumably share properties like being a certain distance from the
midpoint of a ‘straight-line’ between them. For Similarity 1, this has the unfortunate
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consequence that anything represents anything else because any two objects are sim-
ilar in some respect. Unqualified similarity is just too easy to come by to account for
representation.
An obvious response to this problem is to delineate a set of relevant respects and
degrees to which M and T have to be similar in order for the former to represent the
latter. The ‘relevant respects’ aspect allows us to isolate a particular set of properties
to be shared by similar objects, and the ‘relevant degrees’ aspect allows for objects to
share some, but not all of these properties.22
Taking this into account, we arrive at the following answer to the ER-problem:
similarity 2 : A scientific model M represents a target system T if and only if M
and T are similar to one another in the relevant respects and to the appropriate
degree.
I address the question of how these respects and degrees are to be specified shortly.
But I suspect that, however this is done, Similarity 2 is going to face the following
objection. Even similarity suitably restricted remains insufficient on epistemic repre-
sentation. Relying on an intuitive understanding of the relevant respects and degrees,
it would seem that two copies of the same newspaper are relevantly similar to one
another, but neither represents the other. Two identical twins are relevantly similar
to one another, yet neither represents the other. There are numerous cases where two
items are similar with no representational relationship between them. And this won’t
go away even if similarity turns out to be non-symmetric. That North Korea is similar
to China (to some degree) does not imply that North Korea represents China, and that
China is not similar to North Korea to the same degree does not alter this conclusion.
The problem is highlighted in Putnam’s (1981) thought experiment involving an ant
tracing a shape through the sand. We can suppose that the shape of the trace bears
a relevant similarity (or resemblance) to Churchill: the shape includes a cigar shape,
joined to a mouth shape, above a two-fingered salute shape. Has the ant produced
a picture of Churchill? Putnam claims, and I agree, that it hasn’t because the ant
has never seen Churchill, is causally isolated from Churchill, and had no intention of
producing an image of him. Although someone else might see the trace as a depiction
of Churchill, the trace itself does not represent Churchill. This, Putnam concludes,
22 Or alternatively moves us from the idea that objects have to co-instantiate properties in order to be similar
to one another to the idea that they instantiate appropriately similar properties. I discuss the distinction
between these two ways of thinking about similarity below, but for an intuitive example, consider how
we understand a London bus and a British telephone box to be similar to each other with respect to their
colour. We might do so because they co-instantiate redness, or because they instantiate particular shades
of red, which are in turn appropriately similar to each other.
4.1 nai¨ve similarity 47
shows that ‘similarity [...] to the features of Winston Churchill is not sufficient to make
something represent or refer to Churchill’ (Putnam, 1981, 1). And what is true of the
trace and Churchill is true of every other pair of similar items: similarity, relevant or
not, on its own does not suffice to establish representation.
A subtly different observation is made by Sua´rez (2003, 233-234). Using the ex-
ample of Vela´zquez’s portrait of Pope Innocent X, we can consider someone cleverly
disguising themselves as the Pope; dressing up in a red shawl and hat, growing their
facial hair, seating themselves on a gilded chair, and so on. Now if it is the relevant
similarity between the painting and the Pope that grounded the fact that the former
represented the latter, then the same similarity which holds between the painting and
the cleverly disguised individual (in virtue of the disguise) should suffice to establish
that it represents him too. And it doesn’t seem that this is the case. In cases like these,
which Sua´rez calls ‘mistargeting’, a model represents one target rather than another,
despite the fact that both targets are relevantly similar to the model. As in the case
of Putnam’s ant, the root cause of the problem is that the similarity is, in some sense,
accidental. In the case of the ant, the accident occurs at the representation-end of the
relation, whereas in the case of the disguised man, the accidental similarity occurs at
the target-end. Both cases demonstrate that Similarity 2 cannot rule out accidental
representation.
I think this is enough to demonstrate that Similarity 2 won’t work as an answer to
the ER-problem, but it is worth emphasising that it faces another crucial objection: it
cannot handle models that misrepresent their targets. Recall that M misrepresents T
if and only if M represents T, but does so inaccurately or unfaithfully. Phrasing this
in terms of similarity, it would be reasonable to suggest that M misrepresents T by
portraying it as sharing certain relevant properties (to the appropriate degree) with M
that, it turns out, are not shared by T. Consider again Thomson’s plum pudding model,
which represents atomic structure as negative charge bearing electrons surrounded by
positive charge in a way analogous to raisins being surrounded by suet in a plum pud-
ding. One would think that the relevant similarity between the model and the target
here would be the way in which positive and negative charge are distributed. But we
know that in the case of atoms positive charge is concentrated in the atomic nucleus,
and thus the model is not similar to the target in the relevant respect. But then, on
Similarity 2, the model does not represent its target at all, since the relevant similarity
doesn’t hold.23 But as I argued in Chapter 1, the possibility of misrepresentation is
a condition of adequacy for any acceptable account of scientific representation, and
23 Ducheyne (2008) embraces this conclusion when he offers a variant of a similarity account which explic-
itly takes the success of the hypothesised similarity between a model and its target to be a necessary
condition on the model representing the target.
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so misrepresentation should not be conflated with non-representation in the way that
Similarity 2 would seem to entail. Thomson’s model still represents atomic structure,
it just does so inaccurately.
Finally, notice that even restricted to relevant similarities, it remains that every object
is maximally similar to itself. So similarity remains a reflexive relation, and since
representation is not, Similarity 2 still provides the wrong logical properties to the
representation relation. This, combined with the above objections, shows that it fails
as an answer to the ER-problem. It cannot deal with accidental similarities between
models and systems in the world that they don’t represent, and it doesn’t allow for
the possibility of models representing their targets. This is notwithstanding the fact
that the notion of ‘relevantly similar to the appropriate degree’ has yet to be spelt out.
One aspect of this phrase that I have ignored so far is its pragmatic, context sen-
sitive character. In order for a similarity to be ‘relevant’, it needs to be relevant for
something. And in the case of epistemic representation, it would seem that this notion
of relevance will be sensitive to the purposes, goals, and intentions of the model user.
It’s plausible that in order to account for this, an adherent to the similarity approach
will need to shift from what has been called a ‘naturalistic’ account of representation
to a non-naturalistic one.24 The question then is whether non-naturalistic versions of
the similarity account fare any better than the ones considered in this section.
4.2 nuanced similarity
One way to specify the relevant similarities that need to hold to the appropriate de-
grees in order for a model to represent its target is to utilise what Giere (1988, 81)
calls ‘theoretical hypotheses’: statements asserting that model and target are similar in
relevant respects and to certain degrees. This idea can be moulded into the following
answer to the ER-problem.
similarity 3 : A scientific model M represents a target system T if and only if a
model user provides a theoretical hypothesis H specifying that M and T are
similar to one another in the relevant respects and to the appropriate degree.
This avoids many of the problems discussed in the previous section. The require-
ment of theoretical hypotheses linking models and their targets means that even if
similarity is reflexive (and possibly symmetric), it needn’t be the case that scientific
24 Sua´rez, drawing on van Fraassen (2002) and Putnam (2002), defines ‘naturalistic’ accounts of represen-
tation as ones where ‘whether or not representation obtains depends on facts about the world and does
not in any way answer to the purposes, views or interests of enquirers’ (2003, 226-227).
4.2 nuanced similarity 49
representation is. Just because everything is similar to itself doesn’t mean that some-
one provides a theoretical hypothesis specifying that an object is similar to itself. More-
over, accidental similarities, like those involved in Putnam’s ant and the Pope Innocent
impostor, are circumvented since there is no theoretical hypothesis to specify that the
representational vehicles are similar to their respective targets. Allowing for the pos-
sibility of misrepresentation requires that the theoretical hypotheses are fallible; they
could be false. The idea being that the theoretical hypothesis establishes the represen-
tation relation, and then if the theoretical hypothesis is true (or ‘true enough’), then
this establishes that the representation relation is accurate or faithful.
Similarity 3 thus looks like a promising answer to the ER-problem. And once we
pay attention to the fact that the theoretical hypotheses are provided by a model user,
and so are sensitive to their intentions and purposes, it comes close to Giere (2004,
2010) and Ma¨ki’s (2009; 2011) considered views on scientific representation. The for-
mer adopts an agent-based account of scientific representation which focuses on ‘the
activity of representing’ (2004, 743). Analysing representation in these terms amounts
to analysing schemes like ‘S uses X to represent W for purposes P’ (2004, 743), or in
more detail:
‘Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world
W; (4) for purposes, P. So agents specify which similarities are intended
and for what purpose’ (2010, 274).
To account for this in Similarity 3, the purposes of the model users guide the content
of the theoretical hypothesis: they specify which similarities are relevant, and to what
degree. The intentions of the model agent come in via the act of offering the theoretical
hypothesis: a model user intends to use a model to represent a target by providing
such a hypothesis.
Ma¨ki offers an extension of Giere’s view, which adds two conditions to Giere’s: the
agent uses the model to address an audience E and adds a commentary C (Ma¨ki 2011,
55-57 cf. Ma¨ki 2009). The addition of an audience makes the activity of representing
a communal one. It is unclear to me why Ma¨ki demands this, since it rules out cases
where scientists develop, and use, models in isolation; which, at least prima facie, would
still seem to be cases of scientific representation. The role of the commentary is to
specify the nature of the similarity. This is needed because
‘representation does not require that all parts of the model resemble the
target in all or just any arbitrary respects, or that the issue of resemblance
legitimately arises in regard to all parts. The relevant model parts and
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the relevant respects and degrees of resemblance must be delimited’ (Ma¨ki,
2011, 57).
What these relevant respects and degrees of resemblance are depends on the purposes
of the instance of scientific representation in question. These are not determined ‘in
the model’ as it were, but are pragmatic features of the contexts in which it is used.
From this it transpires that in effect C plays the same role as that played by theoretical
hypotheses in Giere’s account. Certain aspects of M are chosen as those relevant to
the representational relationship between M and T.
So, does Similarity 3 provide a successful similarity-based account of epistemic
representation? Unfortunately not. A closer look reveals that the role of similarity has
shifted. As far as offering a solution to the ER-Problem is concerned, all the heavy
lifting in Similarity 3 is done by the appeal to agents and their specification of the
theoretical hypothesis. Giere implicitly admits this when he writes:
‘How do scientists use models to represent aspects of the world? What is
it about models that makes it possible to use them in this way? One way,
perhaps the most important way, but probably not the only way, is by exploiting
similarities between a model and that aspect of the world it is being used
to represent. Note that I am not saying that the model itself represents
an aspect of the world because it is similar to that aspect. There is no
such representational relationship. [footnote omitted] Anything is similar
to anything else in countless respects, but not anything represents anything
else. It is not the model that is doing the representing; it is the scientist using the
model who is doing the representing’ (2004, 747, emphasis added).
But if similarity is not the only way in which a model can be used as a representation,
and if it is the use by a scientist that turns a model into a representation (rather than
any mind-independent relationship the model bears to the target), then similarity has
become otiose in a reply to the ER-problem. A scientist could invoke any relation
between M and T and M would still represent T.
Moreover, on Ma¨ki’s account, he is keen to stress that:
‘Naturally, an account of scientific representation must accommodate fail-
ures. The notion of ‘prompting issues of resemblance to arise’ starts taking
care of this. Failing to prompt those issues is a major failure in representa-
tion (and it is here that ‘mis-representation’ may be appropriately applied),
while failing to resemble is a lesser failure. Respectively, prompting issues
of resemblance gives us weak success, while succeeding to resemble is a
matter of stronger success’ (2011, 57).
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For sure, this move ensures that Similarity 3 can account for misrepresentations, but
it’s the ‘prompting’ issues of similarity, or resemblance, that establishes the prior rep-
resentation relationships, rather than similarity itself. Being similar in the relevant
respects to the relevant degree now provides the standards of accuracy of representa-
tion, rather than grounding it per se. But before investigating the role it plays there, it’s
worth getting more specific about what it means for two objects to be similar to one
another.
4.3 what is similarity anyway?
Unfortunately the philosophical literature contains surprisingly little explicit discus-
sion about what it means for something to be similar to something else. In many cases
similarity is taken to be primitive, possible worlds semantics being a prime example.
The problem is then compounded by the fact that the focus is on comparative overall
similarity, rather than on similarity in respects and degrees (for a critical discussion see
Morreau (2010)). Where the issue is discussed explicitly, the standard way of cashing
out what it means for an object to be similar to another object is to require that they
co-instantiate properties. This is the idea that Quine (1969, 117-118) and Goodman
(1972, 443) had in mind in their influential critiques of the notion. They note that if all
that is required for two things to be similar is that they co-instantiate some property,
then everything is similar to everything else, since any pair of objects have at least one
property in common.
The issue of similarity seems to have attracted more attention in psychology. In
fact, the psychological literature provides attempts to capture it directly in more fully
worked out formal frameworks. The two most prominent suggestions are the geomet-
ric and contrast accounts (see Decock and Douven (2011) for an up-to-date discussion).
It’s worth briefly outlining both of these accounts so we can get clear about what it
takes for two objects to be similar to one another before investigating whether this
notion can bear the weight of providing standards of accuracy.
4.3.1 The geometric account
The geometric account takes similarity relations to be captured by a metric space. It
was associated originally with Shepard (1980). Formally, a metric space is a pair 〈X, δ〉,
where X is a set of points, and δ a function from pairs of those points to the positive
real numbers, including 0, that satisfies three conditions required to be a distance
function. That is δ : X× X → R+0 such that for all x, y, z ∈ X:
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minimality : δ(x, y) ≥ 0 and δ(x, y) = 0⇔ x = y,
symmetry : δ(x, y) = δ(y, x), and
triangle inequality : δ(x, y) + δ(y, z) ≥ δ(x, z).
This allows us to compare similarity relations across pairs of objects located in the
space in a straightforward manner. x is more similar to y than z is to w if and only if
δ(x, y) ≤ δ(z, w). Moreover, if we want to generate an absolute measure of similarity
we can find a threshold t ∈ R+0 such that x is similar to y if and only if δ(x, y) ≤ t.
This would allow us to account for how models and targets are similar to one another:
each of them are located at a point in X based on the properties they instantiate, and
then δ can be used as a measure of the dissimilarity between the two (possibly using a
function of δ as a measure of similarity between the two, to ensure that the lower the
value of δ the higher the measure of similarity).
Although at first glance it looks as though the geometric account of similarity is
committed to the idea that similarity is a symmetric relation (in virtue of δ having
to meet the symmetry condition), and is insensitive to the context and purposes of
model users, Ga¨rdenfors (2000) provides a development in the context of his ‘concep-
tual spaces’ framework that could be utilised by a defender of the geometric account
of similarity. Rather than assuming there is only one metric space under which to
measure how similar two objects are, we can consider multiple spaces. When we’re
interested in whether or not two objects are similar with respect to their colour, we can
use a colour space; when we are interested in whether or not two objects are located
in similar positions in space, we can use a three dimensional Euclidean space; and so
on. Thus the purposes and context of using a particular model to represent a target
system will provide a set of relevant similarities, which in turn determine a metric
space. Moreover, there is nothing to say that the same space has to be used when
measuring how similar an object a is to an object b and when measuring how similar
b is to a. And if a different space is used in each of these situations, then it needn’t be
the case the similarity is a symmetric relation.25
These considerations suggest that for each metric space, although all that is required
is that X be a set of points, it can have a richer dimensional structure. The idea being
that each dimension corresponds to some way in which two objects can be similar
(their blue hue, their red hue, their extension in a particular direction or another, and
so on). This allows us to make sense of Niiniluoto’s (1988, 272-274) distinction between
two different kinds of similarities: what he calls ‘partial identity’ and ‘likeness’ respec-
25 Although notice that if the relevant similarities turn out to be the same in each case, then the same space
will be used and therefore the similarity measure will have to be symmetric.
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tively.26 Assume M instantiates the relevant properties P1, ..., Pn and T instantiates the
relevant properties Q1, ..., Qn. If these properties are identical, i.e. if Pi = Qi for all
i, then M and T are similar in the sense of being partially identical. Partial identity
contrasts with likeness. M and T are similar in the sense of likeness if the properties
are not identical but similar themselves: Pi is similar to Qi for all i. So in likeness the
similarity is located at the level of the properties themselves. For example, a red post
box and a red London bus are similar with respect to their colour, even if they do not
instantiate the exact same shade of red. According to the geometric account of similar-
ity, partial identity is captured when M and T are located at the same point on each of
the i dimensions associated with the relevant properties. Likeness is captured as long
as the restriction of δ to each of those dimensions is ‘small’ enough, i.e. δi(M, T) ≤ e
for each of the i dimensions and for some e.
To the best of my knowledge no one has developed the geometric account of sim-
ilarity in the context of scientific representation. And I won’t do so here, since I’m
sceptical it will work. However, it is worth briefly sketching what it might look like.
Recall from the previous discussion that, in order to account for the possibility of mis-
representation, the similarity account had to fall back on the idea that it’s the proposal
that M and T are similar that establishes that M represents T. This is done by a theo-
retical hypothesis that specifies the relevant respects in which this is proposed to be
the case. This can be taken as specifying a metric space 〈X, δ〉, where each of these
relevant respects corresponds to a dimension in X. Giere’s notion of the ‘appropriate
degree’ can then be read as providing a threshold t ∈ R+0 whereby it is proposed that
δ(M, T) ≤ t. Notice that this is a proposal, and does not guarantee that M and T are
in fact thus similar. Then, if actual similarity between M and T is taken as providing
the standards of accuracy, then so long as it is the case that δ(M, T) ≤ t we can say
that M accurately, or faithfully, represents T.27
This is not without its merits, but it suffers from a serious flaw. In order to pro-
duce a metric space, the properties that are shared by models and their targets must
be quantitative, in the sense that ‘distances’ between the points in the space are mea-
surable by a real number. Assuming each dimension of the space corresponds to a
single relevant property, we need to be able to be able to assign a real number to the
comparison of how M instantiates that property to how T instantiates it. For some
model-world comparisons this seems quite natural. We might compare the period of
a model pendulum with the period of the pendulum in Big Ben, thereby locating the
26 These also feature in Hesse’s discussion of analogies, see, for instance Hesse (1963, 66-67)
27 Notice that this can be sensitive to the purposes of the model users. Whether or not M accurately, or
faithfully, represents T is only defined with respect to a theoretical hypothesis which provides a threshold
t. In different context, this threshold may take different values.
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model with respect to the target on a dimension corresponding to their periods. Even
for properties that we might initially treat as qualitative – e.g. colour – we might be
able to construct a metric space – e.g. an RGB colour space where each dimension
corresponds to measure of chromaticity of red, green, or blue. But it is a very strong
assumption that this can be done for all model-target comparisons.
I suspect that even if it could, then the way of accommodating them will make sig-
nificant assumptions regarding both the ‘scale’ (or scales) of the space, and the way in
which we can compare these comparisons across its dimensions. What I have in mind
here is the fact that, by the definition of a metric space, comparisons of models with
their targets on multiple dimensions need to be commensurable in some sense. Since δ
is defined everywhere on X × X, it requires, for example, that some distance between
M and T with respect to a property P will need to be compared to the distance between
M and T with respect to another property P’. We need to be able to make sense of the
claim that distances in one dimension are shorter, longer, or the same as, distances in
another dimension. And, given the fact that scales in each of the dimensions seem to
be, in some sense, arbitrary (for example, should we measure the length of a pendu-
lum in centimetres or inches?), how to make these comparisons remains unclear.28 So
without more being said about what justifies these inter-dimensional comparisons of
similarity, and how to capture purely qualitative comparisons between properties of
models and their targets, the geometric way of defining similarly does not seem like
the appropriate formal framework in which to think about similarity as providing the
standards of accuracy.
4.3.2 Weighted feature matching
The problem concerning how to compare the qualitative properties of objects with
respect to their similarity is supposed to be overcome in Tversky’s contrast account
(1977). This account defines a gradated notion of similarity based on a weighted
comparison of properties. Weisberg (2012; 2013, Chap. 8) has recently introduced this
28 In economics this corresponds to the so-called ‘interpersonal comparisons of utility’ (Robbins, 1938). The
mathematical considerations are analogous to one another. If an agent’s utility function is only specifiable
up to affine transformation how do we compare specific measures of utility across agents? Similarly,
if the scales on which models and their targets instantiate properties are only specifiable up to some
transformation (which seems to be the case), how do we compare specific distances on each dimension
with one another? It’s worth noting that in the social choice literature there are some suggestions. If, for
example, each agent’s utility function can be measured on a ratio scale then they can be compared even
if the scales are different across agents (Tsui and Weymark, 1997). But this isn’t a question that has been
addressed in the discussion of similarity as applied to models and their targets.
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account into the philosophy of science where it serves as the starting point for his
so-called ‘weighted feature matching account of model world relations’.
The account introduces a set ∆ of relevant properties. Let ∆M ⊆ ∆ be the set of
relevant properties instantiated by the model M; and likewise ∆T ⊆ ∆ the set of rel-
evant properties instantiated by the target system T. Furthermore let f be a ranking
function assigning a positive real number to every subset of ∆.29 The simplest version
of a ranking function is one that assigns to each set the number of properties in the
set, but rankings can be more complex, for instance by giving important properties
more weight. The level of similarity between M and T is then given by the following
equation (Weisberg 2012, 788, cf. Weisberg 2013, 144, the notation is slightly amended):
S(M, T) = θ f (∆M ∩ ∆T)− α f (∆M − ∆T)− β f (∆T − ∆M)
where α, β, and θ are weights, which can in principle take any positive value. This
equation provides a ‘similarity score that can be used in comparative judgements of
similarity’ (Weisberg, 2012, 788). The score is determined by weighing the properties
the model and target have in common against those they do not.30 In the above formu-
lation the similarity score S can in principle vary between any two values (depending
on the choice of the ranking function and the value of the weights), which makes it
difficult to compare multiple similarity scores. One can then renormalise S so that it
takes values in the unit interval as follows:31,32
S(M, T) =
θ f (∆M ∩ ∆T)
θ f (∆M ∩ ∆T) + α f (∆M − ∆T) + β f (∆T − ∆M)
The obvious question at this point is how the various blanks in the account can be filled.
First in line is the specification of a property set ∆. Weisberg is explicit that there are
no general rules to rely on and that ‘the elements of ∆ come from a combination of
context, conceptualization of the target, and theoretical goals of the scientist’ (2013,
149). Likewise, the ranking function, as well as the values of weighting parameters,
29 For non-trivial ∆s, requiring that f be defined on P(∆) (i.e. the power set of ∆) is a significant assumption.
Weisberg (2013, 152) concedes this and suggests that ensuring that f is additive, in the sense that f (X ∪
Y) = f (X) + f (Y) for X, Y ∈ ∆, is a plausible simplifying assumption.
30 Thus this account could be seen as a quantitative version of Hesse’s (1963) theory of analogy in which
properties that M and T share are the positive analogy and ones they don’t share are the negative analogy
31 This equation does not appear in Weisberg’s presentations of his account because he further divides
the elements of ∆ into attributes and mechanisms. The former are the ‘the properties and patterns of
a system [while the latter are the] underlying mechanism[s] that generates these properties’ (2013, 145).
This distinction is helpful in the application to concrete cases, but for my purposes can be set aside.
32 I follow Weisberg by using S to denote both the normalised and non-normalised similarity measure, but
it bears noting that these are different functions.
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depend on the goals of the investigation, the context, and the theoretical framework
in which the scientists operate. The problem of how to weigh similarities between a
model and its target in multiple dimensions raises its head again here. The ranking
function f assigns a real number to sets of properties and when calculating S these
numbers are added and subtracted to each other. The weights α, β, and θ allow that
these arithmetical operations can take weighted values of f as arguments but the fact
remains that the definition of f requires comparisons across dimensions.
Weisberg is keen to stress that given the parameters in the above equation, his ac-
count is compatible with pretty much any such comparison:
‘With no parameters set and no weighting function defined, the equation
describes an infinite set of potential relations—at least one of which almost
certainly holds between a model and a target’ (2015, 300).
But as a result, this means that the context of the model-target comparison has to fix
all of these before S can be used. Again, it is unclear what basis there could be for
such comparisons.
Irrespective of these choices, the similarity score S has a number of interesting fea-
tures. First, it is asymmetrical for α 6= β , which makes room for the possibility of M
being similar to T to a different degree than T is similar to M. So S provides the asym-
metrical notion of similarity mentioned previously. Second, S has a property called
maximality: everything is maximally similar to itself. Formally: S(x, x) = 1 ≥ S(x, y)
for all objects x, y (Weisberg, 2013, 154). Thirdly, at least in some cases, and in contrast
to the geometric account, it allows us to compare models and their targets with respect
to their qualitative properties.
However, since the account is an elaborate version of the co-instantiation account
of similarity it cannot overcome that account’s basic limitations. Recall Niiniluoto’s
distinction between partial identity, which requires co-instantiating various properties,
and likeness which requires co-instantiating appropriately similar properties (which,
according to the geometric account corresponded to being located close to another
another on various dimensions in the appropriate metric space). As Parker (2015, 273)
notes, Weisberg’s account (like all co-instantiation accounts) deals well with partial
identity, but has no systematic place for likeness. To deal with likeness Weisberg
would in effect have to reduce likeness to partial identity by introducing ‘imprecise’
properties into ∆. Parker (2015, 273) suggests that this can be done by introducing
interval valued properties, for instance of the form ‘the value of feature X lies in the
interval (x− e, x + e)’ where e is a parameter specifying the precision of overlap. To
illustrate she uses Weisberg’s example of the US Corps’ San Francisco Bay model and
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claims that in order to account for the similarity between the model and the actual Bay
with respect to their Froude number Weisberg would have to claim something like:
‘The Bay model and the real Bay share the property of having a Froude
number that is within 0.1 of the real Bay’s number. It is more natural to say
that the Bay model and the real Bay have similar Froude numbers-similar
in the sense that their values differ by at most 0.1’ (Parker, 2015, 273).
In his response Weisberg (2015) accepts this and argues that he is trying to provide
a reductive account of similarity that bottoms out in properties shared and those not
shared. But such interval-valued properties have to be elements in ∆ in order for the
formal account to capture them. This means that another important decision regard-
ing whether or not M and T are similar occurs outside of the formal account itself. The
inclusion criteria on what goes into ∆ now not only have to delineate relevant prop-
erties, but, at least for the quantitative ones, also have to provide an interval defining
when they qualify as similar. Furthermore, it remains unclear how to account for M
and T to be alike with respect to their qualitative properties. The similarity between
genuinely qualitative properties cannot be accounted for in terms of numerical inter-
vals. This is a particularly pressing problem for Weisberg, because he takes the ability
to compare models and their targets with respect to their qualitative properties as a
central desideratum for any account of similarity between the two (2013, 136).
In sum, although I think that the weighted feature matching account provides a
more tenable formal framework in which to analyse similarities between models and
their targets, it remains to be seen whether it can make good on its promise of allow-
ing for comparisons with respect to qualitative properties. Moreover, as noted above,
many of the crucial elements are determined outside of the framework (the relevant
properties, weights and so on), so more needs to be said about how these elements are
fixed prior to using the framework to measure model-target similarities.
4.4 similarity, style , and accuracy
Let’s suppose that the questions raised for both the geometric and weighted feature
matching accounts of similarity can be answered. And recall from the previous dis-
cussions that the most plausible version of a similarity based account of scientific
representation takes the intentions of model users and their theoretical hypotheses as
answering the ER-problem, with the question of whether or not models are so similar
to their targets providing the standards of accurate representation. The question to ask
now is whether similarity can, or does, function in this way. But before investigating
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this, it is worth briefly outlining how similarity might play a role in answering the
problem of style, since this will allow us to get to grips with the aspirations of such an
account.
Recall that the problem of style originates from the observation that different scien-
tific models represent their targets in different ways. In the case of art, where different
pictures (for example) represent their subjects in different ways, styles could be cate-
gorised by appealing to the artistic traditions in which the works are situated. In the
scientific context, the question is whether models can be categorised in an analogous
manner. To see how similarity might be useful in such a categorisation scheme, it is
useful to think about similarity and the problem of style on both a coarse and a fine
grained level.
On a more fine grained level, the flexibility of the aforementioned frameworks might
allow for different styles of scientific representation to be categorised according to
how the parameters are determined. The geometric account allows for different met-
ric spaces to be used in different contexts. And if these geometric accounts can be
categorised in some way (depending presumably on the dimensions that appear in
the metric spaces) then this would provide a viable way of categorising at least some
representations. On Weisberg’s contrast account we could use his distinction between
mechanisms and attributes to distinguish between different styles of representation,
e.g. those that aim to be similar with respect to their attributes without being sim-
ilar with respect to their mechanisms could be grouped together under one style of
scientific representation.33 Or we could further distinguish between types of proper-
ties shared, and then further fine grain the similarity measure S in the appropriate
way. I think both of these suggestions are viable avenues of further research and
could provide interesting ways of categorising scientific representations into different
styles. However, an important question that needs to be addressed first is whether the
similarity based approaches can cover all styles of scientific representation.
Answering the problem of style on a coarse grained level could require that sim-
ilarity is taken to be one among many different scientific styles. In some instances,
scientists may set out to construct a model that is similar to its target (in a manner
cashed out using either of the above formal frameworks), and their intentions and
theoretical hypotheses would function to establish the appropriate representation rela-
tion. Whether or not such models turned out to be thus similar could then determine
whether the model was fruitful or accurate. I think that this is a plausible suggestion.
I grant that similarity plays a role in the case of some (or even most) cases of scien-
tific representation. But it is clear that adherents of the similarity approach think that
33 Weisberg (2013, 118, 148) suggests something like this when he discusses ‘how possibly’ modelling, which
could be seen as a specific style of scientific representation.
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similarity isn’t one style among many, but rather underpins all scientific representa-
tion, and depending on their perspective on the demarcation problem, perhaps even
epistemic representation in general.
I think these universal aspirations are problematic once we start to consider what
the relevant properties of the model and targets are when it comes to comparing them.
To warm up, consider the case of the London Tube map as an epistemic representation
of the London Underground system and suppose your purposes for using the map
are to determine whether you can get a direct Victoria line tube from Brixton to King’s
Cross. The relevant properties of the map are whether or not there is a light blue line
between the circle marked ‘Brixton’ and the circle marked ‘King’s Cross’. The relevant
property of the London Underground system is the fact that, as it turns out, the Victo-
ria Line does run from Brixton to King’s Cross. Now if we were to apply the weighted
feature matching account to this example of using an epistemic representation we are
faced with a troubling situation: what properties go in ∆? Intuitively, we want to say
that the relevant property comparison here is between a colour property on the map,
and a tube line property in the London Underground. But it’s not clear that these can
appropriately be taken to be the same property.34 Now, one could try to claim that the
relevant property is a topological one, the dots marked ‘Brixton’ and ‘King’s Cross’ are
connected to one another in the same way that Brixton and King’s Cross are connected,
and this property is shared between the map and the Underground. But this strategy
won’t fly. The property of the map that tells the map user that they can get a direct line
is a colour one, otherwise you might have to change lines. There is no escaping the
fact that it is colour properties that are associated with tube lines. And thus, it doesn’t
seem as though it is similarity, in the sense that the map and the Underground system
instantiate the same property, that establishes that the map to be an accurate repre-
sentation in this respect. Similarly, it’s not obvious whether any model user would
intend that the map and the Underground system were similar with respect to either
property when establishing the representation relation in the first place. Rather, they
associate colours with tube lines conventionally, and this isn’t the sort of association
that can be cashed out in terms of co-instantiating properties.
Conventional associations between properties of models and their targets are not
limited to cartographic representation. For scientific examples, we can consider cases
such as using litmus paper to represent the pH of a solution. Dip the strand of litmus
in an acidic solution; if it turns red it accurately represents the solution as acidic. Are
we happy to grant that the red litmus paper and acidic solution are ‘similar’ in virtue
of the former’s colour and the latter’s pH? Or consider the Phillips-Newlyn machine.
34 And it is not clear that the geometric account will fare any better in this comparison, as these two
properties do not seem to correspond to any dimension in a metric space.
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Figure 6: The London tube map (TFL)36
Prima facie, it is a hydraulic machine consisting of reservoirs, pipes, and valves through
which a pump pumps water depending on the width of the valves and shape of the
tanks.35 The machine is a model that represents an economy, but it remains unclear
whether a theoretical hypothesis will assert that the two are similar (which properties
of the hydraulic machine could be co-instantiated by an economy?).
Additional problems for using the notion of similarity as a universal condition on
accurate representation (and relatedly, taking the prior representation-establishing the-
oretical hypotheses to universally specify similarities between models and their targets,
rather than any other relation) occur when, as in some cases of epistemic representa-
tion, distortions play a vital role in allowing us to use representational vehicles to learn
about their targets. Van Fraassen claims that it ‘seems then that distortion, infidelity,
lack of resemblance in some respect, may in general be crucial to the success of a
35 I present more details about the machine in Chapter 9, for now I hope this brief description suffices to
illustrate my point. See Morgan (2012, Chapter 5) for further discussion.
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representation’ (2008, 13). He illustrates this by means of caricature (which I return
to in Chapter 6 in more detail). We can think of a caricature of Margaret Thatcher
that represents her as draconian. Since we know that Margaret Thatcher does not, in
fact, have wings and a tail, or breathe fire, it seems that the picture is not similar to
Thatcher in these respects. Yet it is these respects that play a vital role in the caricature
being an accurate or faithful representation of her.37 It’s plausible that this holds in the
scientific context as well. Van Fraassen uses the example of representing, by means of
a drawing, two differently orientated parallelograms as being congruent to each other
(2008, 13). In order to do this successfully (accurately, faithfully) they have to be drawn
at different sizes, and thus be dissimilar with respect to their size. Or alternatively, we
can consider idealisation assumptions in scientific models that play a vital role in their
success, i.e. the accuracy of their representation, despite the fact that in these respects
the model and the target are explicitly dissimilar (assuming they cannot be captured
by Weisberg’s interval-valued property approach). In taking proposed similarity as a
universal style of representation, and thereby actual similarity as a universal standard
of accurate representation, we seem committed to the idea that models have to be
copies of their targets (even if only in the relevant respects to the appropriate degree)
in order to be accurate. And I’m sceptical that this is the right way of thinking about
scientific, or epistemic, representation in general.
For those not convinced, it is worth noting that I’m not claiming that there is no
way in which these examples could be accommodated within the similarity frame-
work. But my suspicion is that once they are so, the notion of similarity that drops
out becomes relatively unhelpful. If the notion of similarity used is so flexible that it
captures the aforementioned cases, then it becomes unclear whether or not the result
still corresponds to our pre-theoretical understanding of similarity. And as I discuss
in my own positive proposal in Chapter 9, if all the work that the notion does can
be accommodated elsewhere, I see little motivation for invoking it in the first place.
So to summarise where we are so far. I have argued that similarity itself cannot an-
swer the ER-problem, at pain of conflating misrepresentation with non-representation.
Moreover, even if proposed similarity, by means of a theoretical hypothesis, may answer
the ER-problem in at least some cases, and consequently the success of this proposal
providing standards of accuracy, it remains unclear whether this provides a universal
answer to the problem of style. Some representations are not proposed to be similar
to their targets in the relevant respects, and their success is often specifically down to
the fact that they are dissimilar from them. So I think that accounts that rely solely
36 Available here http://content.tfl.gov.uk/standard-tube-map.pdf.
37 Those with opposing political viewpoints are welcome to substitute another caricature in place of this,
one of Jeremy Corbyn perhaps.
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on the notion of similarity fail to fully capture what is interesting about epistemic and
scientific representation. Before moving on, however, there is yet another problem that
faces the similarity theorist that needs to be discussed.
4.5 similarity and ontology
If models are supposed to be similar to their targets in the ways specified by theoretical
hypotheses or commentaries, then they must be the kind of things that can be so
similar.
Some models are familiar physical objects. The Army Corps of Engineers’ model
of the San Francisco Bay is a water basin and equipped with pumps to simulate the
action of tidal flows (Weisberg, 2013); ball and stick models of molecules are made
of plasticine, metal or wood (Toon, 2011; de Chadarevian, 2004); the Phillips-Newlyn
model of an economy is a system of pipes and reservoirs (Morgan, 2012); model or-
ganisms in biology are animals like worms and mice (Ankeny and Leonelli, 2011); a
model ship is a block of wood in a tank (Sterrett, 2006); and water-based dumb holes
are used as models for black holes (Dardashti et al., 2015). For models of this kind
similarity is straightforward (at least in principle) because they are of the same onto-
logical kind as their respective targets: they are material objects. But many interesting
scientific models are not like this. Two perfect spheres with a homogeneous mass dis-
tribution which interact only with each other (the Newtonian model of the sun-earth
system), or a single-species population isolated from its environment and reproducing
at fixed rate at equidistant time steps (the logistic growth model of a population) are
what Hacking elegantly describes as ‘something you hold in your head rather than
your hands’ (1983, 216). As a neutral term, I call these ‘non-physical models’. The
question then is what kind of objects non-physical models are. Giere submits that they
are abstract objects: ‘models in advanced sciences such as physics and biology should
be abstract objects constructed in conformity with appropriate general principles and
specific conditions’ (2004, 745 cf. 1988, 81; 2010, 270).
The appeal to abstract entities brings a number of difficulties with it. The first is
that the class of abstract objects is rather large. Numbers and other objects of pure
mathematics, classes, propositions, concepts, the letter ‘A’, and Dante’s Inferno are
abstract objects (Rosen, 2014), and Hale (1988, 86-87) lists no less than 12 different
possible characterisations of abstract objects. At the very least this list shows that
there is great variety in abstract objects and classifying models as abstract objects
adds little specificity to an account of what models are. A defender of the similarity
account could follow Giere and counter that they limit their attention to those abstract
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objects that possess ‘all and only the characteristics specified in the principles’ (Giere,
2004, 745), where principles are general rules like Newton’s laws of motion. Giere
further specifies that he takes ‘abstract entities to be human constructions’ and that
‘abstract models are definitely not to be identified with linguistic entities such as words
or equations’ (2004, 747). While this narrows down the choices somewhat, it still
leaves many options and ultimately the ontological status of models in a similarity
account remains unclear. Giere fails to expand on this ontological issue for a reason:
he dismisses the problem as one that philosophers of science can set aside without
loss. He voices scepticism about the view that philosophers of science ‘need a deeper
understanding of imaginative processes and of the objects produced by these process’
(2009, 250), or that ‘we need say much more [...] to get on with the job of investigating
the functions of models in science’ (2009, 250).
I’m not sure that this is quite the case, not least because there is an obvious yet
fundamental issue with abstract objects. No matter how the above issues are resolved
(and irrespective of whether they are resolved at all), at the minimum it is clear that
non-physical models are ‘abstract’ in the sense that they have no spatiotemporal lo-
cation. And as Thomson-Jones (2010) points out, this alone causes serious problems
for the similarity account. The similarity account demands that models can instantiate
properties and relations, since this is a necessary condition on them being similar to
their targets. In particular, it requires that models can instantiate the properties and re-
lations mentioned in theoretical hypotheses or commentaries. But such properties and
relations are typically physical. And if models have no spatiotemporal location, then
they do not instantiate any such properties or relations. Thomson-Jones’ example of
the idealised pendulum model makes this clear. If the idealised pendulum is abstract
then it is difficult to see how to make sense of the idea that it has a length, or a mass,
or an oscillation period of any particular time.
An alternative suggestion due to Teller is that we should instead say that whilst
‘concrete objects HAVE properties [...] properties are PARTS of models’ (2001, 399,
original capitalisation). It is not entirely clear what Teller means by this, but my guess
is that he would regard models as bundles of properties. Target systems, as concrete
objects, are the sorts of things that can instantiate properties delineated by theoretical
hypotheses. Models, since they are abstract, cannot. But rather than being objects
instantiating properties, a model can be seen as a bundle of properties. A collection of
properties is an abstract entity that is the sort of thing that can contain the properties
specified by theoretical hypotheses as parts. The similarity relation between models
and their targets shifts from the co-instantiation of properties, to the idea that targets
instantiate (relevant) properties that are parts of the model. With respect to what it
means for a model to be a bundle of properties Teller claims that the ‘[d]etails will
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vary with one’s account of instantiation, of properties and other abstract objects, and
of the way properties enter into models’ (2001, 399). But as Thomson-Jones (2010, 294-
295) notes, it is not obvious that this suggestion is an improvement on Giere’s abstract
objects. A bundle view incurs certain metaphysical commitments, chiefly the existence
of properties and their abstractness, and a bundle view of objects, concrete or abstract,
faces a number of serious problems (Armstrong, 1989).
An alternative approach, that I discuss in more detail in Chapters 7 and 10, is to take
models to be, in some sense, fictions. In relation to the similarity view this has been
discussed by Giere, who points out that a natural response to Thomson-Jones’ problem
is to regard models as akin to imaginary or fictional systems of the sort presented in
novels and films. It seems true to say that Sherlock is a smoker, despite the fact that
Sherlock is an imaginary detective, and smoking is a physical property. At times, Giere
seems sympathetic to this view. He says:
‘it is widely assumed that a work of fiction is a creation of human imagi-
nation ... the same is true of scientific models. So, ontologically, scientific
models and works of fiction are on a par. They are both imaginary con-
structs’ (2009, 249).
And he observes that:
‘novels are commonly regarded as works of imagination. That, ontologi-
cally, is how we should think of abstract scientific models. They are cre-
ations of scientists’ imaginations. They have no ontological status beyond
that’ (2010, 278).
However, these seem to be occasional slips and he has recently positioned himself as
an outspoken opponent of any approach to models that likens them to literary fiction
(2009).
Furthermore, as Godfrey-Smith (2009) points out, a tension remains when the fiction-
alist account of models is combined with a similarity view of scientific representation.
The latter essentially involved comparing the properties of models (construed as fic-
tional objects) with properties of their targets. But for many models, their relevant
properties are ones that we know aren’t instantiated anywhere in the actual world.
There is no such thing as an infinite population. So the fictionalist needs an ontology
of scientific models which accounts for them instantiating uninstantiated (at least in
the actual world) properties.
In sum, even if my previous objections to the use of similarity in accounts of scien-
tific representation can be met, since it requires that all models to which it is applicable
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co-instantiate relevant, which I take (at least at times) to include physical, properties,
there is an ontological question regarding how non-physical models can do this. And
the similarity view has yet to be equipped with a fully satisfactory answer to this
question.38
38 Notice that this is a general instance of a more general problem for accounts of scientific representation.
As I discussed in Chapter 1, although the semantic and epistemological questions surrounding scientific
models don’t fully specify a required ontology for non-physical models, they do bear on it. These
ontological questions will continue to be discussed throughout this thesis in reference to each answer to
the ER-problem, including my own.
5
S T R U C T U R A L I S M I
The structuralist conception of scientific representation originated in the so-called ‘se-
mantic view of theories’ that was developed in the second half of the 20th Century.39
The semantic view was originally proposed as an account of the nature of scientific the-
ories rather than scientific representation. The driving idea behind the position is that
scientific theories are best thought of as collections of models. This invites the ques-
tions: what are these models, and how do they represent their target systems? The first
question is my problem of ontology, and the second is my ER-problem. As a first pass,
defenders of the semantic view of theories take models to be mathematical structures,
which represent their target systems in virtue of there being some kind of mathemat-
ical mapping (isomorphism, partial isomorphism, homomorphism, ...) between the
two. I begin this chapter by briefly outlining what mathematical structures are before
moving on to how invoking structure preserving mappings might serve to answer
the ER-problem. Given the connections between the structuralist and similarity-based
accounts of scientific representation, it should be of no surprise that a naı¨ve appeal
to the existence of such model-target mapping, which would amount to them being
similar with respect to their structure, suffers problems analogous to those discussed
in Chapter 4. As such, many of the moves made there, to, for example, account for the
possibility of misrepresentation, arise again here.
39 Suppes (1969a, 2002), van Fraassen (1980), Suppe (1989), and Da Costa and French (2003) provide classical
statements of the view. Byerly (1969), Chakravartty (2001), Klein (2013), and Portides (2005, 2010) provide
critical discussions. Lutz (2015) compares the semantic view with a syntactic approach. It is worth
noting that Giere, whose account of scientific representation I discussed in the previous chapter, is also
associated with the semantic view, despite not subscribing to either of the positions discussed in this
chapter.
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5.1 structures , isomorphisms , and scientific models
5.1.1 Structures
Almost anything, from a football match to an economy, can be referred to as a ‘struc-
ture’. So the first task for a structuralist account of representation is to articulate what
notion of structure it employs. A number of different notions of structure have been
discussed in the literature (for a review see Thomson-Jones (2011b)), but by far the
most common and widely used is the notion of structure one finds in set theory and
mathematical logic. A structure S (sometimes described as a ‘mathematical structure’
or ‘set-theoretic structure’) of the sort found there is a pair consisting of the following
elements: a non-empty set D of objects called the domain (or universe) of the struc-
ture and a non-empty indexed set of relations defined extensionally on D. We can
thus define a structure as follows:
S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉
where each Ri is a set of n-tuples, i.e elements of Dn for some n (where the n can vary
across different relations depending on their aritary). This definition is close to, but
not quite, the definition of structure that is used in logic and model theory. As they are
used there, structures contain (or are sometimes identified with) an additional element
called an interpretation function I, whose domain is a set of symbols such that for
each n-ary predicate symbol Rn, I : Rn → Dn (cf. Enderton, 2001; Boolos and Jeffrey,
1989).40 Each of the values of this function, i.e. as it’s applied each predicate symbol,
could then be identified with an Ri. From a logical point of view we would define
what could be called an ‘interpreting structure’ as a triple: 〈D, {Ri}i∈I , I〉, where I
is a function from some a set of symbols to {Ri}i∈I . But adherents to the semantic
approach usually prefer to use the word ‘structure’ to refer to the set theoretic object
that provides the range of I, i.e. S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉.41 See, for example, Suppes (1969a,
290-291), Lloyd (1994, 15), French (2003, 1480), French (2014, 103), and the references
therein, and van Fraassen, who explicitly states that:
‘logicians do also use “model” to refer to the interpretation itself; that may
be convenient, since the structure can then be identified as the range of the
40 Interpretation functions are usually defined over constant and function symbols in the language as well,
where I maps constant symbols to elements of D, and function symbols to operations on D. I ignore
this for my current purposes, since constant symbols do not play any significant role in the structuralist
account, and operations can be reduced to relations (by identifying them with their graph).
41 A comparison between these approaches is discussed in Thomson-Jones (2006).
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interpretation. This is ‘book-keeping’; the terminology can be adjusted for
convenience in various ways’ (2014, fn.1).
I shall follow suit here.
5.1.2 Isomorphisms
Isomorphisms are structure preserving functions between structures. Intuitively, two
structures S and S ′ are isomorphic if they share the same relational structure, despite
the fact that their domains might consist of different objects. This notion can be defined
as follows:
Two structures S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉 and S ′ = 〈D′, {R′i}i∈I〉 are isomorphic if
and only if:
(i) there exists a function f : D → D′,
(ii) f is a bijection, i.e. one-to-one map from D onto D′, and
(iii) for each 〈x1, ...xn〉 ∈ Dn, Ri ∈ {Ri}i∈I , and corresponding R′i ∈ {R′i}i∈I :
〈x1, ...xn〉 ∈ Ri ⇔ 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ R′i.
It bears pointing out, again, that this definition is slightly different from the standard
definition used in logic and model theory. There, they take isomorphism to hold
between two L-structures, where an L-structure interprets a set of symbols in the lan-
guage L (like the ‘interpreting structures above). In that context, in order for structures
to be isomorphic, they have to interpret the same set of symbols, and the correspon-
dence between the relations Ri and R′i is given by the fact that they interpret the same
predicate symbol (see, e.g. Enderton, 2001, 94). When structures are divorced from the
language they interpret, as in the case under consideration here, the way in which the
relations in S are associated with the relations in S ′ is being done by their index. This
means that by permuting the relations of one structure in its indexed set, structures
which were previously isomorphic may turn out to be non-isomorphic. This has the
unsatisfactory consequence that isomorphic structures in this sense needn’t be elemen-
tary equivalent i.e. satisfy the same set of sentences in some language L, since one
could permute the interpretation function as well. For the difficulties associated with
this in the context of defining theories as sets, or classes, of structures in this way see
Glymour (2013), Halvorson (2012, 2013), and Lutz (2015).
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5.1.3 Models
Structuralists solve the problem of ontology by identifying scientific models with struc-
tures in the above sense. Suppes clearly states that ‘the meaning of the concept of
model is the same in mathematics and the empirical sciences’ (1969a, 12). Lloyd ar-
gues that ‘models should be understood as structures; in almost all of the cases I shall
be discussing, they are mathematical structures, i.e., a set of mathematical objects
standing in certain mathematically representable relations’ (1994, 15). Likewise, van
Fraassen claims that a ‘[s]cience represents the empirical phenomena as embeddable
in certain abstract structures (theoretical models) [...] Those abstract structures are de-
scribable only up to structural isomorphism’ (2008, 238). And French and Ladyman
claim that ‘the specific material of the models is irrelevant; rather it is the structural
representation [...] which is important’ (1999, 109).42
These structuralist accounts have typically been proposed in the semantic view of
theories framework. There are differences between them, and formulations vary from
author to author. However, as pointed out by Da Costa and French (2000, 119), all these
accounts are committed to the idea that scientific models are mathematical structures.
As such, I take it that all of these authors provide the following answer to the prob-
lem of ontology: models are structures. It remains to give an account of what these
structures are ontologically speaking. Are they Platonic entities, equivalence classes,
intuitionist constructions, or something else? This is a question for philosophers of
logic and mathematics. Various positions are available (see, for example, Hellman
(1989, 1996), Dummett (1991), Resnik (1997), and Shapiro (2000)). But philosophers
of science need not resolve this issue and can pass off the burden of explanation to
philosophers of mathematics. So I don’t pursue this matter further here.
An extension of the standard conception of structure is the so-called partial struc-
tures approach (see, for instance, Bueno et al. (2002); Da Costa and French (2003);
French (2003, 2014)). Relations were defined above by extensionally specifying the
n-tuples for which they hold. This naturally allows a sorting of all n-tuples into two
classes: ones that belong to the relation and ones that don’t. The leading idea of par-
tial structures is to introduce a third option: for some n-tuples it is not determined
whether or not they belong to the relation. Such a relation is a partial relation and is
defined as follows: let an n-ary partial relation be an ordered triple Rn = 〈R1, R2, R3〉,
such that R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 = Dn, all of R1, R2, and R3 are mutually disjoint, and where R1
is set of n-tuples of objects for which the relation holds, R2 is the set of n-tuples for
which it doesn’t, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not defined whether or
42 See also Suppes (1969b, 24); van Fraassen (1980, 64; 1991, 483; 1995, 6; 2008, 238); and Da Costa and
French (1990, 249).
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not the relations hold. At the limit, where R3 = ∅, partial relations (almost) coincide
with fully specified relations over a domain.43 A partial structure is then defined in a
way analogous to ‘normal’ structures discussed above, but with partial relations rather
than the more familiar fully specified relations used there:
S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉, where each Ri is a partial relation.
Proponents of that approach are more guarded regarding the ontology of models.
Bueno and French emphasise that ‘advocates of the semantic account need not be
committed to the ontological claim that models are structures’ (2011, 890, original
emphasis). This claim is motivated by the idea that the task for philosophers of science
is to represent scientific theories and models, rather than to reason about them directly.
French (2010) makes it explicit that according to his account of the semantic view of
theories, a scientific theory is represented as a class of models, but should not be
identified with that class. Moreover, a class of structures is just one way of representing
a theory; we can also use an intrinsic characterisation and represent the same theory
as a set of sentences satisfied by those structures in order to account for how they can
be objects of our epistemic attitudes (French and Saatsi, 2006). He therefore adopts a
quietist position with respect to what a theory or a model is, declining to answer the
question.
There are thus two important notions of representation at play: scientific representa-
tion of targets by models, which is the job of scientists; and representation of theories
and models by structures, and the representation of scientific representation in terms
of structure preserving mappings, which is the job of philosophers of science. The
project is a ‘rational reconstruction’ of scientific practice, and the quietist needn’t say
anything about what scientific model, or scientific representation, actually is. The
question for this approach is whether the philosophical project of representing models
and scientific representation as partial structures and morphisms that hold between
them is an accurate or useful one. Some rational reconstructions are better than others;
if the reconstruction is to work then it better be the case that it gets something right
about what it is a reconstruction of. I take it that the concerns raised below remain in
this context as well.
There is an additional question regarding the correct formal framework for thinking
about models in the structuralist position. Landry (2007) argues that the universal re-
liance on set theory to define structures and morphisms is misguided, claiming that the
43 I say ‘almost’ because, technically speaking, such a partial relation is a pair of sets of n-tuples, whereas
usual relations are identified with single sets of n-tuples. In this sense, fully specified partial relations
contain slightly more information than usual relations, because they encode the entire domain they are
defined over.
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context determines which formal framework is appropriate to work in. For example,
in the context of quantum mechanics, there are reasons to utilise group theory rather
than set theory. In other contexts category theory may be the appropriate framework.
Similarly, Halvorson (2012, 2016) claims that an account of scientific theories that treats
theories as classes of models fails to account for important intra and inter theoretical
relationships. He proposes that theories should thus be identified with categories of
models instead, where the (category theoretic) morphisms between the models iden-
tify intra-theory relationships, and functors between categories identify inter-theory
relationships.
Although these concerns highlight important questions regarding the nature of sci-
entific theories, it is less obvious whether they have any significant bearing on how
models represent their target systems. Even if models are construed non-set theoreti-
cally, an account of how they enter into morphisms with their target systems still needs
to be given, and it’s plausible that such an account will face difficulties analogous to
the ones I discuss below. Landry’s paper is not an attempt to re-frame the repre-
sentational relationship between models and their targets (see Brading and Landry
(2006) for her scepticism regarding how structuralism deals with this question). And
Halvorson’s category theoretic approach still takes individual models to be set theo-
retic structures; he just takes them to be embedded in categories rather than classes
of such structures. So the question of how an individual model represents its target
system is unchanged. Thus, for reasons of simplicity I focus on the structuralist view
that identifies models with set-theoretic structures throughout the rest of this chapter.
5.2 nai¨ve structuralism
So, with the appropriate formal notions thus introduced, and the structuralist answer
to the problem of ontology offered, it’s now time to turn to how these come to bear
in answering the ER-problem. In its simplest guise, the structuralist answer to the
ER-problem is the following:
structuralism 1 A scientific model M represents a target system T if and only if
M and T are isomorphic to one another.
This view is articulated explicitly by Ubbink, who claims that ‘a model represents
an object or matter of fact in virtue of this structure; so an object is a model [...] of mat-
ters of fact if, and only if, their structures are isomorphic’ (1960, 302). Views similar
to Ubbink’s seem to operate in many versions of the semantic view. However, in fair-
ness to proponents of structuralist accounts, it ought to be pointed out that for a long
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time representation was not the focus of attention and the attribution of (something
like) Structuralism 1 to the semantic view is an extrapolation (an extrapolation that,
for instance, Frigg (2006) and Sua´rez (2003), make). Representation became a much-
debated topic in the first decade of the 21st century, and many proponents of the
semantic view then either moved away from Structuralism 1, or pointed out that
they never held such a view. I turn to more advanced positions shortly, but to under-
stand what motivates such positions it is helpful to understand why Structuralism
1 fails.
This account has two prima facie advantages. Firstly, it offers a straightforward an-
swer to the ER-problem which allows for surrogative reasoning: the mappings be-
tween the model and the target allow scientists to convert truths found in the model
into claims about the target system. The second advantage concerns the applicabil-
ity of mathematics. Mathematical structuralists take mathematics to be the study of
structures (Shapiro, 2000). It is a natural move for the scientific structuralist to follow
suit, which provides them with a clear explanation of how mathematics is used in sci-
entific modelling: mathematics is applicable to the natural world because the subject
matter of mathematics (mathematical structures) are isomorphic to systems found in
the world.
But, like Similarity 1 discussed in the previous chapter, Structuralism 1 suffers
from serious flaws. The first concern, again, concerns the logical properties of sci-
entific representation and the relation used to ground it, in this case isomorphism.
Isomorphisms are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Since scientific representation
has none of these logical properties, Structuralism 1 fails to capture the properties
of scientific representation.
A second concern is how we can make sense of the idea that target systems can enter
into isomorphisms. The notion is only defined on pairs of structures. And, at least prima
facie target systems aren’t structures; they are physical objects like planets, molecules,
populations of organisms, and economies. The relation between structures, abstract
mathematical objects, and physical targets is a serious question. Are we supposed
to take physical objects to be abstract structures? To instantiate abstract structures? Or
something else entirely? I devote the next chapter to investigating how the structuralist
can answer this question.
Relatedly, although the account has the resources to successfully deal with math-
ematical models, it remains unclear how to apply it to models that aren’t like this:
concrete models like the Phillips-Newlyn machine, or scale models of ships in water
tanks. Suppes (1969a) claims that these models can be ascribed a structure in some
sense or another. But, like the question of target-end structure, how physical systems
can be said to ‘be’, or ‘have’, structures remains at this point rather unclear. For the
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purposes of this chapter I grant the structuralist the assumption that physical systems,
targets and concrete models, are (or at least have) structures.
Thirdly, like similarity, isomorphism alone is insufficient for scientific representation.
Not all structures that are isomorphic to one another represent each other. In the case
of similarity this case was brought home by Putnam’s thought experiment with the
ant crawling on the beach; in the case of isomorphism a look at the history of science
will do the job. Furthermore, as Frigg (2006, 10) notes, many mathematical structures
were discovered and discussed long before they were used in science. Non-Euclidean
geometries were studied by mathematicians before Einstein used them in the context
of spacetime theories, and Hilbert spaces were studied by mathematicians prior to
their use in quantum theory. If representation were nothing more than isomorphism,
then it would be the case that Riemann discovered general relativity and that Hilbert
invented quantum mechanics. This jars with our intuitions, which provides one reason
to doubt that isomorphism on its own does not establish representation.
Another concern is how Stucturalism 1 deals with a version of the ‘mistargeting’
objection discussed previously. Granted, isomorphism is more restrictive than simi-
larity: not everything is isomorphic to everything else. But isomorphism is still too
easy to come by to correctly identify the class of systems a structure represents. The
root of the difficulty is that the same structures can be found in different target sys-
tems. As Frigg (2003, 33-35) points out, the F = G m1×m2r2 law of Newtonian gravity
is the mathematical skeleton of Coulomb’s law of electrostatic attraction, F = k q1×q2r2 .
The mathematical structure of the pendulum is also the structure of an electric circuit
with a condenser and solenoid (Kroes, 1989). Linear equations, partial differential
equations, and probability spaces and yet more kinds of mathematical objects, are all
ubiquitous in physics, biology, economics, and other scientific fields. And, certain geo-
metrical structures are found in many different systems; consider how many spherical
things there are. This shows that the same structure can be exhibited (in some sense)
by more than one kind of target system. Structures are ‘multiply realisable’ (Frigg,
2003, 33). If representation is explicated solely in terms of isomorphism, then we have
to conclude that, say, a model of a celestial orbit is also a model of a model of the
electrostatic interaction between two charged particles. But this seems wrong. Hence,
it is difficult to see how the notion of being isomorphic to a model M can be used to
delineate the systems that M represents.44
44 Van Fraassen (1980, 66), mentions a similar problem when he discusses ‘unintended realisations’ and
attempts to avoid it by claiming that it will ‘disappear when we look at larger observable parts of the
world’. Even if there are multiply realisable structures to begin with, as science progresses we will realise
that such targets have different structural features. Once we focus on a sufficiently large part of the world
in enough detail, no two targets will have the same structure. But relying on future science to explain
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Fourthly, as we have seen in the last section, a misrepresentation is one that rep-
resents its target as having features it doesn’t have. In the case of an isomorphism
account of representation this presumably means that the model represents the target
as having structural properties that it doesn’t have. However, isomorphism demands
identity of structure: the structural properties of the model and the target must corre-
spond to one another exactly. Any model that misrepresents the structure of its target
(of which there are many; I don’t think anyone believes that any model perfectly rep-
resents the structure of its target system) will not be isomorphic to the target. By the
lights of Structuralism 1 it is therefore not a representation at all. Like simple similar-
ity accounts, Structuralism 1 conflates misrepresentation with non-representation.
And fifthly, like the similarity account, Structuralism 1 has a problem with non-
existent targets because no model can be isomorphic to something that doesn’t exist.
If there is no ether, a model can’t be isomorphic to it. Hence models without targets
are not dealt with by Structuralism 1.
So, to summarise: Structuralism 1 (i) prescribes the wrong logical properties to
scientific representation; (ii) needs to provide an account of where the target end-
structures come from; (iii) doesn’t provide sufficient conditions on scientific repre-
sentation, (a) since it ignores both the transition from when structures were studied in
mathematics to when they came to be used in the sciences and (b) the fact that multiple
target systems exhibit the same structure; (iv) conflates (structural) misrepresentation
with non-representation; and (v) has nothing to say about non-existing targets.
5.2.1 Choosing a morphism
From the above objections, it could be argued that at least (i) and (iv) can be met by
weakening Structuralism 1, whilst keeping the spirit of the account. The central
idea is to replace isomorphism in the definition of scientific representation with a
weaker structure preserving mapping. There are two (non-exclusive) ways of going
about this. The first is to move to the partial structures framework outlined above,
and define an isomorphism in that context. The second is to look at weaker mappings
than isomorphism. The formal details of these approaches are spelt out first, and then
I investigate the resulting answers to the ER-problem.
If the structures in question are taken to be partial structures, then the notion of
a partial isomorphism can be defined as follows. Let S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉 and S′ =
how models work today seems unconvincing. It is a matter of fact that we currently have models that
represent gravitational attraction and electrostatic interaction, and waiting for future science to provide
us with more detailed accounts of such target systems seems irrelevant with respect to what our current
models actually represent (Frigg, 2003, 34-35).
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〈D′, {R′i}i∈I〉 be two partial structures. Then f is a partial isomorphism from D to D′ if
and only if
(i) f is a bijection, i.e. one-to-one map from D onto D′, and
(i) For all 〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ D and for each Ri = 〈R1, R2, R3〉 ∈ {Ri}i∈I and corre-
sponding R′i = 〈R′1, R′2, R′3〉 ∈ {R′i}i∈I : 〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ R1 ⇔ 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈
R′1 and 〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ R2 ⇔ 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ R′2.
Other relevant mappings include homomorphisms (Bartels, 2006; Lloyd, 1994; Mundy,
1986), isomorphic embeddings (van Fraassen, 1980, 1997, 2008; Redhead, 2001), and
∆/Ψ-morphisms (Swoyer, 1991). It’s worth noting that there is some confusion in the
literature about how to define homomorphism (see Pero and Sua´rez (2015) for a useful
discussion), so I offer multiple definitions to clarify how they differ.45 Since Swoyer’s
∆/Ψ-morphisms require further elaboration on his non-standard use of ‘structure’,
and it doesn’t solve the problems associated with the below mappings, I do not discuss
it here.
f is a homomorphism from S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉 to S ′ = 〈D′, {R′i}i∈I〉 if and only if for all
〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ Dn and each Ri ∈ {Ri}i∈I and corresponding R′i ∈ {R′i}i∈I : 〈x1, ...xn〉 ∈
Ri ⇒ 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ R′i.
f is a surjective homomorphism if it is a homomorphism that is surjective (i.e. onto
D′).
f is a faithful homomorphism from S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉 to S ′ = 〈D′, {R′i}i∈I〉 if and only
if:
(i) For all 〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ Dn and each Ri ∈ {Ri}i∈I and corresponding R′i ∈ {R′i}i∈I :
〈x1, ...xn〉 ∈ Ri ⇒ 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ R′i, and
(ii) For all 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ D′n and each R′i ∈ {R′i}i∈I and corresponding Ri ∈
{Ri}i∈I : 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ R′i ⇒ 〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ Ri.
A structure S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉 can be isomophically embedded in a structure S ′ =
〈D′, {R′i}i∈I〉 if and only if:
(ii) For all 〈x1, ..., xn〉 ∈ Dn and each Ri ∈ {Ri}i∈I and corresponding Ri ∈ {R′i}i∈I :
〈x1, ...xn〉 ∈ Ri ⇔ 〈 f (x1), ..., f (xn)〉 ∈ R′i, and
(iii) f is an injection, i.e. one-to-one map from D to (but not necessarily onto) D′.
45 In all of the below, that f : D → D′ is left as implicit.
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Hopefully the pertinent differences between these mappings is clear. An isomorphism
demands that the two structures have the same structure in the sense that each relation
is fully preserved in both directions. A homomorphism from S → S ′ simply demands
that the relations in S are preserved in the image of the homomorphism. A surjective
homomorphism requires that f map to every element in the domain of S ′ (but as I use
it allows for there to be relations in S ′ that are not preserved). A faithful homomor-
phism from S → S ′ requires that the relations are preserved in both structures, but
differs from an isomorphism in not requiring that the function be a bijection, and thus
S ′’s preserved relations are restricted to the image of the faithful homomorphism. An
isomorphic embedding of S into S ′ is an injection that preserves both sets of relations,
where S ′’s are restricted to the image of the embedding. Each of these have straight-
forward analogs in the partial structures framework. When I need to, I use the term
‘morphism’ to remain neutral between these mappings.
If we replace the term ‘isomorphism’ in Structuralism 1 with any of the above
mappings, we can consider how the resulting account fares with respect to the issues
concerning the logical properties of scientific representation, and whether it can handle
the problem of misrepresentation.
With respect to the logical properties, weaker mappings do fare better than isomor-
phism. None of the above mappings are symmetric, which captures the idea that in
general, models represent their target systems but not the other way around. How-
ever, all of them are reflexive, and some of them remain transitive. So the weaker
mappings alone don’t suffice to establish the logical properties we expect of scientific
representation.
The problem of misrepresentation is more subtle. To start with the partial structures
approach, Bueno and French claim that:
‘With the introduction of partial isomorphism and homomorphism, no re-
quirement is made that the structures that are used to represent other struc-
tures do so with perfect accuracy’ (2011, 888).
For sure, the claim that there is a partial isomorphism f from a scientific model M to
a target system T allows for some degree of misrepresentation. For instance, it allows
that there are objects, or n-tuples of objects, that are not known to be in the extension of
a relation in M (i.e. are in R3 for some Ri) that, as a fact of the matter either are, or are
not, in the extension of the corresponding relation in T. And if partial homomorphism
is used instead, then it allows that there are relations in the target that don’t correspond
to any relation in the model. The first of these cases corresponds to cases where we are
ignorant about whether or not target objects are related by various relations, and the
second to cases where models are abstractions of their targets: models that represent
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only some of the relations in the target system. In this sense it is true that the partial
structures framework has a degree of flexibility that the standard view does not.
But, despite Bueno and French’s claims to the contrary, it remains unclear whether
it stretches far enough. The pertinent cases of misrepresentation I have in mind are
where scientific models are distortive representations; in the terminology of the par-
tial structures approach, where the model represents certain objects as being in the
extension of relations that they are explicitly not in the extension of. These distortions
can come about through deliberate misrepresentation – cases of representation which
from our current perspectives are known to be radically inaccurate in certain respects
– or from the fact that our models, despite our best efforts, are still mistaken about the
structure of their target systems. With respect to the former kind of misrepresentation,
consider for example the case introduced in Chapter 1 of modelling a sand box as a
two dimensional lattice, sand grains as integers associated with cells, and the toppling
rule defined in terms of grains of sand moving to their neighbour cells. In this case,
presumably, the partial structure will include a function on time that governs how
sand grains in the model move. This function will, again presumably, correspond to
a ‘function’ in the sandbox that governs the actual dynamic behaviour of sand grains.
But actual sand grains don’t instantly ‘jump’ in axial directions, and then stay still
(assuming their action doesn’t induce another toppling event), they exhibit inertia: it
takes some time for them to accelerate, and some time for them to come to rest. So
if the partial homomorphism maps a ‘sand grain’ in the model to a sand gain in the
sandbox, then the function in the model will ascribe the sand grain a location which
explicitly doesn’t correspond to the actual location of the sand grain. But this sort of
distortion isn’t captured by the introduction of partial relations in any obvious way.
With respect to the latter sort of misrepresentation; it’s difficult to imagine what sort
of partial homomorphism could be set up between, for example, Thomson’s plum
pudding model of hydrogen atoms (which presumably would include a relation be-
tween locations and charges) and actual hydrogen atoms (which are misrepresented
by the model in the sense that the positive charge is concentrated in the centre of the
atom). The plum pudding model explicitly relates locations away from the centre, and
locations at the centre, of the model with uniform positive electric charge. As a fact of
the matter, this is not so in the case of the actual hydrogen atom. Again, we have an
instance where something in the model is in the extension of a relation in the model,
and what it corresponds to is explicitly not in the corresponding relation in the world.
This precludes a partial homomorphism. So it is at best unclear how partial homo-
morphisms, let alone partial isomorphisms, can account for these kinds of distortive
representations.
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The other morphisms outlined above fare no better with respect to these sorts of
representations either. The most plausible approach, that claims a model M scientifi-
cally represents a target system T if and only if there is a homomorphism from M to
T, allows for there to be relations in the target that are not represented by the model,
but it still demands that every relation in the model accurately represent a relation in
the target. A surjective homomorphism does worse, since it requires that every object
in the target is represented: it precludes abstraction on the level of objects. A faithful
homomorphism does even worse, since it requires that every relation in the target be
accurately represented, at least with respect to their restrictions to the image of the
homomorphism. So, again, a weaker mapping does not seem to have the resources to
deal with misrepresentation, at least of certain kinds.46
Isomorphic embeddings are motivated by a slightly different worry. van Fraassen
(1980) uses them to cash out his structuralist constructive empiricism, i.e. the idea that
we should be committed to what scientific models tell us about the observable world,
and remain agnostic with respect to what they say about the unobservable world. An
isomorphic embedding then, is an embedding of what he calls ‘the appearances’ into
a theoretical model. The appearances are taken to be the structure of the observable
world (more on this in the next chapter), and the embedding ensures that a theoretical
model represents the appearances. Again, this approach cannot deal with misrepre-
sentation of the structure of observable phenomena. Consider, for example, how the
population of predator and prey fish in the Adriatic sea change through time. This
is, presumably, something we can observe. But this would mean that no mathemati-
cal structure that failed to accurately represent the way that these populations change
through time (i.e. any mathematical structure that does not not embed the appear-
ances), could represent the fish. This doesn’t seem right: not all population growth
models are accurate representations. I suspect for this reason, van Fraassen (2008), as
discussed in the next chapter, moves on from using a structure preserving mapping to
answering the ER-problem, to using it as providing the standards of accuracy instead.
Another option, as suggested by Muller is to give up on the idea that there is a
specific morphism that relates all representing models with their targets, and instead
choose a ‘tailor-made morphism on a case by case basis’ (2011, 112). Muller is explicit
that this suggestion presupposes that there is ‘at least one resemblance’ (2011, 112) be-
tween model and target because ‘otherwise one would never be called a representation
of the other’ (2011, 112). While this may work in some cases, it is not a general solution.
Models that are gross distortions of their targets (such as the sandpile model or the
logistic model of a population) may not enter into any structure preserving mapping
46 Pero and Sua´rez (2015) provide a useful discussion where they formally capture the sorts of misrepresen-
tation where each of these mappings fail.
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with their target systems. More generally, as Muller admits, his solution ‘precludes
total misrepresentation’ (2011, 112). So in effect it just limits the view that representa-
tion coincides with correct representation of at least part of the target by at least part
of the model.47 However, this is too restrictive a view of representation. I take it that
total misrepresentations may be useless, but they are representations nevertheless.
So although replacing isomorphism with a weaker mapping in Structuralism 1
provides an answer to the ER-problem which fares better than the purist account, it
still cannot fully account for the logical properties of scientific representation, nor
all instances of misrepresentation. Moreover, these were just two of five objections I
provided at the end of the previous section, and the remaining three objections have
not be addressed. For these reasons I don’t think that a structure preserving mapping,
of any kind, alone will suffice to ground scientific representation. Like naı¨ve similarity,
the account needs additional resources if it is to meet these objections, and, as there,
it would seem that giving up on the idea that representation can be naturalised will
provide, at least part of the story.
5.3 nuanced structuralism
Most of these problems can be resolved by making the same move that lead to Sim-
ilarity 3: introduce agents and proposed theoretical hypotheses into the account of
representation. This delivers the following:
structuralism 2 : A scientific model M represents a target system T if and only
if a model user provides a theoretical hypothesis H specifying that M and T are
appropriately morphic to one another.48
Something similar to this was suggested by Adams (1959, 259) who appeals to the
idea that physical systems are the intended models of a theory in order to differentiate
them from purely mathematical models of a theory. This suggestion is also in line
with van Fraassen’s recent pronouncements on representation. He offers the following
as his ‘Hauptstatz’ of a theory of representation: ‘There is no representation except in
the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent things as thus and so’ (2008,
94, original emphasis). Likewise, Bueno submits that ‘representation is an intentional
act relating two objects’ (2010, 94, original emphasis), and Bueno and French point
47 I remain deliberately vague by what I mean by ‘part’ here, because this could be cashed out in multiple
ways in the structuralist context, for instance by taking restrictions of the model to subsets of its domain,
or restrictions of the model with respect to some of its relations, and so on. Muller’s suggestion of
choosing ‘tailor-made’ morphisms would be compatible with each of the aforementioned suggestions.
48 Structuralism 2 is really a family of positions depending on the specific morphism invoked.
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out that using one thing to represent another thing is not only a function of (partial)
isomorphism but also depends on pragmatic factors ‘having to do with the use to
which we put the relevant models’ (2011, 885).49 This, of course, reliquishes the idea
of an account which reduces representation to intrinsic features of models and their
targets. At least one extra element, the model user, also features in whatever relation is
supposed to constitute the representational relationship between M and T. In a world
with no agents, there would be no scientific representation.
This seems to be the right move. Like Similarity 3, Structuralism 2 accounts
for the logical properties of representation, and as long as the truth of the theoretical
hypothesis isn’t baked into the conditions on representation, then it has no problem
with misrepresentation. Requiring that a model user propose that a model is appro-
priately morphic to a target system also accounts for the fact that many mathematical
structures were studied in their own right by mathematicians before being used to rep-
resent any target system and allows us to differentiate between models that are used
to represent different target systems with ‘the same’ structure. In fact, with the excep-
tion of the problem of non-existing targets, it solves all of the issues I highlighted at
the end of section 5.2. But, again as in the case of Similarity 3, this is Pyrrhic victory
as the role of the morphism has shifted. The crucial ingredient is the agent’s intention
and a morphism has in fact become either a representational style or normative crite-
rion for accurate representation (or both). Let’s see how they fare in response to those
problems.
5.3.1 Structures, style, accuracy, and demarcation
The problem of style is to identify representational styles and characterise them. Iso-
morphism offers one style of representation: one can represent a system by coming up
with a model and proposing that the two are appropriately morphic to one another.
This style also offers a clear-cut standard of accuracy: the representation is accurate if
the hypothesised isomorphism holds; it is inaccurate if it doesn’t.
This is a neat answer. The question is what status it has vis-a`-vis the problem of
style. Is the isomorphism style merely one style among many other styles which are
yet to be identified, or is it in some sense privileged? Just as I granted in the previous
section that intended similarities might provide one style, amongst others, I can grant
that intended isomorphisms might provide one style, amongst others. However, that
49 However, for reasons that I find unclear, they remain sceptical that the intentions of model users be
directly written into the conditions on scientific representation (cf. French, 2003).
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fact that structuralists emphasise isomorphisms, and other morphisms, to such an
extent, it seems that they think that they cover all styles of scientific representation.
This claim seems to conflict with scientific practice. Many representations are dis-
tortions, and known to be. Theoretical hypotheses that specify that models have to
be isomorphic to their targets in order to be accurate miss out ways in which models
can still allow successful surrogative reasoning about their targets, despite not having
exactly the same structure as them. Some models in statistical mechanics have an in-
finite number of particles and the Lotka-Volterra model represents ecological systems
without unlimited food for the prey, and where predators and prey do not reproduce
continuously. These models can be used fruitfully, at least in certain contexts, and for
certain purposes, despite the fact that they are not isomorphic to their target systems.
This raises the question whether other mappings such as homomorphisms, or em-
beddings would fare any better. They would, I think, provide multiple different styles
of scientific representation, but they would not fill all of the gaps. Again, although
they deal well with models that are, in some sense, abstractions of their targets, either
by allowing scientific representations to reflect our ignorance as to whether certain
objects are in the extension of certain relations (partial isomorphisms), or allow our
models to be accurate despite the fact that they fail to represent all relations on the
target domain (homomorphisms), they still cannot account for the fact that models
which are distortions can nevertheless be accurate representations of their target sys-
tems. From a morphism perspective all one can say about such idealisations is that
they are failed morphism representations (or morphism misrepresentations). This is
rather uninformative. One might try to characterise these idealisations by looking at
how they fail to be appropriately morphic to their targets, but I doubt that this is going
to get us very far. Understanding how distortive idealisations work requires a positive
characterisation of them, and I cannot see how such a characterisation could be given
within the morphism framework. So one has to recognise styles of representation
other than the proposed morphisms.
Structuralism’s stand on the demarcation problem is by and large an open ques-
tion. Unlike similarity, which has been widely discussed across different domains,
structuralism is tied closely to the formal framework of set theory, and it has been
discussed only sparingly outside the context of the mathematised sciences. An excep-
tion is French (2003), who discusses structuralist accounts in the context of pictorial
representation. He discusses in detail Budd’s (1993) account of pictorial representation
and points out that it is based on the notion of a structural isomorphism between the
structure of the surface of the painting and the structure of the relevant visual field.
Therefore representation is the perceived isomorphism of structure (French, 2003, 1475-
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1476).50 In a similar vein, Bueno claims that the partial structures approach offers a
framework in which different representations – among them ‘outputs of various in-
struments, micrographs, templates, diagrams, and a variety of other items’ (2010, 94)
– can be accommodated. This would suggest an isomorphism account of representa-
tion at least has a claim to being a universal account covering representations across
different domains.
This approach faces a number of questions. First, neither a visual field nor a paint-
ing is a structure, and the notion of there being an isomorphism in the set theoretic
sense between the two at the very least needs unpacking. The theory is committed to
the claim that paintings and visual fields have structures, but, as I discuss in the next
subsection, this claim faces serious issues. Second, Budd’s theory is only one among
many theories of pictorial representation, and most alternatives do not invoke isomor-
phism. So there is a question whether a universal claim can be built on Budd’s theory.
In fact, there is even a question about isomorphism’s universality within scientific
representation. Non-mathematised sciences work with models that aren’t structures.
Godfrey-Smith (2006), for instance, argues that models in many parts of biology are
imagined concrete objects. There is a question whether isomorphism can explain how
models of that kind represent.
This points to a larger issue. The structuralist view is a rational reconstruction of
scientific modelling, and as such it has some distance from the actual practice. Some
philosophers have worried that this distance is too large and that the view is too
far removed from the actual practice of science to be able to capture what matters
to the practice of modelling (this is the thrust of many contributions to Morgan and
Morrison (1999); see also Cartwright (1999)). Although some models used by scientists
may be best thought of as set theoretic structures, and the way that they represent
their targets might be grounded in a proposed morphism, there are many where this
seems to contradict how scientists actually talk about, and reason with, their models.
Obvious examples include physical models like the Phillips-Newlyn machine, and the
the San Francisco Bay model (Weisberg, 2013), but also systems such as the idealised
pendulum or imaginary populations of interbreeding animals. Such models have the
strange property of being concrete-if-real and scientists talk about them as if they were
real systems, despite the fact that they are obviously not. (Thomson-Jones, 2010, 295-
298) dubs this ‘face value practice’, and provides a useful discussion of how unnatural
the structuralist position looks when applied to such models. The question remains
how to apply the structuralist framework beyond purely mathematical models.
50 This point is reaffirmed by Bueno and French (2011, 864-865); see Downes (2009, 423-425) for a critical
discussion
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So, to sum up. Structuralism 2 fares much better than Structuralism 1 as an
answer to the ER-problem. But it is no longer a morphism between models and their
targets that answers this problem. Instead, it is a proposed morphism, by means of a
theoretical hypothesis. Morphisms themselves now provide the standards of accuracy,
or a style, instead. Even if the stylistic concerns raised in this section, along with the
idea that distortive models can still be accurate representations of their target systems,
at least in some sense, can be addressed, there remains an additional question for any
structuralist account. Target systems are physical objects: atoms, planets, populations
of rabbits, economic agents, etc. By definition, all of the mappings suggested – isomor-
phism, partial isomorphism, homomorphism, or isomorphic embedding – only hold
between two structures. Claiming that a set theoretic structure is isomorphic to a part
of the physical world is prima facie a category mistake. In order to make sense of the
idea that a model is isomorphic (or appropriately morphic) to its target, we have to
assume that the latter somehow exhibits a certain structure. But what does it mean for
a target system – a part of the physical world – to exhibit a structure, and where in the
target system is the structure located? That is the focus of the next chapter.
6
S T R U C T U R A L I S M I I
As far as I can see, there are two places where the structuralist might look for struc-
tures at the target-end of their morphisms. The first is in data. Data can be seen as
mathematical objects, and the sorts of things that can enter into morphisms. The struc-
turalist is at liberty then, to answer the ER-problem by invoking a theoretical hypoth-
esis specifying a morphism between a scientific model and data. If Structuralism 2
is correct, this would then establish that a scientific model represents data. If the mor-
phism holds, then we can grant that the representation is accurate. Alternatively, the
structuralist could try to locate the target-end structure ‘in’ the physical target system
itself, either by appealing to the idea that parts of the world can instantiate structures,
or even are, at base, structures themselves. This would allow physical systems to enter
into morphisms. I discuss both of these strategies in order, but it’s worth noting that
structuralists themselves disagree with respect to which option to take. Van Fraassen
himself describes the suggestion that physical systems can enter into isomorphisms as
a ‘ “dormative virtue” response [which is not] only [...] merely verbal, but [...] also
hijacks a term from mathematics for unwarranted use elsewhere’ (2010, 549).
6.1 data and phenomena
What are data? Data are what are gathered in experiments. When observing the
motion of a planet across the sky, for instance, we choose a coordinate system and at
consecutive instants of time observe the position of the planet in this coordinate system.
These observations are written down, and data thus gathered are the ‘raw data’. The
raw data then is then cleansed and regimented: anomalous data points are rejected;
measurement errors taken into account; scientists take averages; and usually idealise
the data, for instance by replacing discrete data points by a continuous function. Often,
but not always, the result is a smooth curve through the data points that satisfies
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certain theoretical desiderata.51 I call the result of this process a ‘data model’.52 These
resulting data models can be treated as set theoretic structures. In many cases the data
points are numeric and the data model is a smooth curve through these points. Such a
curve is a relation over Rn (for some n), or subsets thereof, and hence it is a structure
in the requisite sense.53
Suppes (1969b) was the first to suggest that data models are the targets of scientific
models: models don’t represent parts of the world; they represent data structures. This
approach has then been adopted by van Fraassen, when he declares that ‘[t]he whole
point of having theoretical models is that they should fit the phenomena, that is, fit
the models of data’ (1981, 667). He has defended this position on multiple occasions
(1980, 64; 1985, 271; 1989, 229; 1997, 524; 2002, 164; 2008, Chapter 7). So models don’t
represent planets, atoms, or populations; they represent data that are gathered when
performing measurements on planets, atoms, or populations.
This revisionary point of view has met with stiff resistance. Muller articulates the
unease about this position as follows:
‘The best one could say is that a data structure D seems to act as simu-
lacrum of the concrete actual being B [...] But this is not good enough. We
don’t want simulacra. We want the real thing. Come on’ (2011, 98).
Muller’s point is that science aims to represent real systems in the world and not data
structures. Van Fraassen calls this the ‘loss of reality objection’ (2008, 258). He points
out that ‘phenomena are actual objects, events, and processes, while [data models] are
the products of our independent intellectual activity’ (2008, 259), and accepts that the
structuralist must ensure that models represent target systems, rather than finishing
the story at the level of data. He addresses this issue in detail and offers a solution
which I turn to below. But before going on, it’s worth clarifying the objection in a little
more detail, and to this end I briefly revisit the discussion about phenomena and data
which took place in the 1980s and 1990s.
51 Harris (2003) and van Fraassen (2008, 166-168) elaborate on this process.
52 Van Fraassen’s discussion throws up a terminological issue that needs regimenting to avoid confusion.
Throughout this chapter I use ‘data model’ rather than van Fraassen’s ‘surface model’ to refer to the
end result of the cleaning and idealising process. I also use ‘scientific model’ in place of van Fraassen’s
‘theoretical model’.
53 The example of numerical data is illustrative. As van Fraassen notes, the process of creating data models
is not restricted to ‘number assigning’, and the resulting structures do not have to have R as their domain.
For example, a measurement procedure may only provide an ordinal ranking, and therefore deliver a
different kind of structure (van Fraassen, 2008, 158-160). This has no bearing on the discussion in this
section.
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Bogen and Woodward (1988) and Woodward (1989) introduced the distinction be-
tween phenomena and data. The difference is best understood by thinking about an
example: the discovery of weak neutral currents (Bogen and Woodward, 1988, 315-
318).54 The model represents particles, neutrinos, nucleons, and the Z0 particle, and
their interactions. The data in this example were 290,000 photographs produced at
the bubble chamber in CERN, and only 100 provided evidence for the existence of
weak neutral currents. The question then is whether the model represents particles
and their interactions, or whether it represents these photographs (or a data model
extracted from them). I think the following observation should persuade us (if it’s
even required) that the former is the case.
As Bogen and Woodward point out, whilst scientists in CERN were taking pictures
of interactions in bubble chambers, scientists at the NAL in Chicago were also per-
forming an experiment to detect weak neutral currents. But their research involved an
entirely different experimental set-up. Rather than bubble chamber photographs, the
NAL experiment recorded patterns of discharge across electronic particle detectors.
This meant that the sorts of data gathered at CERN were completely different to the
sorts of data gathered at NAL. So different, in fact, that it’s difficult to see how the
model that represents particles interacting with in each in a particular manner could
be appropriately morphic to both of them. And yet both experiments provided evi-
dence for the existence of weak neutral currents, and so both were taken to provide
evidence for the same scientific model. As such, I take it that the model, and indeed
models more generally, represent phenomena not data.55
If data are not the ultimate targets of scientific models, then what role do they play
in scientific modelling? Following Frigg (2003, 74), I take it that they perform an evi-
dential function. Data provide evidence for the presence, and features, of phenomena
that are in turn represented by scientific models (cf. Bogen and Woodward, 1988, 305).
A certain pattern in a bubble chamber photograph, or a certain pattern of recorded
electrical discharge, is evidence for the existence of weak neutral currents. How data
provide this evidential support is a difficult question that goes beyond the scope of
this thesis. But I want to stress that I’m not claiming that data are irrelevant to the
practice of scientific modelling. I’m just pointing out that it’s phenomena, not data,
that are the ultimate targets of scientific models.56
54 In the following discussion of this example I draw heavily upon Frigg (2003, 71-72).
55 What ‘phenomena’ are, ontologically speaking is an additional question. I take it that they are a diverse
collection of objects, states of affairs, processes, mechanisms, amongst other kinds of things (cf. Bogen
and Woodward, 1988, 321). But this doesn’t matter for my current purposes. All that matters is that they
are distinct from data, and that they are not mathematical structures.
56 Notice that this does not even preclude data being represented. All I am claiming is that somewhere in
this whole story there has to be an account of how scientific models represent physical phenomena.
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Those who think that data models are the ultimate targets of scientific models have
three options available to them in light of this. Firstly, they can appeal to radical em-
piricism. By taking phenomena to exist independently of the data we gather from
them we have left the realm of observable entities. I doubt that this response will help
much. Firstly, note that it even rules out representing ‘observable phenomena’. To
use van Fraassen’s (2008, 254-260) example, which is discussed in more detail below,
we can consider the case of a population biologist representing the growth of a deer
population through time. If all that is represented is a data model, then strictly speak-
ing, what is represented are data, rather than the deer population itself. Traditionally,
empiricists would readily accept that deer, and the rates at which they reproduce, are
observable phenomena. Denying that they are represented, by replacing them with
data models, seems to be an implausible move. Secondly, as Frigg (2003, 75) points
out, regardless of whether phenomena should be understood realistically (Bogen and
Woodward, 1988) or anti-realistically (McAllister, 1997), it is still phenomena, not data,
that models represent. By suspending belief in the existence of weak neutral currents,
it doesn’t follow that the model discussed above all of a sudden represents bubble
chamber photographs or recorded patterns of electrical discharge.
The second reply is to invoke a chain of representational relationships. Brading and
Landry (2006, 575) point out that the connection between a model and the world can
be broken down in two parts: the connection between a model and a data model, and
the connection between a data model and the world. So the structuralist could claim
that scientific models represent data models in virtue of an isomorphism between the
two and additionally claim that data models in turn represent phenomena. But the
key questions that need to be addressed here are (a) what establishes the representa-
tional relationship between data models and phenomena, and (b) why, if a scientific
model represented some data model, which in turn represented some phenomenon,
that would establish a representational relationship between the model and the phe-
nomenon itself. With respect to the first question, Brading and Landry argue that it
cannot be captured within the structuralist framework. The question has just been
pushed back: rather than asking how a scientific model qua mathematical structure
represents a phenomenon, we now ask how a data model qua mathematical structure
represents a phenomenon.57 With respect to the second question, although scientific
representation is not antitransitive, it is intransitive.58 Suppose I take a photograph
of one of Picasso’s portraits of Dora Maar. The photograph represents the picture,
the picture represents Dora Maar, but the photograph doesn’t represent Dora Maar
57 Van Fraassen’s (2008, Chapters 6,7) account of (a) is discussed below.
58 A relation R is antitransitive if ∀x∀y∀z((Rxy ∧ Ryz) → ¬Rxz). R is intransitive if ¬∀x∀y∀z((Rxy ∧
Ryz)→ Rxy) cf. fn 11 above.
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(cf. Frigg, 2002, 11-12). To illustrate, Figure 7 represents the portrait (along with the
author of this thesis), but not Dora Maar herself.
Figure 7: A picture that represents a portrait of Dora Maar, but doesn’t represent Dora Maar
So more needs to be said regarding how a scientific model representing a data
model, which in turn represents the phenomenon from which data are gathered, es-
tablishes a representational relationship between the first and last element in the rep-
resentational chain.
The third reply is due to van Fraassen (2008). His ‘Wittgensteinian’ solution is to
diffuse the loss of reality objection by appealing to features in the context of using
models to represent their targets.59 He claims that despite the distinction between
data and phenomena, for a given scientist, in a given context, there is no difference
between accurately representing the two. That accurately representing data is the same
as accurately representing the system that provided it is claimed to be a ‘pragmatic
tautology ... [something that is] ... logically contingent but undeniable nonetheless’
(2008, 259).
Van Fraassen’s argument for this is one of the most significant contributions of his
(relatively) recent Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (2008), but it hasn’t
received the attention it deserves. I can only speculate about why, but I suspect that
it is: in part due to the considerable novelty of many of the central notions used; in
part due to the fact that the argument is spread out throughout the book, interwoven
59 The material in the remainder of this chapter is drawn from Nguyen (2016).
6.1 data and phenomena 89
with substantial broader discussions of representation, measurement, and empiricism;
and in part due to a style of presentation that is often difficult to penetrate. In fact, the
project of extracting a coherent position from the rich and intricate lines of thought is
beset with exegetic challenges. Since this is certainly his most developed account of
scientific representation, and, in my opinion, the most developed of all the structuralist
accounts on offer, it’s worth investigating his argument for this claim in detail. This is
my task for the remainder of this section.
But before turning to his argument, it is worth clarifying that he takes a morphism
(or more specifically, an isomorphic embedding) to establish that a pre-existing rep-
resentational relationship is accurate (as per something like Structuralism 2), rather
than establishing the representational relationship itself (as per Structuralism 1).60
This is despite the fact that he starts the discussion with the claim that the central
question to be addressed is:
‘How can an abstract entity, such as a mathematical structure, represent something
that is not abstract, something in nature?’ (2008, 240, original emphasis).
But he then shifts to the question of how a structure can do so accurately:
‘The question how an abstract structure can represent something . . . is just
this: how, or in what sense, can such an abstract entity as a model “save” or fail
to “save” this concrete phenomenon?’ (2008, 245, original emphasis).
And then, when presenting his solution, he couches it in terms of ‘fit’, ‘match’, ‘empir-
ical adequacy’ and so on, and explicitly states:
‘If a model were offered to represent the phenomenon, that structural re-
lation [a model-phenomenon morphism] would determine whether the
model was adequate with respect to its purpose’ (2008, 249-250).
But, as mentioned above, van Fraassen is explicitly aware that phenomena are not
the sorts of things that can enter into morphisms. And he accepts that the structuralist
cannot finish the sort at the level of data. He phrases the objection as follows:
‘Oh, so you say that the only ‘matching’ is between data models and theo-
retical [scientific] models. Hence the theory does not confront the observ-
able phenomena, those things, events, and processes out there, but only
certain representations [i.e. data models] of them.’ (2008, 258).
60 See Thomson-Jones (2011a) for a discussion of how this distinction is important to van Fraassen’s project.
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He then admits that ‘[a]n empiricist account of what the sciences are all about must
absolutely answer this objection’ (2008, 258). Without an answer, the structural em-
piricist is left in the uncomfortable position, whereby it is data, the ‘products of our
independent intellectual activity’, not phenomena, that are the ultimate targets of sci-
entific models. Now onto his argument for the pragmatic equivalence between taking
a model to accurately represent a data model, and taking it to accurately represent the
phenomenon from which the data were gathered. The argument utilises notions that
are relatively novel in the literature on scientific representation. So the first task is to
outline these. This is a necessary first step in any critical evaluation of van Fraassen’s
developed philosophical position.
6.1.1 Toolbox
i . hauptstatz : ‘There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used,
made, or taken, to represent things as thus or so’ (2008, 23, origional emphasis). There
are two important things to note about this. Firstly, it is clearly non-reductive as
it invokes the intentions and acts of agents. Secondly, it involves representation-as,
rather than representation-of.61 Van Fraassen (2008, 16) explicitly refers to Good-
man (1976) as the source of the distinction, and following them I assume that x is a
representation-of y if and only if x denotes y. Representation-as is stronger: x repre-
sents y as thus or so if and only if x denotes y and attributes certain features to y. If
y has those features then x accurately represents y with respect to them. To use one
of van Fraassen’s examples, the proper name ‘Margaret Thatcher’ is a representation
of Margaret Thatcher, since it denotes her. But a caricature of Margaret Thatcher
also represents her as thus or so, e.g. if she is depicted with horns and a tail then it
represents her as being draconian (2008, 13-15).
ii . use of representations : Hauptsatz makes clear that representations only rep-
resent when they are used to do so. But in addition, certain representations have
particular uses: ‘they are typically produced for a certain use, with a certain purpose
or goal’ (2008, 76). Using maps to navigate provides an illustrative example: ‘[a] map
is designed to help one get around in the landscape it depicts’ (2008, 76). Throughout
this discussion I assume that the analogous use of models is to generate predictions
about their target systems. This is supported by van Fraassen’s analogy between us-
ing a map to navigate and using the Aviation Model (AVN) for weather forecasting,
i.e. to generate predictions about the weather (2008, 77).
61 Van Fraassen doesn’t develop what establishes representation-as. In Part iii I do this, but outside of the
structuralist framework.
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iii . logical space : Representations, or at least scientific models, are associated
with ‘logical spaces’. This is a very general notion. Examples include PVT space
in elementary gas theory, phase spaces in classical mechanics, and Hilbert spaces in
quantum theory (2008, 164). Locations in PVT space are combinations of pressure,
volume and temperature. Routes through a phase space are possible trajectories of
an object, and locations in a Hilbert space are possible quantum states of a system.
iv. self-location : A necessary condition on using a map to navigate, or a model
to predict, is that the user self-locates in the logical space provided. They ‘must be in
some pertinent sense able to relate him or herself, his or her current situation, to the
representation’ (2008, 80). In order to navigate with a map, the users must be able
to locate themselves in the terrain depicted and associate that location with an area
on the map. They distinguish a particular map region as representing where they
are, they orient the map to correspond to the direction they’re facing, and so on. In
doing so they locate themselves with respect to the map. When it comes to scientific
models, van Fraassen claims:
‘Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively represents
the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this is so. Suppose
we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so. Then still, before we can go
on to use that model, to make predictions and build bridges, we must
locate ourselves with respect to that model. So apparently we need to have
something in addition to what science has given us here. The extra is the
self-ascription of location’ (2008, 83, original emphasis).
It’s worth clarifying what ‘self-location’ could mean in the spaces under considera-
tion. Although suggested by van Fraassen’s cartographic analogy, I presume that it
doesn’t require that the model user locate herself in logical space. When it comes to
measuring the pressure of his tire (2008, 181), what would it mean for van Fraassen
to locate himself in PVT space? Van Fraassen is 100psi? A more charitable reading of
‘self-location’ is that the model users themselves actively locate the target system in
logical space. And this proceeds in two steps. The model user first adopts a certain
perspective towards the target by taking it to be the sort of thing that can be located
in the logical space provided by the model. For example: van Fraassen takes the tire
to be the sort of object that can be located in PVT space.
But although this may be a necessary condition on using a model to generate a pre-
diction, it is not the condition van Fraassen has in mind when he invokes the carto-
graphic analogy. It isn’t enough that a navigator is located somewhere in the terrain
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depicted; we need to delineate a specific point, or at least an interval or region, of the
space. This is the second step in self-location.
When it comes to generating predictions using scientific models, this is done by in-
putting the target’s initial and boundary conditions:
‘The AVN itself requires input to be run at all, of course: namely initial con-
ditions and lateral boundary conditions obtained from operational weather
centers in the relevant area [...] The model presents a space of possible
states and their evolution over time – the input locates the weather fore-
caster in that space, at the outset of the forecasting process’ (2008, 78, origi-
nal emphasis).
Self-location demands that it is not enough that the system is in fact thereby located,
but the model user must perform an act of location. To speak loosely, the user distin-
guishes a region in logical space with the claim ‘that target system is there’.
v. measurement as location in logical space : ‘the act of measurement is an
act – performed in accordance with certain operational rules – of locating an item in
logical space’ (2008, 165). And these measurements deliver data models. As van
Fraassen notes, the location needn’t be a point, but can be a region (2008, 165). This
can, but doesn’t have to, be the result of measurement imprecision. Even a perfectly
precise pressure reading p determines only a region of PVT space since there are
multiple volume-temperature pairs compatible with p.
vi . measurement as representation : locating a system in logical space involves
representing it as thus or so. This form of representation is not established by a mor-
phism (recall van Fraassen’s worry about invoking a ‘dormative virtue’). Instead,
data models represent because:
‘A measurement is a physical interaction, set up by agents, in a way that
allows them to gather information. The outcome of a measurement pro-
vides a representation of the entity (object, event, process) measured’ (2008,
179-180).
A data model represents the system measured as having the features corresponding
to the region of logical space where it is thereby located. If the system has those
features, the data model is accurate.
vii . pragmatic tautology : ‘a pragmatic tautology is a statement which is logi-
cally contingent, but undeniable nevertheless. Similarly, a pragmatic contradiction is
a statement that is logically contingent, but cannot be asserted’ (2008, 259). Moore’s
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paradox – utterances of the form ‘P and it is not the case that I believe that P’ - is a
classic example of the latter. They are logically contingent - their form is an agent
i asserting ‘P ∧ ¬Bi(P)’, where Bi(P) means i believes that P - and neither conjunct
semantically entails the negation of the other (if they did, i would be clairvoyant).
Such sentences are pragmatic contradictions because, in the context of i asserting P,
i commits herself to believing P. It is this commitment that, when combined with
the second conjunct, makes the sentence unassertable. Since van Fraassen’s account
of scientific representation does not involve linguistic representation, his argument
requires generalising from the assertablity of sentences to certain acts of representa-
tion.
With the above notions in mind, we can now turn to van Fraassen’s argument for the
pragmatic equivalence between taking scientific models to accurately represent data
and phenomena. My primary interest here is not the relationship between data and
phenomena. For my current purposes I simply grant that data represent the systems
from which they were gathered (as per VI. Measurement as representation). I further
grant that morphisms play a role in establishing whether a scientific model represents,
accurately or otherwise, data. I’m concerned with representational relationships be-
tween scientific models and phenomena. Although accurately representing a data
model D might provide us with evidence that M is an accurate representation of T,
this does not establish any representational relationship between M and T. Without
this Loss of Reality remains.
6.1.2 The Wittgensteinian move
Van Fraassen’s resolution to Loss of Reality is to claim that in the context of use there’s
no difference between accurately representing data and phenomena. The reasoning,
which is found in pages 254-60, is illustrated with an example. I present it here before
reconstructing the argument that underpins it. The example in question concerns
only observable features of a target system (the observable-unobservable distinction is
largely irrelevant in the current context). Focusing on observables makes it clear how
important the Wittgensteinian move is to van Fraassen’s project. If he fails to establish
the pragmatic equivalence with respect to observable phenomena, then they fail to
feature in his structuralist account of scientific representation. The result is a far more
radical anti-realist position than has been offered previously, and is a far more radical
position than I suspect van Fraassen would accept.
He begins by considering a scientist representing the growth of the deer popula-
tion in the Princeton region. The scientific model used includes assumptions about
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environmental features: luscious gardens, the council’s culling instinct, its tendency
to experiment with birth-control measures for the local animal population, and so on.
The data model D is supplied by a graph constructed from cleaned up data points
gathered by field researchers measuring samples of ‘values of various parameters over
time’ (2008, 255). Van Fraassen does not specify which parameters are measured, but
given that the theory concerns the deer population growth, I assume that the scientist
literally counts deer in representative regions throughout the duration of the experi-
ment. So the graph plots the number of deer against time. The target system is the
deer population itself.
The scientist has a model M about deer population growth and argues that M is mor-
phic to D. Van Fraassen imagines a philosophical interlocutor, arguing that although
M accurately represents D, the question is whether M accurately represents the popu-
lation itself (2008, 249). The scientist showing the interlocutor that it matches D does
not establish this.
Van Fraassen replies that the scientist has ‘no leeway’ to deny that the model ac-
curately represents the actual population without withdrawing the graph altogether
(2008, 256). According to him, the scientist should say:
‘Since this is my representation of the deer population growth, there is for
me no difference between the question whether [M] fits the graph [i.e. the
data model] and the question whether [M] fits the deer population growth.
If I were to opt for a denial or even a doubt, though without withdrawing
my graph, I would in effect be offering a reply of form:
• The deer population growth in Princeton is thus or so, but the sentence
“The deer population growth in Princeton is thus or so” is not true, for
all I know or believe’ (2008, 249, original formatting).
And since a scientist who replied this way would be faced with a Moorean para-
dox, the scientist simply cannot doubt that the model accurately represents the target
system whilst accepting that it accurately represents the graph. This is supposed to
establish the pragmatic equivalence between the two.
That’s the example, now let’s work out why the scientist might be forced into such
a position. In the rest of this section I reconstruct the argument for this conclusion
in detail. I break it down into three sub-arguments, and show how the notions laid
out in the previous subsection are utilised. It’s important to notice that the first two
arguments — which establish that the scientist must locate the target in the logical
space of the model in order to use it at all, and that this is done with the graph -– are
explicitly concerned with representation simpliciter. This accounts for the scientist’s
6.1 data and phenomena 95
claim that ‘this [data model] is my representation of the deer population growth’ (2008,
249, emphasis in the original). The third argument then shifts to the question of
accurate representation in an attempt to establish that, for that scientist, there is ‘no
difference between the question whether [M] fits the graph and the question whether
[M] fits the deer population growth’ (2008, 249, emphasis added). The first premise
in the third argument makes it explicit how van Fraassen requires that the necessary
act of representation established in the first two arguments must generate doxastic
commitments, i.e. commit the model user to certain beliefs, if the third argument is to
generate the pragmatic equivalence.
(A) The argument for self-location:
a1 . A scientist S is using M to represent a target system T for certain purposes P.
(Premise)
a2 . If S is using M to represent a target T for purposes P, then S must self-locate in
the logical space, L, provided by the model. (Premise)
a3 . S must self-locate in L. (From A2 and A3)
M is a model of deer population growth, T is the target deer population, and the
scientist is using M to represent T for the purpose of generating a prediction (II. Use of
Representations). M provides a logical space L, the space of possible deer populations
and their growth through time (III. Logical Space). A necessary condition on using M
to generate a prediction about T is self-location in L (IV. Self-location).
(B) The argument from self-location to representation-as:
b1 . S self-locates in L using a data model D. (Premise specifying A3)
b2 . If S uses D to self-locate in L, then S uses D to represent T as thus or so (Π).
(Premise)
b3 . S uses D to represent T as Π. (From B2 and B3)
Argument (A) required that the scientist self-locate in L. In van Fraassen’s example,
this is done using a data model D, a graph of the deer population. When S uses D to
represent the target system, S locates T in the logical space provided by the model (V.
Measurement as location). Locating T in a region of L requires representing T as having
the features corresponding to that region (VI. Measurement as representation). Let Π be
the conjunction of predicates that corresponds to that region. This may be a region,
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not a point, so these predicates are of the form ‘the magnitude of Pi is in region ∆’. In
this instance Pi is the size of the deer population at particular times and the size of ∆
corresponds to the potential measurement error induced by the counting process and
the generalisation from representative samples to the population as a whole. So when
using D to locate T in logical space the scientist represents T as Π.
(C) The argument from representation-as to the pragmatic tautology:
c1 . The (pragmatic) content of S using D to represent T as Π includes S believing that
T is Π. (Premise)
c2 . If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to express
disbelief in any proposition concerning T that S commits herself to in using D to
represent T. (Premise)
c3 . If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to express
disbelief that T is Π. (from B3, C1, and C2)
c4 . It is not the case that S is able to express disbelief that T is Π (whilst using D to
represent T), on pain of pragmatic contradiction. (Premise)
c5 . It is not the case that S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T.
(From C3 and C4)
I return to C1 and C2 below. C3 follows from B3, C1 and C2. S represents T as Π
(B3), and in doing so commits herself to the belief that T is Π (C1). This instantiates
the universal quantifier in C2 delivering C3. C4 is the instance of Moore’s paradox
that van Fraassen is concerned with. He claims that if the scientist were to accept that
M accurately represents D but not T, whilst using D to represent T as Π, S would
be offering a reply of in the form of Moore’s paradox (‘the deer population is thus
or so but ...’). Taking D to represent T is analogous to asserting the first conjunct.
Denying that M accurately represents T is analogous to asserting the second conjunct
(VII. Pragmatic tautology). This generates the pragmatic equivalence between accurately
representing T and D (C5).
6.1.3 The argument scrutinised
With the argument reconstructed, I now turn to my critical discussion. My objections
are the following. Firstly, the pragmatics of representation don’t induce doxastic com-
mitments: acts of representation don’t commit the agent doing the representing to any
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relevant beliefs. So C1 is false. Secondly, one option available to van Fraassen is to
amend C1 to the claim that S takes D to accurately represent T as Π. But this isn’t
supported by (A) and (B): it would require that in order to use a scientific model to
generate a prediction, the model user must believe the inputted initial/boundary con-
ditions. This is false. My final objection concerns C2, I argue that without an account
of scientific representation (irrespective of accuracy), it’s difficult to get a grip on what
it would mean for S to deny that M accurately represents T.
The pragmatics of representation
The argument has the following macro structure. Models are used to generate predic-
tions about their targets and a necessary condition on doing this is that the user locate
the target in the model’s logical (A). This is typically done with a data model, and
when S uses a data model to locate a target system T in such a way, S represents T as
Π (B). So far so good.
C1 is vital for rest of the argument, since it is the move from S representing T as
Π to pragmatically committing herself to the belief that T is Π that is required to
generate the pragmatic tautology. Using the data model to represent the target system
is supposed to commit S to the belief that the deer population is thus or so in a way
analogous to asserting the first conjunct of the Moorean paradox. The denial that
the model accurately represents the deer population then provides the analogy with
asserting the second.
But all arguments (A) and (B) established is that S represents T as Π. And acts
of representation do not incur the same pragmatic commitments as acts of assertion.
Consider the example of representing Margaret Thatcher as draconian. A caricaturist
can represent Thatcher as such without committing herself to the belief that Thatcher
is draconian. There is a vital pragmatic difference between acts of representation and
assertions. If the caricaturist were to assert that Margaret Thatcher was draconian, then
she would commit herself to believing such. But the caricaturist doesn’t do this; she
merely represents Thatcher in such a way. The artist could have been commissioned
to draw the caricature despite having only a vague idea of who Thatcher was, and
no knowledge about her time as Prime Minister. The artist can reasonably draw the
caricature, thereby representing her as draconian, whilst at the same time remaining
agnostic about her character. The same point applies to scientific representation: S’s
act of representing the target system in a certain way doesn’t pragmatically commit
her to the belief that the target is that way.
It pays to be careful here. My claim does not concern whether or not S actually
believes that T is Π, it is a conceptual point regarding the pragmatics of assertion
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and representation. Presumably in most cases, model users do believe that the ini-
tial/boundary conditions used are (at least approximately) accurate. But this does not
establish that an agent’s act of representing something in a particular way commits that
agent to any particular beliefs in the way that acts of assertion do in the traditional
version of Moore’s paradox. So C1 is false, S’s act of representing a target system as
thus or so doesn’t commit S to the belief that the target is thus or so. Therefore (C) is
unsound.
A possible response is to invoke a weaker doxastic attitude than belief as being
incurred in representing a target system. And although this attitude might not de-
liver the Moorean paradox van Fraassen discusses, it may deliver a closely related
pragmatic contradiction that still allows a version of (C) to go through. In other con-
texts van Fraassen invokes the attitude of acceptance (Muller and van Fraassen, 2008).
Accepting a theory, or model, is to take it to be empirically adequate: to believe its ob-
servable content and to remain agnostic about its unobservable content (acceptance is
typically applied to scientific models, but here I’m considering applying it to data). So,
what happens if, in using D to represent T as Π, S commits herself to accepting that T
is Π? Well that depends on T and Π. We can distinguish between the observable and
unobservable content of Π(T), denoted Π(T)O and Π(T)U respectively. If S accepts
Π(T), then S commits herself to believing Π(T)O and being agnostic about Π(T)U , i.e.
not believing Π(T)U or ¬Π(T)U (see Muller and van Fraassen, 2008, 204).
For neither of these types of content will acceptance do the work required. Re-
garding observable content we are back where we started. Accepting that Thatcher
is draconian entails believing that she is. And an agent can represent her in such a
way without taking on this commitment. Regarding unobservable content, S accepting
Π(T)U entails ¬Bs(Π(T)U) and ¬Bs(¬Π(T)U). But this will not generate a pragmatic
contradiction when combined with the second conjunct of van Fraassen’s instance of
Moore’s paradox, i.e. ¬BS(Π(T)) (even restricted to its unobservable content).
Invoking acceptance when an agent uses a data model to represent a target doesn’t
work. But the above discussion suggests another available strategy available to van
Fraassen. It proceeds in two steps. Firstly, introduce a weaker act than assertion – call
it entertaining – and assume that an act of entertaining that P incurs a commitment to
not believing ¬P. Again this alone doesn’t generate a pragmatic contradiction when
combined with ¬Bi(P). But it does when combined with Bi(¬P). The second step is to
move from a Moorean paradox of the form P∧¬Bi(P) to one of the form P∧ Bi(¬P) –
i.e. from sentences like ‘it’s raining and I don’t believe it’s raining’ to ‘it’s raining and
I believe that it’s not raining’. (C) then becomes (C*):
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c1*. The (pragmatic) content of S using D to represent T as Π includes S not believing
that it is not the case that T is Π. (Premise)
c2*. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to express
belief in the negation of any proposition concerning T that S commits herself to
in using D to represent T. (Premise)
c3*. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to express
belief that it is not the case that T is Π. (From B3, C1*, and C2*)
c4*. It is not the case that S is able to express belief that it is not the case that T is Π
(whilst using D to represent T), on pain of pragmatic contradiction. (Premise)
c5*. It is not the case that S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T.
(From C3* and C4*)
Assuming that an act of representation is an act of entertaining, in using D to rep-
resent T as Π, S pragmatically commits herself to not believing that it is not the case
that T is Π , i.e. ¬BS(¬Π(T)) (C1*). Further assume that S denying that M accurately
represents T whilst accepting it accurately represents D, induces a commitment to be-
lieving that it is not the case that T is Π (C2* and C3*). This is a stronger commitment
than assumed in C, BS(¬Π(T)) rather than ¬BS(Π(T)). Under these assumptions, if
S were to take M to accurately represent D but not T, whilst at the same time using
D to represent T, she would be offering a reply with the following commitments: ‘It’s
not the case that I believe that T isn’t Π and I believe that T isn’t Π’. This would be a
pragmatic contradiction.
(C1*) requires that in using D to represent T as Π, S entertain that T is Π, and there-
fore commit herself to not believing that T isn’t Π. However, the following example
shows that even this commitment is not incurred by acts of representation. Consider a
different caricaturist representing Margaret Thatcher as draconian. This time assume
that the Labour Party has commissioned the caricature and the artist is a staunch Con-
servative. He goes ahead and draws the picture because he is desperate for the money.
In drawing the caricature the artist represents Thatcher as draconian, but he certainly
doesn’t believe it. In fact, he explicitly believes that she isn’t draconian to the extent
that he sings her praises whilst drawing the caricature. This makes him feel better
about drawing something that goes so strongly against his political beliefs. Now, if,
in representing Thatcher as draconian, the artist commits himself to not believing that
she isn’t, then his act of drawing her as such whilst singing the negation would be a
pragmatic contradiction. But although a strange situation, this isn’t the case. Acts of
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representing that P don’t incur the pragmatic commitment to ¬Bi(¬P). So C1* is false,
and (C*) unsound.
From self-location to belief
Despite van Fraassen’s phrasing, the above concerns suggest that argument (C) shouldn’t
start from the premise that S uses D to represent T as Π, but rather S takes D to accu-
rately represent T as Π. Rather than:
‘Since [D] is my representation of the deer population growth, there is for me
no difference between the question whether [M] fits [D] and the question
whether [M] fits the deer population growth’ (2008, 256, original emphasis)
the scientist should say:
Since I take D to be an accurate representation of the deer population
growth, there is for me . . .
It’s plausible that in taking D to accurately represent T as Π, S commits herself to
believing that T is Π. But since B3 only got us as far as representation, the preceding
argument needs amending. Argument (A) stays as it is. In order to use a model to
generate a prediction, the model user must self-locate in its logical space. (B) gets
revised to (B†):
b1† . S self-locates in L using a data model D. (Premise specifying A3)
b2† . If S uses D to self-locate in L, then S takes D to accurately represent T as Π.
(Premise)
b3† . S takes D to accurately represent T as Π. (From B2† , B3†)
And if this can be established then a revised version of (C) runs as follows62:
c1† . The (pragmatic) content of S taking D to accurately represent T as Π includes S
believing that T is Π. (Premise)
c2† . If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to express
disbelief in any proposition concerning T that S commits herself to in taking D
to accurately represent T. (Premise)
62 (C†) is a revised version of (C), not (C*), but my criticisms can be run against a revised version of the
latter as well.
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c3† . If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to express
disbelief that T is Π. (From B3† , C1† , and C2†)
c4† It is not the case that S is able to express disbelief that T is Π (whilst using D to
represent T), on pain of pragmatic contradiction. (Premise)
c5† . It is not the case that S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T.
(From C3† , C4†)
But although (C†) seems plausible in isolation, the argument as a whole is not, for B2†
is false.
To see why, recall what self-location required. The model user had to adopt a certain
perspective towards the target by taking it to be the sort of thing that could be located
in the model’s logical space. She then had to delineate an area within that space for
the target. This was a necessary condition on generating a prediction using the model.
But neither of these steps commits the agent to any beliefs. In particular, in using a
data model to self-locate in a model’s logical space, the model user does not thereby
commit herself to the data’s accuracy.
Consider again the example of the deer population. In order to use her model to
generate a prediction about its size, the scientist had to input an initial number of,
and fitness values for, the deer. The model allows the scientist to make any number
of predictions about the future size of the population. If the scientist inputs a low
fitness value – imagine a pro-cull council – then the model will predict a small future
population. If the scientist initially assumes that the deer population is too large
for the region to support, then the model will predict population decline. And so
on. The scientist can use the model to generate numerous predictions about the deer
population regardless of whether or not she believes these values to be accurate. All
of these inputs serve to delineate the logical space of the model, and some input is
necessary to generate a prediction about the target. But she is not required to believe
them.
Other examples abound. Some are of scientists failing to believe that the logical
space of a model is correct. Ptolemaic models can be used to generate predictions
about planetary orbits without the user believing that those planets in fact are lo-
cated anywhere in the model’s logical space. State of the art global climate models
(GCMs) contain variables that are known to describe model-processes with no direct
real-world correlates. These variables – in that context typically referred to as ‘param-
eters’ – are loosely related to sub-grid processes such as small-scale convection and
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cloud coverage. However, their values depend to a large extent on details of the par-
ticular computational scheme used rather than on the state of the world. So we have
here a case where scientists don’t believe that the logical space is correct (at least not
completely correct), and yet they pick values for certain variables in order to make
calculations (Bradley et al., 2016). And this is no isolated instance; one can find similar
cases, for example, in economics (Friedman, 1953) and population dynamics.63
The problems don’t end here. Even supposing that the scientist believes that the
logical space is correct, they still needn’t believe that the target is located in the region
delineated by the model input. For example, representative concentration pathways
(RCPs) are used to locate the global climate in the logical space of GCMs. They supply
concentration trajectories of the main forcing agents of climate change. One particular
pathway, RCP2.6, requires that we essentially eliminate greenhouse gas emissions im-
mediately, something that no one believes is, or will be, the case. And yet RCP2.6 is
widely used to generate numerous predictions about the global climate (see the 2013
IPPC report (Stocker et al.), Ch.12 in particular).
The point is that the scientists can use models to generate predictions about target
systems without adopting any epistemological position towards the model, or where
the target is located in its logical space. As stressed previously, this isn’t to say that
scientists don’t believe that their data models and initial/boundary conditions are (at
least approximately) accurate. My claim is that this belief is not a necessary condition
on using a model to generate a prediction. As such it is not part of the pragmatic
content of locating a target in logical space. And this is what van Fraassen requires.
So, although (C†) may seem plausible in isolation, it rests on (B†) for its support, which
in turn rests on the false premise B2†. So the argument as a whole is unsound.
Representation and accurate representation
I hope by now to have shown that van Fraassen’s argument fails. But before moving
on, it is worth highlighting a further issue with the argument. It concerns accurate
representation, and the question of what establishes the prior representational rela-
tionship is not addressed. I suspect that van Fraassen would fall back on his Hauptsatz
and claim that representation cannot be analysed beyond this. But this does not help
when we look at C2 (or its variants). In particular, what would it mean for S to deny
that M accurately represents T? Van Fraassen’s phrasing suggests that in doing so S
would take M to represent T, but to do so inaccurately. In this sense the deer scientist
would be effectively asserting the second conjunct of van Fraassen’s version of Moore’s
63 See for example Weisberg and Reisman (2008) who offer individual-based versions of the Lotka-Volterra
model that start from the assumption that individuals move about on a 30× 30 toroidal lattice.
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paradox (the sentence ‘the deer population is thus or so’ is not true for all I know or
believe).
But this needn’t be the question the philosophical interlocutor asks. Rather than
asking whether the scientific model matches the phenomenon, they can ask whether
the model represents it in the first place (perhaps by doubting whether Structualism
2 is the correct answer to the ER-problem). And if the scientist were to doubt that M
represents T in this sense, then (C) (and its variants) will again fail irrespective of my
previous criticisms. I have established that acts representation failed to incur doxastic
commitment. But what about representational denial, as it occurs in C2/C2*/C2†?
Consider a caricature that depicts David Cameron as draconian. Denying that it rep-
resents Margaret Thatcher doesn’t incur a commitment to believing (or disbelieving)
anything about Thatcher, other than she isn’t the one caricatured. That an agent incur
any doxastic commitments in the denial of representational relationships is even less
plausible than him incurring them when affirming them.
For these reasons, van Fraassen’s attempt to establish a pragmatic equivalence be-
tween taking a scientific model to accurately represent data (via a morphism), and
accurately represent the phenomenon from which the data was gathered doesn’t seem
to work. This leaves the question of target-end structures unanswered. I’m sceptical
that data provide them, so it’s now time to turn to the alternative option available to
the structuralist: locate the target-end structures in the phenomena themselves.
6.2 the structure of the world
Locating target-end structures ‘in’ the target themselves can be done in at least two
different ways: one can either argue that target systems, in some sense, instantiate
structures; or alternatively one can attempt to identify target systems with structures. I
discuss each of these approaches in turn.
6.2.1 Structure instantiation
The idea that target systems instantiate structures is intuitively straightforward. Recall
the definition of a structure given in the previous chapter:
S = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉
where D is a domain of objects, and each Rni an extensionally defined n-ary relation
over Dn. The idea then, is that a physical system can instantiate such a structure in
virtue of consisting of a collection of parts that enter into various physical relations
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with one another. The objects can then be used to define the domain of individu-
als, and by considering the physical properties and relations purely extensionally, we
arrive at a class of extensional relations defined over that domain (see for instance
Suppes’ (2002, 22) discussion of the solar system). This supplies the required notion
of structure. We might then say that physical systems instantiate a certain structure,
thus providing a candidate for the proposed morphism to link to a scientific model.
As an example consider the methane molecule. The molecule consists of a carbon
atom and four hydrogen atoms grouped around it, forming a tetrahedron. Between
each hydrogen atom and the carbon atom there is a covalent bond. One can then take
the atoms to be the objects and the bonds to be the relations. Denoting the carbon atom
by a, and the four hydrogen atoms by b, c, d, and e, we obtain a structure S with the
domain {a, b, c, d, e} and the relation R21 = {〈a, b〉, 〈b, a〉, 〈a, c〉, 〈c, a〉, 〈a, d〉, 〈d, a〉, 〈a, e〉,
〈e, a〉} which is the extensional counterpart to the relation of being connected by a
covalent bond.
The main problem facing this approach is the underdetermination of target-end
structure. Underdetermination threatens in two distinct ways. Firstly, in order to de-
termine the structure determined by a target system, a domain of objects is required.
What counts as an object in a given target system is a substantial question (Frigg, 2006).
One could just as well choose bonds as objects and consider the relation to be the shar-
ing of a node with another bond. Denoting the bonds by α, β,γ, and δ, we obtain a
structure S ′ with the domain {α, β,γ, δ} and the relation R′21 = {〈α, β〉, 〈β, α〉, 〈α,γ〉,
〈γ, α〉, 〈α, δ〉, 〈δ, α〉, 〈β,γ〉, 〈γ, β〉, 〈β, δ〉, 〈δ, β〉, 〈γ, δ〉, 〈δ,γ〉, }. Obviously S and S ′ are
not isomorphic (their domains don’t even have the same cardinality). So which struc-
ture is picked out depends on how we think about the system; depending on which
parts we take to be objects and which parts we take to be relations, very different
structures can emerge.
I take it that there is nothing special about the methane molecule in this regard, and
that any target system can be carved up in different ways, each of which delivers an
alternative structure instantiated by the target. So I think that the lesson generalises:
there is no such thing as the structure of a target system. Systems only have a structure
when certain things are taken as objects, and others are taken as relations. And there
are many non-equivalent ways of thinking about target systems in this way. So in
order to make sense of the structuralists’ idea that scientific representation (accurate
or otherwise) is grounded in the fact that scientific models are appropriately morphic
to their targets, we have to take into account how the target system is ‘carved up’.
Under one carving of a target T, a model M might be morphic to T, under another it
might not. But then this carving has a role to play in establishing the representation
relation. So an account of scientific representation should explicate this role.
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Figure 8: The structure of a methane molecule (cf. Frigg, 2006, 57)
One way of thinking about how we ‘carve up’ target systems is the way in which
we describe them. In the case of the methane molecule we can describe it as a system
of atoms related by bonds, which gives rise to S , or a system of bonds related by
sharing a node with one another, which gives rise to S ′ instead. And when the system
is described as in the former case, the latter structure is, in some sense, illegitimate
(and mutatis mutandis when it is described as in the latter case). I think it’s plausible
that introducing the notion of a ‘target-system-under-a-description’ will provide a way
in which to discriminate between the multiple structures that arise in the manner
discussed above.
Whether this is an acceptable way of dealing with the problem of multiple structures
depends on how austere one’s conception of models is. The semantic view of theories,
which is most strongly associated with the structuralist accounts of scientific represen-
tation, was in part an attempt to divorce scientific representation from any linguistic
trappings. Many proponents of the view emphasised that the model-world relation-
ship ought to be understood as a purely structural relation, without any reference to
language. Van Fraassen, for instance, rather boldly, claims that ‘no concept which is
essentially language dependent has any philosophical importance at all’ (1980, 56) and
takes it that ‘[t]he semantic view of theories makes language largely irrelevant’ (1989,
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222). And other proponents of the view, while less vocal about the irrelevance of lan-
guage, have not assigned language a systematic place in their analysis of theories or
scientific representation.
For someone who wants to exorcise language from scientific representation the
above argument is bad news. However, a more liberal position could integrate de-
scriptions in the package of modelling, but this would involve abandoning the idea
that representation can be cashed out solely in structural terms. Bueno and French
have recently endorsed such a position. They accept the point that different descrip-
tions lead to different structures and explain that such descriptions would involve
‘at the very least some minimal mathematics and certain physical assumptions’ (2011,
887). Likewise, ‘Munich’ structuralists explicitly acknowledge the need for a concrete
description of the target-system (Balzer et al., 1987, 37-39). This is a plausible move,
but those endorsing this solution have to concede that there is more to representation
than structures and morphisms.
The second way in which structural indeterminacy can surface is via Newman’s
theorem. The theorem essentially says that any system instantiates any structure, the
only constraint being cardinality.64 Hence, any structure of cardinality Γ is isomorphic
to a target of cardinality Γ because the target instantiates any structure of cardinality
Γ.
The argument can be run as follows. Assume M = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I〉 is a scientific
model, |D| = Γ (where the vertical bars denote cardinality in the usual way), and M
represents a target system whose domain D′ is such that |D′| = Γ. Then we can prove
that there exists a structure T , whose domain is D′ and M is isomorphic to T . We
do so by first noting that since |D| = |D′|, there exists a bijection pi : D → D′. Then
for each Rni ∈ {Ri}i∈I we can define a relation R′ni as follows: R′ni = {〈y1, ..., yn〉 ∈
D′n : 〈pi−1(y1), ...,pi−1(yn)〉 ∈ Rni }. Doing this for all Rni ∈ {Ri}i∈I , and letting the
indices of the constructed relations on D′ match the indices of the relations on D
from which they were constructed, we arrive at an indexed set of relations {R′i}i∈I
on the n-ary products of D′. Then, by letting T = 〈D′, {R′i}i∈I〉, we have provided
a structure of the target system that is isomorphic to M by construction. Since we
started with an arbitrary M, and the only constraint on the construction is that the
target system have a domain whose cardinality matched that of the model’s domain, it
follows that the target system will instantiate a structure isomorphic to any scientific
model whatsoever, as long as their cardinalities match.65 And this means that the
proposal that the target and model are isomorphic in Structuralism 2 will be correct
64 A very similar conclusion is reached in Putnam’s so-called model-theoretic argument; see Demopoulos
(2003) for a discussion.
65 See Ketland (2004); Frigg and Votsis (2011); Ainsworth (2009) for further discussions of this objection.
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just so long as the two have the same cardinality (other morphisms are satisfied even
more easily). Which will mean that accurate representation boils down to getting the
cardinality of the target right.
Newman’s theorem is both stronger and weaker than the argument from multiple
conceptualisations of the target. It’s stronger in that it provides more alternative struc-
tures. It’s weaker in that many of the structures it provides are ‘unphysical’ because
the relations defined may be purely set theoretical combinations of elements. By con-
trast, the multiple conceptualisations of the target pick out structures that a system
can reasonably be seen as possessing in a substantial sense. The above response of
picking out target-end structures via descriptions might work again here. By describ-
ing the relations on the domain of the target we rule out ones that don’t correspond
to something we have described, thereby, at least in some cases, ruling out the re-
lations constructed by Newman’s theorem. In the literature, solutions to Newman’s
objection either turn on linguistic considerations about how to to construct so-called
‘Ramsey-sentences’ and/or require that among all structures formally instantiated by
a target system one is singled out as being the ‘true’ or ‘natural’ structure of the system
(Ainsworth (2009) provides as a useful summary of the different solutions). The first
family of solutions is not available to the structuralist, since they have no systematic
place for linguistic formulations of theories or models. Moreover, how to single out a
single structure as being the ‘natural’ or ‘true’ one instantiated by a target system in
the structuralist framework remains unclear.
6.2.2 The world is a structure
An alternative way of picking out the structures of the target system is more radical.
Rather than appealing to the idea that they instantiate them, one might instead identify
target systems with structures. If this is the case then there is no problem with the
idea that they can be morphic to a scientific model. One might expect ontic structural
realists to take this position. If the world fundamentally is a structure, then there is
nothing mysterious about the notion of an morphism between a model and the world.
Surprisingly, some ontic structuralists have been hesitant to adopt such a view (see
French and Ladyman (1999, 113) and French (2014, 195)). Others, however, seem to
endorse it. Tegmark (2008), for instance, offers an explicit defence of the idea that the
world simply is a mathematical structure. He defines a seemingly moderate form of re-
alism – what he calls the ‘external reality hypothesis (ERH)’ – as the claim that ‘there
exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans’ (Tegmark,
2008, 102) and argues that this entails that the world is a mathematical structure (his
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‘mathematical universe hypothesis’) (Tegmark, 2008, 102). His argument for this is
based on the idea that a so-called ‘theory-of-everything’ must be expressible in a form
that is devoid of human-centric ‘baggage’ (by the ERH), and the only theories that are
devoid of such baggage are mathematical, which, strictly speaking, describe mathe-
matical structures. Thus, since a complete theory of everything describes an external
reality independent of humans, and since it describes a mathematical structure, the
external reality itself is a mathematical structure.
This approach stands or falls on the strengths of its premise that a complete theory of
everything will be formulated purely mathematically, without any ‘human baggage’,
which in turn relies on a strict reductionist account of scientific knowledge (Tegmark,
2008, 103-104). Discussing this in any detail goes beyond my current purposes. But it
is worth noting that Tegmark’s discussion is focused on the claim that fundamentally
the world is a mathematical structure. Even if this were the case, it seems irrelevant
for many current scientific models, whose targets aren’t at this level. When modelling
an aeroplane wing we don’t refer to the fundamental super-string structure of the
bits of matter that make up the wing, and we don’t construct wing models that are
isomorphic to such fundamental structures. So Tegmark’s account offers no answer to
the question about where structures are to be found at the level of non-fundamental
target systems.
So, as discussed in Chapter 1, the ER-problem is not distinct from questions of
ontology, and any structuralist answer to the former requires that there is a target-end
structure with which scientific models could be appropriately morphic to. Where to
find this structure remains, by and large, an open question. Appealing to data fails
to account for the fact that, ultimately at least, scientific models represent phenomena.
The alternative approach, of appealing to the idea that phenomena themselves are
‘structured’ faces underdetermination issues that have yet to be resolved within the
structuralist framework.
7
F I C T I O N S A N D T H E D I R E C T V I E W
The theories of representation I have discussed so far take it for granted that there are
model systems and construe representation as a relation between two entities; these
and their target systems. Following Toon (2012, 43), this can be called the indirect view
of scientific representation.66 In the case of physical models this relation simply relates
two physical objects. In the case of non-physical models, the idea is that descriptions of
models pick out non-physical model systems, which in turn represent target systems.
Such an approach can be clearly seen in the views discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6:
these non-physical model systems are either abstract objects, fictions, or mathematical
structures, and these objects are the vehicles of scientific representation in virtue of
some (possibly intended) similarity relation between them and their targets.
This can be contrasted with the direct view which aims to do without model systems
at all and takes scientific descriptions to directly describe (in a certain fashion) target
systems themselves.67,68 In this chapter I outline the direct view associated with Toon
(2010b,a, 2012) and Levy (2015) and argue that it is unmotivated; that it has trouble
accounting for models lacking target systems (for one reason or another); and that the
comparison of ‘models’ and their targets remains undeveloped.
7.1 who needs model-systems anyway?
To understand the direct view, it is useful to briefly outline what it is a reaction to.
According to the indirect view, scientific descriptions – be they descriptions of specific
66 Weisberg (2007) takes this as a defining feature of scientific modelling and argues that cases of scientific
representation which are not indirect should not be considered cases of scientific modelling.
67 Levy (2012), who discusses the direct vs. indirect views in the context of fictional accounts of the ontology
of scientific models refers to the former as the ‘worldly fiction’ view, and the latter as the ‘whole cloth’
view. In his more recent discussion of the issue he uses Toon’s terminology (Levy, 2015).
68 In the case of physical models the idea would be that they too describe, in some sense, target systems,
without treating them as model systems in their own right. I return to this when explicating the direct
account below.
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models (‘imagine an infinite population of rabbits breeding at such and such a rate’),
or classes of models (T = 2pi
√
m/k, where T = an oscillation period, m is a mass term,
and k a spring constant) – pick out model systems (an infinite population of rabbits,
ideal pendulums) which in turn represent target systems (an actual finite population
of rabbits, an actual bob bouncing on a spring). As discussed in Chapter 1, this ap-
proach faces the problem of ontology; what are these model systems when they are
not physical?
Levy (2015) discusses two ways of answering this question; these model systems
can be taken to be abstract objects, without physical properties, or they can be taken to
be concrete but hypothetical objects, to which we can ascribe physical properties, even
if we do not bear spatiotemporal relations to them in any straightforward sense. One
popular way of cashing out the latter approach is to appeal to the idea that model
systems are fictions in the same way that the characters and situations in Lord of
the Rings, or the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, are fictions (Godfrey-Smith, 2006;
Frigg, 2010a,b).
Both Levy and Toon think that the idea that models are fictions is a step in the right
direction, but they both argue that appealing to the idea that they are stand-alone
systems is unnecessary. Rather than treating them as systems in their own right –
entirely distinct from their targets – we should instead take model descriptions to be
fictional in the same way that we (or at least Levy and Toon) take historical fiction to
be fictional. To borrow Levy’s example, I Claudius, both the book and the TV series, is
a fiction. But we don’t need to invoke a separate ‘world’ of which every sentence in
the book is true. Rather, we can treat the book as being directly about actual historical
Rome, albeit in such a way that the sentences needn’t necessarily be literally true of it.
By bypassing model systems entirely they take it that they have avoided the problem
of ontology altogether.
So let’s turn to the details of their accounts. Since Levy (2015, 790) sees his approach
as ‘largely so complementary to Toon’s’ I present Toon’s account before turning to
Levy’s.
Toon (2010b,a, 2012) takes as his point of departure Walton’s (1990) pretense theory.
At the heart of this theory is the notion of a game of make-believe. The simplest ex-
amples of these games are children’s plays (Walton, 1990, 11). In one such play we
imagine that stumps are bears and if we spot a stump we imagine that we spot a
bear. In Walton’s terminology the stumps are props, and the rule that we imagine a
bear when we see a stump is a principle of generation. Together a prop and principle
of generation prescribe what is to be imagined. If a proposition is so prescribed to be
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Figure 9: A statue of Napoleon on horseback (public domain)70
imagined, then the proposition is fictional in the relevant game.69 The set of propo-
sitions actually imagined by someone need not coincide with the set of all fictional
propositions in the game. It could be the case that there is a stump somewhere that no
one has seen and hence no one imagines that it’s a bear. Yet the proposition that the
unseen stump is a bear is still fictional in the game.
Walton considers a vast variety of different props. In the current context two kinds
are particularly important. The first are objects like statues. Consider a statue show-
ing Napoleon on horseback (Toon, 2012, 37). The statue is the prop, and the games of
make-believe for it are governed by certain principles of generation that apply to stat-
ues of this kind. So when seeing the statue we are mandated to imagine, for instance,
that Napoleon has a certain physiognomy and certain facial expressions. We are not
mandated to imagine that Napoleon was made of bronze, or that he hasn’t moved for
more than 100 years.
The second important kind of props are works of literary fiction. In this case the text
is the prop, which together with principles of generation appropriate for novels of a
certain kind, generates fictional truths by prescribing readers to imagine certain things.
For instance, when reading The War of the Worlds we are prescribed to imagine that
the dome of St Paul’s Cathedral has been attacked by aliens and now has a gaping
hole on its western side (Toon, 2012, 39).
69 The term ‘fictional’ has nothing to do with falsity; rather it indicates that the proposition is ‘true in the
game’.
70 Available here https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Napoleon_statue_cherbourg.jpg#
/media/File:Napoleon_statue_cherbourg.jpg.
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In Walton’s theory something is a representation if it has the social function of serv-
ing as a prop in a game of make believe, and something is an object of a representation
if the representation prescribes us to imagine something about the object. In the above
examples the statue and the written text are the props, and Napoleon and St Paul’s
Cathedral, respectively, are the objects of the representations.
The crucial move now is to say that models are props in games of make-believe.
Specifically, material models – such as an architectural model of the Forth Road Bridge
– are like the statue of Napoleon: the model is the prop and the Bridge is the object
of the representation (Toon, 2012, 39). The same observation applies to non-physical
models, such as the mechanical model of a bob bouncing on a spring. The model
portrays the bob as a point mass and the spring as perfectly elastic. Rather than
thinking of the model as a system in its own right, we are urged to treat the model
description as representing the real ball and spring system in the same way in which a
literary text represents its objects (Toon, 2012, 39-40): the model description prescribes
imaginings about the real system – we are supposed to imagine the real spring as
perfectly elastic and the bob as a point mass. This supplies the following direct account
of scientific representation:
direct view : ‘M is a model-representation if and only if M functions as a prop in a
game of make-believe’ (Toon, 2012, 62)
where M ranges over physical models and model-descriptions in the case of non-
physical models.
It should now be apparent how Toon’s account is a direct view of modelling. Theo-
retical model descriptions represent actual concrete objects, e.g an actual bob bouncing
on a spring. There is no intermediary entity of which model descriptions are literally
true and which are doing the representing. Models prescribe imaginings about a real
world target, and that is what representation consists of. The same holds in the case of
physical models; although they are objects in their own right, the way they represent
their targets is by prescribing us to imagine certain things about their targets.
It’s worth briefly outlining how Direct View answers the questions laid out in
Chapter 1. Firstly, as least as the definition is stated, the view appears committed to
the idea that there is no demarcation between scientific and non-scientific epistemic
representation. Just as the Phillips-Newlyn machine prescribed imaginings about an
economy, the statue prescribes imaginings about Napoleon. Both function as props
in games of make-believe. Indeed Direct View goes as far as to include all works of
literary fiction (or at least all that Walton’s approach reasonably applies to) within its
purview. However, Toon does note a possible distinction between scientific modelling
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and works of fiction. He suggests that the former involves the representation of vari-
ous different objects at different times (i.e. in virtue of prescribing us to imagine things
about different target systems in different contexts), whereas ‘it seems that the object
(or objects) of a work of fiction are usually fixed: paintings or novels rarely represent
different objects at different times’ (2012, 63).
As previously mentioned, the account doesn’t face the problem of ontology, since
the only ‘objects’ involved beyond target systems are physical models and model-
descriptions. The account has little to say about the problem of style, or the applica-
bility of mathematics. But this is not to say that they couldn’t be incorporated within
the framework. One way of doing this could be to group together different props, or
principles of generation, in such as way as to form the locus of a classification system
by styles. For example, the principles of generation associated with particle physics
seem very different to the principles of generation associated with population biology.
Alternatively, material models seem to prescribe imaginings about their targets in a
different manner to the way linguistic model-descriptions do. Similarly, the account
could be extended in such a way that when the model-descriptions are mathematical
in character, they prescribe us to imagine that their targets are governed by mathe-
matical equations, an insight that could be extended to provide a more fully fledged
account of the applicability of mathematics and one that to the best of my knowledge,
hasn’t been considered in the literature concerning that question. The problem of mis-
representation is dealt with in a straightforward manner, since there is no expectation
that what a model prescribes us to to imagine about a target systems be literally true
of that system.
Unfortunately, the account fares less well with respect to answering the ER-problem
in such a way that accounts for surrogative reasoning and provides standards of accu-
racy, and in addition, has trouble dealing with models without target systems.
7.2 we need model-systems
7.2.1 Model-target comparisons
Answering the ER-problem requires providing an account of in virtue of what models
represent their targets that explains how they are used to reason about their targets.
The surrogative reasoning condition, in Toon’s framework, amounts to explaining the
relationship between claims we are prescribed to imagine about target systems, and
claims that we should import to target systems. The inferential use of models is the
inferential relationship between these two types of claims. According to Direct View,
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models represent their targets simply by prescribing us to imagine certain things about
them. But imagining that the target has a certain feature does not tell us how the
imagined feature relates to what we should take the target to actually have, and so
there is no mechanism to transfer model results to the target. Imagining the pendulum
bob to be a point mass tells us nothing about which, if any, claims about point masses
are also true (or better, which we should take to be true) of the real bob.
As far as I can see, there are two ways that Toon could explain the relationship
between fictional propositions and imported propositions. The first is to simply take
them to be the same. Every proposition prescribed to be imagined, by either a concrete
model or a model description, should also be imported directly onto the relevant target
system. The second is to introduce a mechanism of transfer that relates fictional and
imported propositions. I discuss both of these options in order.
The first option doesn’t sit well with scientific practice for two reasons. Firstly, it’s
not the case that everything that a model prescribes us to imagine gets imported onto
its target system, at least by competent model-users. In Chapter 6 I discussed state of
the art global climate models that contain variables that are known to describe model-
processes with no direct real-world correlates. These provide a case where the model
descriptions prescribe us to imagine something about a target system, which explicitly
is not imported. In fact, it’s plausible that the model users don’t even imagine that the
target has any process corresponding to what’s going on in the model whatsoever, let
alone imagine them but withhold imputation.
The second, and more worrying, issue is that, even restricted to fictional proposi-
tions that are taken to correspond, in some sense, to something in the target system,
the idea that an imagined proposition is just taken to hold directly in the target seems
implausible. When we imagine that an inclined plane is frictionless we don’t import
this onto the inclined plane. Rather, we import something like ‘the fiction on the sur-
face of the plane is low enough to be negligible’. And the same applies to countless
other instances of scientific modelling; what a model (or model-description) prescribes
us to imagine about a target rarely, if ever, corresponds exactly to what a competent
model user imports to the target itself. And if this is what Toon has in mind, then
under the assumption that the standards of accuracy associated with the account are
that what is imagined is true, his account has the unfortunate consequence that the
majority, if not all, of scientific models are inaccurate representations, without telling
us anything about why they are useful.
An alternative approach is to distinguish between fictional propositions and those
the model user should import to the target system. For instance, in some cases it
could be the case that when a model prescribes the user to imagine something about
the target, then the model user should take this to be ‘approximately’ true, or ‘true
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enough’. In the case of the frictionless plane model, the model user might import that
the claim ‘the surface of the plane is frictionless’ is approximately true when literally
applied to the plane itself. But clearly the details of the transfer mechanism between
imagined propositions and what is imported need to be spelt out, and Toon provides
little information about how to go about doing this.
In response to these difficulties, Levy (2015) invokes Yablo’s (2014) notion of ‘partial
truth’. The core idea of this view is that a statement is partially true
‘if it is true when evaluated only relative to a subset of the circumstances
that make up its subject matter – the subset corresponding to the relevant
content-part’ (Levy, 2015, 792).
Levy submits that this will also work for a number of cases of modelling and illustrates
it using how the ideal gas model explains Boyle’s law, the claim that the pressure of a
fixed amount of gas at a constant temperature is inversely proportional to its volume.
He writes:
‘The model is an instruction to regard (imagine) a real world gas as if it
had various features (including non-colliding molecules). When it is used
to explain real-world Boylean behavior, we are in effect told that because
of the specified features, the gas behaves in a Boylian way. This, we know
full well, cannot be true as stated, because the gas simply doesn’t have all
the specified features (in particular, its molecules collide all the time). Here
we bring in partial truth: the model (or, more precisely, the derivation
of its Boylean behavior) is partially true and partially untrue: true with
respect to the role of energy distribution, but false with respect to the role
of collisions’ (Levy, 2015, 794).
The ideal gas model includes a content part pertaining to molecular energy distri-
bution of gas particles and a part pertaining to the lack of collisions between these
particles. It is true with respect to the first part, and false with respect to the second.
This means it’s partially true, and this suffices for it to explain Boyle’s law, an observed
proportionality between the pressure and volume of an actual gas to which the model
has been applied.
The notion of partial truth is used to augment Direct View in order to explain how
we use models to reason about target systems, and provide standards of accuracy. The
idea is that when a model prescribes us to imagine something about a target system,
what we are to imagine is supposed to be partially true of the system, and if this is
the case, then the model is an accurate, or fruitful representation of that system. This
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certainly seems like a step in the right direction, but a lot hangs on whether the notion
of partial truth can do the job for all models. Levy is explicit that
‘there are other sorts of cases, which may be harder to capture in terms
of partial truth. Sometimes, a model treats some factor in a system in an
idealized fashion, and this factor modulates the relationship between two
other factors (where the latter, let’s suppose, are depicted accurately). In
this kind of case [...] it is often not obvious what the model says about
the relationship between the non-idealized factors, and whether that can
be treated as a partial truth (Levy, 2015, 795).
Consider the model of the sand pile introduced in Chapter 1. We can suppose that,
according to Direct View, the description prescribes us to imagine, of an actual sand
pile, that it sits on a discrete two dimensional lattice; sand grains are cubes that land
on cells; and move as governed by the toppling rule. According to Levy, when using
this model to represent an actual sand pile the model user should take these claims
to be partially true. But this doesn’t seem right. The content circumstances that make
up the subject matter of the model are actual sand grains and their motions. But
no one thinks that sand grains are perfect cubes, or that they move as governed by
the defined toppling rule. At best, we might say that what the model invites us to
imagine is ‘partially true’ in the sense that some of the claims it invites us to imagine
(that sand piles end up in SOC states) are approximately true. But it is unclear how
to accommodate the idea that some of the claims a model invites us to imagine are
approximately true using Yablo’s notion of partial truth, at least in cases where the
relevant content of the model includes idealised claims that are known to be, strictly
speaking, false. The fact sand grains are not perfect cubes, and do not move according
to the toppling rule, is a crucial part of the model and cannot be clearly ‘partitioned
out’ in the way that Levy suggests the role of collisions can in the ideal gas model. So,
at best, it remains an open question whether the notion of partial truth will be able to
provide the appropriate standards of accuracy required by using Direct View as an
answer to the ER-problem.
7.2.2 Target-less models
The next issue is that not all models have a target system, which is a serious problem
for a view that analyses representation in terms of imagining something about a target.
Toon is well aware of this issue and calls them ‘models without objects’ (2012, 76).
Some of these are models of discredited entities like the ether and phlogiston, which
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were initially thought to have a target but then turned out not to have one. But not all
models without objects are errors: architectural plans of buildings that are never built
or models of experiments that are never carried out fall into the same category.
Toon addresses this problem by drawing another analogy with fiction. He points
out that not all novels are like The War of the Worlds, which has an actual object, St
Paul’s Cathedral, of which we are invited to imagine things about. Passages from
Dracula, for instance, ‘do not represent any actual, concrete object but are instead
about fictional characters’ (2012, 54). Models without a target are like passages from
Dracula. So the solution to the problem is to separate the two cases neatly. When a
model has a target then it represents that target by prescribing imaginings about the
target; if a model has no target it prescribes imaginings about a fictional character.
Toon immediately admits that models without targets ‘give rise to all the usual
problems with fictional characters’ (2012, 54). However, he seems to think that this is
a problem we can live with because the more important case is the one where models
do have a target, and his account offers a neat solution there. So what his account
requires is a sharp distinction between how models with targets work compared to
how models without targets work. In the former case, they prescribe us to imagine
that their targets have certain features; in the latter case, they prescribe us to imagine
that some fictional target system has certain features.
This bifurcation of imaginative activities raises questions. The first is whether it
squares with scientific practice. In some cases we are mistaken about whether or not
a model has a target system: we think that the target exists but then find out that it
doesn’t (as in the case of ether and phlogiston). But does that make a difference to the
imaginative engagement with a phlogiston model of combustion? Even today we can
understand and use such models in much the same way as its original protagonists
did, and knowing that there is no target seems to make little, if any, difference to
our imaginative engagement with the model. Of course the presence or absence of
a target matters to many other issues, most notably surrogative reasoning (there is
nothing to reason about if there is no target!), but it seems to have little importance for
how we imaginatively engage with the scenario presented to us in a model. In other
cases it is simply left open whether there is a target when the model is developed.
In elementary particle physics, for instance, a scenario is often proposed simply as a
suggestion worth considering and only later, when all the details are worked out, the
question is asked whether this scenario bears an interesting relation to what happens
in nature, and if so what the relation is. So, again, the question of whether there is or
isn’t a target seems to have little, if any, influence on the imaginative engagement of
physicists with scenarios in the research process.
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In contrast to Toon, Levy offers a radical solution to the problem of models without
targets: there aren’t any! He first broadens the notion of a target system, allowing
for models that are only loosely connected to targets (2015, 796-979). To this end he
appeals to Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) notion of ‘hub-and-spoke’ cases: families of mod-
els where some are simple and well understood (which makes them the hub models)
and the others are connected to them via conceptual links (spokes) but include all
sorts of additional modelling assumptions necessary to accurately represent specific
target systems. Godfrey-Smith mentions population growth models as examples. He
assumes that something like the Lotka-Volterra model introduced in Chapter 1 is the
‘hub’ model. And once it’s applied to actual populations, which involves introducing
additional assumptions about the reproduction and death rates of prey and preda-
tors, taking into account multiple different populations competing for resources and
so on, then we arrive at a ‘spoke’ model. According to Levy, we should take the
Lotka-Volterra hub model as a model with a ‘generalised target’, population growth
in the abstract.71 More detailed models of specific target systems, based on the Lokta-
Volterra equations, are then the ‘spokes’ attached the hub model.
If something that looks like a model doesn’t meet the requirement of having even a
generalised target, then it’s not a model at all. Levy mentions structures like Conway’s
game of life and observes that they are ‘bits of mathematics’ rather than models (2015,
979). This eliminates the need for fictional characters in the case of target-less models.
Notice that although Levy may be correct that that we do not have to deal with
things like Conway’s Game of Life when developing an account of modelling, it seems
far fetched to make the same claim about Toon’s other examples of target-less models.
Things like models of ether or phlogiston, or architectural models of things that are
never built, strike me as clear cut instances of scientific representation, despite the fact
that they don’t have target systems. So I don’t think that an account that remains silent
about them is fully satisfactory.
Toon and Levy differ with respect to how they treat target-less models. The for-
mer takes them to work as per Direct View; but they prescribe us to imagine things
about fictional systems, rather than any concrete target system. The latter attempts to
minimise the instances of target-less models by appealing to the idea of a generalised
target. And for cases where this won’t work, he is happy to bite the bullet and accept
71 This claim is in tension with my discussion in Chapter 1 where I made it explicit that Volterra was
interested in a specific target population, fish in the Adriatic sea, rather than population growth in
general. The tension arises because historically the model had a specific target system, but has been
superseded by more complex models that account for more and more details about that system. The
question why the original, relatively simple, model is still discussed and investigated in population
biology, despite the fact that it is no longer used to represent specific systems, is answered, according to
Levy, by the fact that it has ‘population growth’ as a generalised target.
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that they are not models at all, and thus does ‘not think we need to tailor our account
of modeling to accommodate [them]’ (2015, 979).
The question, then, is whether either of these approaches is acceptable. As I discuss
in the next subsection, one of the primary motivations for adopting Direct View in the
first place is its apparent ontological parsimony. Rather than having to invoke abstract
objects (fictional, mathematical, or something else entirely), scientific modelling is ex-
plained in terms of homely imaginings about actual objects. No ontological inflation
is required. But in having to appeal to fictional (in the case of Toon), or generalised (in
the case of Levy) target systems, the accounts are no more ontologically parsimonious
(at least with respect to ontological types) than the indirect accounts. Both have to
invoke at least some non-physical objects of which models are about.72 So one of the
key motivations for Direct View over its competitors is lost.
7.2.3 The direct view is unmotivated
My main issue with the direct view is that I don’t think it is very well motivated. It
is clear that both Toon, and Levy’s primary interests are ontological considerations,
rather than attempting to address the ER-problem first, and then considering the im-
plications this has for the problem of ontology as a question of secondary importance.
Both of them motivate their accounts by rejecting the idea of thinking about models
as abstract entities, preferring instead to think about them as concrete hypothetical
systems akin to works of fiction. But then, they argue that once we do this, then we
should no longer adopt an indirect view of scientific representation, since their pre-
ferred (Waltonian) account of fiction does not require invoking fictional-systems that
exist independently of the sorts of objects we are prescribed to imagine things about.
Toon writes:
‘So if we are to understand model-systems in the same way that Walton un-
derstands fictional characters then it seems we would conclude that there
are no model-systems’ (2012, 58)
and goes on to argue against Frigg’s (2010a) attempt to reconcile a Waltonian view of
the ontology of models with an indirect view of how they represent.
Similarly, Levy argues that:
72 In the case of Levy’s generalised target systems the targets are things like population growth or complex
behaviour, not applied to any particular system, and these are not concrete things like rabbits, stumps,
or clock pendulums.
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‘[W]e have good reasons to treat models as concrete and to assign a central
role to the imagination in model development and analysis. However, iden-
tifying models with imaginary entities, even if in the end they are nothing
but mere make-believe, is problematic because it is hard to make sense of
model-target comparisons on such a view’ (2015, 791)
and goes on to argue that by shifting to a direct view of representation instead, the
model-target comparisons can be handled by Yablo’s partial truth of what models
prescribe us to imagine.
My preferred take on the relationship between the problem of scientific representa-
tion and the question of the ontological status of models is the other way around. I
think we should first attempt to answer the ER-problem, and then look at the onto-
logical implications such answers have. I grant that this may be a matter of taste, but
I think that semantic considerations are more tractable that ontological ones. From
the discussions in the previous subsections, I hope I have made it clear that the direct
account, as it turns out, isn’t any more ontologically parsimonious that its competitors,
and therefore doesn’t answer the ontological questions in a way that gives it an edge
over the indirect view. But most importantly, Direct View fails to provide an account
of the representational relationship between models and their targets. Toon has noth-
ing to say about this question, and although Levy’s attempt to invoke the notion of
partial truth is a step in the right direction, it fails to deal with distortive models.
I think if we were to focus on semantic considerations first and foremost, leaving
ontological questions as secondary, then the path towards the Direct View becomes
much less attractive. As noted at the beginning of this chapter Weisberg (2007) takes
indirectness to be a defining characteristic of scientific modelling, and by abandoning
it, Levy and Toon assimilate modelling with other kinds of scientific practice. This
misses out an important feature of how scientists use models to represent their target
systems. Volterra didn’t start out by closely investigating fish in the Adriatic Sea,
and imagining certain things of them. He explicitly constructed a scientific model,
and then used that to represent the fish. Bak and his collaborators didn’t start off by
directly imagining things about sand piles, they constructed a two dimensional lattice
and investigated its dynamical properties under their toppling rule.73 Models can be
constructed, and investigated, without reference to any target system whatsoever, and
Direct View, by focusing on ontology first and foremost, makes no room for these
types of investigations.
73 In fact, it’s not clear whether they were interested in sand piles at all. In Bak et al. (1987) they first offer
a model consisting of a system of pendulums, and then reinterpret the formalism in terms of sand piles.
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This is not to say that I would hold onto the methodological principal of seman-
tics first, ontology second, come what may. If it were the case that models have to
be thought of as fictional, and that the only way to make sense of model-target com-
parisons in this context is to appeal to the direct view of representation, then so be
it.74 But I remain unconvinced that either of these claims is true. As I discuss in Part
iii my own account of scientific representation is compatible with various accounts
of the ontological status of models, and even if models are best construed as fictions,
this doesn’t not preclude us comparing their properties with properties of the target
systems. Moreover, my account provides a unified framework in which to think about
target-less models that does not require invoking either fictional or generalised targets,
and makes sense of the fact that models can be investigated in their own right.
74 However, even Levy (2012, 746) accepts that, at least when it comes to models with actual targets, both
the indirect and direct views are compatible with scientific practice.
8
I N F E R E N T I A L I S M
In this chapter I discuss accounts of scientific representation that analyse representa-
tion in terms of the inferential role of scientific models. On the previous accounts
discussed, a model’s inferential capacity dropped out of whatever it was that was sup-
posed to answer the ER-problem: proposed morphisms or similarity relations between
models and their targets, for example. The accounts discussed in this section build the
notion of surrogative reasoning directly into the conditions on epistemic representa-
tion.
In contrast to the ideas discussed in the previous chapters, no canonical ‘inferen-
tialist’ positions have emerged in the debate, presumably at least in part because of
their considerable novelty. For this reason, this chapter is explicitly structured around
the individual authors Sua´rez (2004, 2015), Sua´rez and Sole´ (2006), Contessa (2007),
Ducheyne (2012), Hughes (1997), and Frigg (2010a). Their accounts are discussed in
the order listed here.
8.1 deflationism
Sua´rez argues that we should adopt a ‘deflationary or minimalist attitude and strategy’
(2004, 770). I discuss deflationism in some detail below but in order to formulate and
discuss Sua´rez’s theory of representation at least a preliminary idea of what is meant
by a deflationary attitude is needed. In fact, two different notions of deflationist are in
operation in his account. The first is
‘abandoning the aim of a substantive theory to seek universal necessary
and sufficient conditions that are met in each and every concrete real in-
stance of scientific representation ... necessary conditions will certainly be
good enough’ (2004, 771).
I call the view that an answer to the ER-problem should provide only necessary con-
ditions n-deflationism (‘n’ for necessary). The second notion is that we should seek
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‘no deeper features to representation other than its surface features’ (2004, 771) or
‘platitudes’ (Sua´rez and Sole´, 2006, 40) and that we should deny that an analysis of a
concept ‘is the kind of analysis that will shed explanatory light on our use of the con-
cept’ (Sua´rez, 2015, 39). I call this position s-deflationism (‘s’ for surface level feature).
As far as I can tell, Sua´rez intends his account of representation to be deflationary in
both senses. He provides the following answer to the ER-problem.
inferentiaism 1 ‘[M] represents [T] only if (i) the representational force of [M]
points towards [T], and (ii) [M] allows competent and informed agents to draw
specific inferences regarding [T] ’ (2004, 773).
In keeping with his n-deflationism Inferentialism 1 features a material conditional
rather than a biconditional and hence provides necessary (but not sufficient) condi-
tions for M to represent T. Let’s see how each of these conditions satisfy s-deflationism.
The first condition is designed to make sure that M and T indeed enter into a rep-
resentational relationship, and Sua´rez stresses that representational force is ‘necessary
for any kind of representation’ (2004, 776). But explaining representation in terms of
representational force seems to shed little light on the matter as long as no analysis
of representational force is offered. Sua´rez addresses this point by submitting that the
first condition can be ‘satisfied by mere stipulation of a target for any source’ (2004,
771).75 One might think that this is denotation, a condition that features in the ac-
counts discussed below and in the next part of this thesis, but Sua´rez stressed that this
is not what he intends for two reasons. Firstly, he takes denotation to be a substan-
tive relation between a model and its target, and the introduction of such a relation
would violate the requirement of s-deflationism (Sua´rez, 2015, 41). Secondly, M can
denote T only if T exists. And thus, including denotation as a necessary condition
on scientific representation ‘would rule out fictional representation, that is, representa-
tion of nonexisting entities’ (Sua´rez, 2004, 772), and ‘any adequate account of scientific
representation must accommodate representations with fictional or imaginary targets’
(Sua´rez, 2015, 44). The second issue is one that besets other accounts of representation
too, in particular similarity and isomorphism accounts. In Chapter 9 I provide a solu-
tion that keeps denotation as a condition. So non-existent targets need not necessarily
be a reason to ban denotation from a theory of representation. The first reason, how-
ever, goes right to the heart of Sua´rez’s account: it makes good on the s-deflationary
condition that nothing other than surface features can be included in an account of
representation. At a surface level one cannot explicate ‘representational force’ at all,
and any attempt to specify what representational force consists in is a violation of
s-deflationism.
75 Sua´rez uses ‘source’ as I use ‘vehicle’ to refer to the object (e.g. picture or model) doing the representing
8.1 deflationism 124
The second necessary condition, that models allow competent and informed agents
to draw specific inferences about their targets, is in fact just the surrogative reasoning
condition I introduced in Chapter 1, now taken as a necessary condition on scientific
representation. The sorts of inferences that models allow are not constrained. Sua´rez
points out that the condition ‘does not require that [M] allow deductive reasoning and
inference; any type of reasoning – inductive, analogical, abductive – is in principle
allowed (Sua´rez, 2004, 773). A problem for this approach is that we are left with no
account of how these inferential rules are generated: what is it about models that
allows them to licence inferences about their targets, or what leads them to licence
some inferences and not others? Contessa makes this point most stridently when he
argues that:
‘On the inferential conception, the user’s ability to perform inferences from
a vehicle [model] to a target seems to be a brute fact, which has no deeper
explanation. This makes the connection between epistemic representation
and valid surrogative reasoning needlessly obscure and the performance
of valid surrogative inferences an activity as mysterious and unfathomable
as soothsaying or divination’ (2007, 61).
This seems correct, but Sua´rez can dismiss this complaint by appeal to s-deflationism.
Since inferential capacity is supposed to be a surface level feature of scientific repre-
sentation, we are not supposed to ask for any elucidation about what makes an agent
competent and well informed, or how inferences are drawn.
For these reasons Sua´rez’s account is deflationary both in the sense of n-deflationism
and of s-deflationism. His position provides a conception of representation that is
cashed out in terms of an inexplicable notion of representational force and of an inex-
plicable capacity to ground inferences. This is very little indeed. It is the adoption of
a deflationary attitude that allows him to block any attempt to further unpack these
conditions and so the crucial question is: why should one adopt deflationism? I turn
to this question below, but it is useful to first see how the account fares with respect
to the additional questions and conditions of adequacy discussed in Chapter 1.
The account provides a neat explanation of the possibility of misrepresentation:
‘Part (ii) of this conception accounts for inaccuracy since it demands that
we correctly draw inferences from the source about the target, but it does
not demand that the conclusions of these inferences be all true, nor that all
truths about the target may be inferred’ (Sua´rez, 2004, 776).
Models represent their targets only if they license inferences about them. They rep-
resent them accurately to the extent that the conclusions of these inferences are true.
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With respect to the representational demarcation problem it is clear that the conditions
of Inferentialism 1 are met by non-scientific as well as scientific epistemic represen-
tations, so, at least as it stands without sufficient conditions, there is no clear way
of demarcating between the different kinds of epistemic representation. And given
that Sua´rez illustrates his account with a large range of representations, including dia-
grams, equations, scientific models, and non-scientific representations such as artistic
portraits (like Vela´zquez’s portrait of Innocent X), and that he explicitly states that ‘if
the inferential conception is right, scientific representation is in several respects very
close to iconic modes of representation like painting’ (2004, 777) I presume that he
agrees with this outcome.
Given the wide variety of types of representation that this account applies to, it’s
unsurprising that Sua´rez has little to say about the ontological problem. The only con-
straint that Inferentialism 1 places on the ontology of models is that ‘[i]t requires [M]
to have the internal structure that allows informed agents to correctly draw inferences
about [T]’ (Sua´rez, 2004, 774, emphasis added). And relatedly, since the account is
supposed to apply to a wide variety of entities, including equations and mathematical
structures, the account implies that mathematics is successfully applied in the sciences,
but in keeping with the spirit of s-deflationism no explanation is offered about how
this is possible.
Sua´rez does not directly address the problem of style, but a minimalist answer
emerges from what he says about representation. On the one hand he explicitly ac-
knowledges that many different kinds of inferences are allowed by the second condi-
tion in Inferentialism 1. In the passage quoted above he mentions inductive, analog-
ical and abductive inferences. This could be interpreted as the beginning of classifica-
tion of representational styles. On the other hand, Sua´rez remains silent about what
these kinds are and about how they can be analysed. This is unsurprising because
spelling out what these inferences are, and what features of the model ground them,
would amount to giving a substantial account, which is something Sua´rez wants to
avoid.
I now return to the question about the motivation for deflationism. As I have dis-
cussed, a commitment to deflationism about the concept is central to Sua´rez’s ap-
proach to scientific representation. But deflationism comes in different guises, which
Sua´rez illustrates by analogy with deflationism with respect to truth. Sua´rez (2015)
distinguishes between the ‘redundancy’ theory (associated with Frank Ramsey, also
referred to as the ‘no theory’ view), ‘abstract minimalism’ (associated with Crispin
Wright) and the ‘use theory’ (associated with Paul Horwich).76 What all three are
76 Here I concentrate on what Sua´rez says about these accounts, rather than their original presentations.
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claimed to have in common is that they accept the disquotational schema – i.e. in-
stances of the form: ‘ϕ’ is true if and only if ϕ. Moreover they ‘either do not provide
an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or if they do provide such
conditions, they claim them to have no explanatory purchase’ (Sua´rez, 2015, 37).
Starting with the redundancy theory of truth (abstract minimalism and the use the-
ory are discussed in the next section) Sua´rez claims that it is characterised by the idea
that ‘the terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ do not admit a theoretical elucidation or analysis.
But that, since they can be eliminated in principle – if not in practice – by disquotation,
they do not in fact require such an analysis’ (2015, 39). So, as Sua´rez characterises the
position, the redundancy theory denies that any necessary and sufficient conditions
for application of the truth predicate case be given. He argues that:
‘the generalization of this ‘no-theory theory’ for any given putative con-
cept X is the thought that X neither possesses nor requires necessary and
sufficient conditions because it is not in fact a ‘genuine’, explanatory or
substantive concept’ (2015, 39).
This is supposed to motivate n-deflationism.77
This approach faces a number of challenges. First, the argument is based on the
premise that if the no theory view is good for truth it must be good for representation.
This premise is assumed tacitly. There is, however, a question whether the analogy
between truth and representation is sufficiently robust to justify subjecting them to
the same theoretical treatment. Surprisingly, Sua´rez offers little by way of explicit ar-
gument in favour of the no theory account of (or indeed any deflationary approach to)
scientific representation. In fact, the natural analogue of the linguistic notion of truth
is accurate epistemic representation, rather than epistemic representation itself, which
may be more appropriately compared with linguistic meaning. Second, the argument
insinuates that no theory view is the correct analysis of truth. This, however, is far
from an established fact. Different positions are available in the debate and whether
deflationism (or any specific version of it) is superior to other proposals remains a
matter of controversy (see, for instance, Ku¨nne (2003)). But as long as it remains un-
clear whether the no theory account about truth is a superior position, it’s hard to see
how one can muster support for the no theory approach to scientific representation by
appealing to deflationism about truth.
More significantly, a position that allows only necessary conditions on epistemic
representation faces a serious problem. While such an account allows us to rule out
77 However, even here, it remains unclear why the approach would motivate giving even necessary condi-
tions.
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certain scenarios as instances of epistemic representation (for example a proper name
doesn’t allow for a competent and well informed language user to draw any specific
inferences about its bearer and Callender and Cohen’s salt-shaker discussed in Chapter
2 doesn’t allow a user to draw any specific inferences about Madagascar), the lack of
sufficient conditions doesn’t allow us to rule in any scenario as an instance of epistemic
representation. So on the basis of Inferentialism 1 we are never in a position to assert
that a particular model actually is a scientific representation, which is an unsatisfactory
situation.
8.2 inference , representation, and levels of abstraction
The other two deflationary positions in the debate over truth Sua´rez draws on are
abstract minimalism and the use theory. Sua´rez characterises the use theory as being
based on the idea that ‘truth is nominally a property, although not a substantive or
explanatory one, which is essentially defined by the platitudes of its use of the pred-
icate in practice’ (2015, 40). Abstract minimalism is presented as the view that while
truth is ‘legitimately a property, which is abstractly characterized by the platitudes, it
is a property that cannot explain anything, in particular it fails to explain the norms
that govern its very use in practice’ (2015, 40). Both positions imply that necessary
and sufficient conditions for truth can be given. But on either account, such conditions
only capture non-explanatory surface features. This motivates s-deflationism.
Since s-deflationism explicitly allows for necessary and sufficient conditions, Infer-
entialism 1 can be extended to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on scien-
tific representation:78
inferentialism 2 : A model M represents a target T if and only if (i) the represen-
tational force of M points towards T, and (ii) M allows competent and informed
agents to draw specific inferences regarding T.
Depending on how conditions (i) and (ii) are interpreted, we arrive at an analog of
either the use theory, or abstract minimalism.
If one takes the conditions to refer to ‘features of activates within a normative prac-
tise, [that] do not stand for relations between sources and target’ (Sua´rez, 2015, 46),
then we arrive at a ‘use-based’ account of scientific representation. In order to under-
stand a particular instance of a model M representing a target T we have to understand
78 Which also seems to be in line with Sua´rez and Sole´ (2006, 41) who provide a formulation of inferential-
ism with a biconditional
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how scientists go about establishing that M’s representational force points towards T,
and the inferential rules, and particular inferences from M to T, they use and make.79
Plausibly, such a focus on practice amounts to looking at the inferential rules em-
ployed in each instance, or type of instance, of scientific representation. This, however,
raises a question about the status of any such analysis vis-a´-vis the general theory of
representation as given in Inferentialism 2. There seem to be two options. The first
is to affirm Inferentialism 2’s status as an exhaustive theory of representation. This,
however, would imply that any analysis of the workings of a particular model would
fall outside the scope of a theory of representation because any attempt to address
Contessa’s objection would push the investigation outside the territory delineated by
s-deflationism. Such an approach seems to be overly purist.
The second option is to understand Inferentialism 2 as providing abstract condi-
tions that require concretisation in each instance of scientific representation. Studying
the concrete realisations of the abstract conditions is then an integral part of the theory.
This approach seems plausible, but it remains unclear whether this approach is truly
‘deflationary’. Thus understood, the view becomes indistinguishable from a theory
that accepts the surrogative reasoning condition, along with a condition that demands
models are about their targets in a way that targets are not about their models, and
then analyses these conditions in a pluralist spirit, that is, under the assumption that
these conditions can have different concrete realisers in different contexts. If these
realisers are substantial properties of the activities of the normative practice of sci-
ence, then each specific instance of scientific representation will not be analysed in
a deflationary manner, even if the ‘concept’ in general is analysed solely in terms of
platitudes.
One might worry that these responses unfairly stack the deck against inferentialism
and point out that different inferential practises can be studied within the inferentialist
framework. One way of making good on this idea would be to submit that the infer-
ences from models to their targets should be taken as conceptually basic, denying that
they need to be explained; in particular, denying that they need to be grounded by any
(possibly varying) relation(s) that might hold between models and their targets. Such
an approach is inspired by Brandom’s inferentialism in the philosophy of language
where the central idea is to reverse the order of explanation from representational no-
tions – like truth and reference and so on – to inferential notions – such as the validity
of argument (Brandom, 1994, 2000). Instead, we are urged to begin from the inferential
role of sentences (or propositions, or concepts, and so on) – that is the role that they
79 It’s worth reiterating that Suarez provides no argument for why we should adopt these positions, restrict-
ing himself to pointing out the analogy between deflationary accounts of truth and deflationary accounts
of scientific representation.
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play in providing reasons for other sentences (or propositions etc.), and having such
reasons provided for them – and from this reconstruct their representational aspects.
Such an approach is developed by de Donato Rodrı´guez and Zamora Bonilla (2009)
and seems like a fruitful avenue of research. The idea being that each investigation
into the inferential rules utilised in each instance, or type of instance, of scientific
representation will likely be a substantial (possibly sociological or anthropological)
project.80 And there is a tension between this philosophical approach and Sua´rez’s
s-deflationary aspirations, at least if these are taken to require that nothing substan-
tial can be said about scientific representation in each instance, as well as in general.
One way to address this issue is to note that once the inferential capacities of models
are taken as conceptually basic, and that investigating these requires investigating the
practice of scientists using them in particular cases, the notion of ‘representation’ has
little role to play. Rather, as philosophers we are closer to sociologists or anthropol-
ogists, whose investigations should focus on the scientific practice of using models,
rather than addressing things like the ER-problem or the other questions discussed in
Chapter 1. Such an approach could be in line with Price’s (2011) project of eliminating
the concept of representation from our philosophical agenda. His central idea is that
to adopt a global expressionism: we shouldn’t think that any ‘statement’ functions by
‘matching’ some fact in the world, their primary function is not to describe. Applying
this insight for scientific models: we shouldn’t think that they function by ‘matching’
(read: ‘representing’) some target system in the world. If we are to properly under-
stand how they work we should instead investigate how, as part of the natural world
themselves, scientists go about using models.
Investigating scientific models within the broader philosophical frameworks associ-
ated with the likes of Brandom and Price goes beyond the scope of this thesis. How-
ever, I think that such an investigation is worthwhile for at least two reasons. Firstly,
Brandom’s approach of reversing the notions of inference and representation in terms
of their conceptual basicness stands or falls with how fruitful such a reversal is. I
grant that good philosophy cannot be done without taking something as primitive,
but the basis for this decision should be sensitive to the outcome of doing so. If, by
taking the notion of inference as conceptually basic we arrive at a fruitful picture of
how we understand the world, then the approach stands as a worthwhile alternative
to the representational alternative (which I take to have proven its worth in the devel-
opment of things areas like semantics and formal logic, and, as I discuss later in the
thesis, understanding how scientific models represent in the way I advise furthers our
understand of the models themselves). Investigating scientific models – i.e. one of our
80 By ‘substantial’, I mean will uncover inferential practises that are described in a level of detail that go
beyond Sua´rez’s platitudes.
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primary ways of investigating the world – from this perspective would seem like an
interesting test-bed for Brandom’s project.
Secondly, Brandom and Price’s criticisms of the representational approach are tar-
geted primarily at linguistic representation. Price in particular criticises how philoso-
phers have utilised the concept of the ‘truth’ of a proposition, rather than understand-
ing how speakers use the proposition in discursive contexts. Even if their criticisms
bite there, it remains to be seen whether they carry over into the context of model-
based representation. If they do, then the frameworks gain further support. If not,
then the representational alternative should be preferred.
Moving onto Sua´rez’s third deflationary analogy, if the conditions in Inferential-
ism 2 are taken to be abstract platitudes then we arrive at an abstract minimalism.
Although Inferentialism 2 defines the concept of scientific representation, the defini-
tion does not suffice to explain the use of any particular instance of scientific represen-
tation for:
‘on the abstract minimalism here considered, to apply this notion to any
given concrete case of representation requires that some additional relation
obtains between [M] and [T], or a property of [M] or [T], or some other
application condition’ (Sua´rez 2015, 48 cf. Sua´rez and Sole´ 2006).
Hence, according to this approach, representational force and inferential capacity are
taken to be abstract platitudes that suffice to define the concept of scientific represen-
tation. However, because of their level of generality, they fail to explain any particular
instance of it. To do this requires reference to additional features that vary from case
to case. These other conditions can be ‘isomorphism or similarity’ and they ‘would
need to obtain in each concrete case of representation’ (Sua´rez 2015, 45 cf. 2004, 773,
776 and Sua´rez and Sole´ 2006, 45). These extra conditions are called the ‘means’ of
representation – the relations that scientists exploit in order to draw inferences about
targets from their models – and are to be distinguished from conditions (i) and (ii) –
the ‘constituents’ of representation – that define the concept (Sua´rez 2003, 230; 2010,
93-94; 2015, 46; Sua´rez and Sole´ 2006, 43). We are told that the means cannot be re-
duced to the constituents but that ‘all representational means (such as isomorphism
and similarity) are concrete instantiations, or realisations, of one of the basic platitudes
that constitute representation’ (Sua´rez and Sole´, 2006, 43), and that ‘there can be no
application of representation without the simultaneous instantiation of a particular set
of properties of [M] and [T], and their relation’ (Sua´rez and Sole´, 2006, 44).
Such an approach amounts to using conditions (i) and (ii) to answer the ER-problem,
but again with the caveat that they are abstract conditions that require concretisation
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in each instance of scientific representation.81 In this sense it is immune to Contessa’s
objection about the ‘mysterious’ capacity that models have to licence about their tar-
gets. They do so in virtue of more concrete relations that hold between models and
their targets, albeit relations that vary from case to case. The key question facing
this account is to fill in the details about what sort of relations concretise the abstract
conditions. But again such an approach faces a similar problem to the above. Even
if s-deflationism applies to scientific representation in general, an investigation into
each specific instance will involve uncovering substantial relations that hold between
models and their targets, which again seems to conflict with Sua´rez’s s-deflationary
approach.
I take these observations to indicate that Sua´rez’s project could be developed into
a substantial account of scientific representation. Depending on one’s broader philo-
sophical commitments, this could be done by adopting an inferentialist position –
taking the notion of inference as conceptually basic, investigating the inferences asso-
ciated with normative scientific practise, and then reconstructing the notion of repre-
sentation from them (or, following Price, abandoning the notion of representation al-
together)82 – or alternatively, investigating more concrete relations that hold between
models and their targets in various instances. Both of these approaches would be in
line with Inferentialism 2, but they would entail that more can be said about scien-
tific representation, at least in its instances, than I suspect Sua´rez himself would be
happy with.
8.3 reinflating inferentialism
In response to these difficulties Contessa claims that ‘it is not clear why we should
adopt a deflationary attitude from the start’ (2007, 50) and provides a ‘interpretational
account’ of scientific representation that is still, at least to some extent, inspired by
Sua´rez’s account, but without being deflationary. Contessa claims:
‘[t]he main difference between [the] interpretational conception [...] and
Sua´rez’s inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a sub-
stantial account – interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation;
it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else’
(2007, 48).
81 Abstract minimalism differs from the use-based account in virtue of where these concrete conditions are
found. In the former it is taken to be properties of models and their targets, in the latter is is taken to be
properties of the practise of using scientific models.
82 See Price (2011, Chapter 14) for a discussion of the differences between these projects in the context of
the philosophy of language.
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Contessa introduces the notion of an interpretation of a model, in terms of its target
system, as a necessary and sufficient condition on epistemic representation:
interpretation : ‘A [model M] is an epistemic representation of a certain target [T]
(for a certain user) if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the [M] in
terms of [T]’ (2007, 57 cf. 2011, 126-127).
A loose way of characterising what it means to adopt an interpretation of a model in
terms of target is that the user ‘takes facts about the vehicle to stand for (putative)
facts about the target’ (2007, 57). Contessa offers a precise formulation of a specific
type of interpretation – a so-called ‘analytic interpretation’ – that first requires that the
model user identify, in both the vehicle and the target, relevant sets of objects, relations
(including properties) and relations:
‘An analytic interpretation of a vehicle in terms of the target identifies a
(nonempty) set of relevant objects in the vehicle (ΩV = {oV1 , ..., oVn }) and
a (nonempty) set of relevant objects in the target (ΩT = {oT1 , ..., oTn}), a
(possibly empty) set of relevant properties of and relations among objects
in the vehicle (PV = {nRV1 , ...,nRVm}, where nR denotes an n-ary relation and
properties are construed as 1-ary relations) and a set of relevant properties
and relations among objects in the target (PT = {nRT1 , ...,nRTm}), and a set
of relevant functions from (ΩV)n – that is, the Cartesian product of ΩV
by itself n times – to ΩV (ΦV = {nFV1 , ...,nFVm }, where nF denotes an n-
ary function) and a set of relevant functions from (ΩT)n to ΩT (ΦT =
{nFT1 , ...,nFTm})’ (Contessa, 2007, 57).
Notice that this explicitly does not require that the relevant sets exhaust the objects,
relations, or functions in either the vehicle or the target. The definition of an analytic
interpretation is then given as follows:
‘A user adopts an analytic interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target if
and only if:
1. The user takes the vehicle to denote the target,
2. The user takes every object in ΩV to denote one and only one object in
ΩT and every object in ΩT to be denoted by one and only one object
in ΩV ,
3. The user takes every n-ary relation in PV to denote one and only one
relevant n-ary relation in PT and every n-ary relation in PT to be de-
noted by one and only one n-ary relation in PV ,
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4. They take every n-ary function in ΦV to denote one and only one n-
ary function in ΦT and every n-ary function in ΦT to be denoted by
one and only one n-ary function in ΦV ’ (Contessa, 2007, 58).
Analytic interpretations licence inferences from models to their targets in the following
manner:
‘An analytic interpretation underlies the following set of inference rules:
rule 1 : If oVi denotes o
T
i according to the interpretation adopted by the
user, it is valid for the user to infer that oTi is in the target if and only
if oVi is in the vehicle,
rule 2 : If oVi denotes o
T
i , ..., o
V
n denotes oTn , and nRVk denotes
nRTk according
to the interpretation adopted by the user, it is valid for the user to infer
that the relation nRTk holds among o
T
1 , ..., o
T
n if and only if nRVk holds
among oV1 , ..., o
V
n ,
rule 3 : If, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, oVi denotes
oTi , ..., o
V
n denotes oTn , and nFVk denotes
nFTk , it is valid for the user to
infer that the value of the function nFTk for the arguments o
T
1 , ..., o
T
n is
oTi if and only if the value of the function
nFVk is o
V
i for the arguments
oV1 , ..., o
V
n ’ (Contessa, 2007, 61).
So according to the interpretational account, a vehicle represents its target in virtue
of a model user adopting an analytic interpretation of the former in terms of the
latter. This proceeds by the model user identifying sets of relevant objects, relations,
and functions in both the vehicle and the target, and setting up one-to-one directed
denotation relations from elements in the vehicle’s relevant sets to elements in the
target’s relevant sets. With this established the model user can infer from facts about
the vehicle – things like a particular n-tuple of objects being in the extension of a
relation – to (purported) facts about the target – the n-tuple of target objects that are
the denotatum of the n-tuple of vehicle objects are in the extension of the a target
relation that is the denotatum of the vehicle relation.83
Interpretation is a non-deflationary account of scientific representation; most (but
not necessarily all) instances of scientific representation involve a model user adopting
83 At first sight Contessa’s interpretation may appear to be equivalent to setting up an isomorphism between
model and target. This impression is correct in as far as an interpretation requires that there be a one-
to-one correspondence between relevant elements and relations in the model and the target. However,
unlike the isomorphism view, Contessa’s interpretations are not committed to models being structures.
Relations (and functions) can be interpreted as full fledged relations (and functions) rather than purely
extensionally specified sets of n-tuples, and Contessa restricts himself to ‘relevant’ sets of each.
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an analytic interpretation towards a target. The capacity for surrogative reasoning is
then seen as a symptom of the more fundamental notion of a model user adopting
an interpretation of a model in terms of its target. For this reason the adoption of an
analytical interpretation is a substantial sufficient condition on establishing the repre-
sentational relationship. Contessa focuses on the sufficiency of analytic interpretations
rather than their necessity and adds that he does ‘not mean to imply that all interpre-
tation of vehicles [models] in terms of the target are necessarily analytic. Epistemic
representations whose standard interpretations are not analytic are at least conceiv-
able’ (2007, 58). Even with this in mind, it is clear that he intends that there be some
interpretation as a necessary condition on epistemic representation.
With the account presented, it’s now time to see how well the account fares with
respect to the questions and conditions of adequacy laid out previously. Modulo the
caveat about non-analytical interpretations, Interpretation provides necessary and
sufficient conditions on epistemic representation and hence answers the ER-problem.
Furthermore, unlike the naı¨ve similarity and structuralist accounts, it does so in a way
that is not symmetric: interpreting a model in terms of a target does not entail inter-
preting a target in terms of a model. Contessa does not comment on the applicability
of mathematics but since his account shares the structuralist emphasis on relations and
one-to-one model-target correspondence, Contessa can appeal to the same sort of ac-
count of the applicability of mathematics as was appealed to there. With respect to the
demarcation problem, Contessa is explicit that ‘[p]ortraits, photographs, maps, graphs,
and a large number of other representational devices’ also satisfy [Interpretation]
(2007, 54). Since nothing in the notion of an interpretation seems restricted to scientific
models, it is plausible to regard Interpretation as a universal theory of epistemic
representation.84 As such, Interpretation seems to deny the existence of a substan-
tial distinction between scientific and non-scientific epistemic representations (at least
in terms of their representational properties). It remains unclear how Interpretation
addresses the problem of style. With respect to the question of ontology, Interpreta-
tion itself places few constraints on what scientific models are, ontologically speaking.
All it requires is that they consist of objects, properties, relations, and functions. Con-
tessa (2010) himself takes (at least some models) to be abstract objects, and thus one
would assume that the relevant features of such models that feature in their analytic
interpretations are themselves abstract.
Given Contessa’s adherence to the distinction between representation and accurate
representation one might think that Interpretation would be designed to handle the
possibility of misrepresentation. There are, however, issues facing the account in this
84 A conclusion that is also supported by the fact that Contessa uses the example of the London under-
ground map to motivate his account.
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Vehicle diagram Target diagram
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γ
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γ′
A B
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A′
B′
C′
Figure 10: An equilateral triangle and an obtuse triangle (cf. Shech, 2014, 13)
regard that deserve to be briefly sketched. The way that Contessa takes Inferential-
ism to deal with the possibility of misrepresentation is by distinguishing between valid
and sound inferences. Valid inferences are instances of Rules 1,2 and 3 above, but they
needn’t have true conclusions; they needn’t be sound. It’s an interesting question,
though, how such a inference, if licenced by an analytic interpretation, could have a
false conclusion. In fact, Shech (2014) argues that this cannot be the case. He does
so by first inviting us to consider the instance of epistemic interpretation displayed in
Figure 10.
He claims that any analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target will
guarantee that all valid inferences licenced by such an interpretation will be sound.
He argues for this as follows. Suppose we identify A, B, C, α, β, and γ as the relevant
objects in the vehicle, A′, B′, C′, α′, β′, and γ′ as the relevant objects in the target,
α = β = γ and A = B = C as the relevant relations in the vehicle, and β′ > γ′ > α′
and B′ > A′ > C′ as the relevant relations in the target. And we notice that α =
β = γ is a relation in the vehicle. What inference(s) does this licence? Well this
turns on what analytic interpretation we adopt, but Shech seems to assume that the
only possibilities available that we let A denote A′, α denote α′, and so on. Further
suppose that we identify α = β = γ as a relation in the vehicle. The question, then,
is what relation in the target should α = β = γ be taken to denote? Shech claims
that the possible denotable relations are B′ > C′ > A′ and β > γ > α. But in both
cases, any inference drawn from such an interpretation will be sound, thus seemingly
ruling out an inference that is valid but unsound, and thus ruling out the possibility
of misrepresentation.
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But this is an artifact of the limited analytic interpretations he considers. In con-
trast, consider the following analytic interpretation. Let A denote A′, B denote B′,
and C denote γ′, α denote α′, β denote β′ and γ denote C′. Let the property angle
in the vehicle (whose extension RV1 = {α, β,γ}) denote the property angle in the tar-
get (whose extension RT1 = {α′, β′,γ′}), and the property line in the vehicle (whose
extension RV2 = {A, B, C}) denote the property line in the target (whose extension
RT2 = {A′, B′, C′}).85 Then, from the fact that C instantiates line (or extensionally,
C ∈ RV2 ), and the preceding interpretation, the user can validly infer that γ′ instan-
tiates line (or extensionally, γ′ ∈ RT2 ). This is false, so we have a valid but unsound
inference licenced by the above analytic interpretation. Thus, Shech’s objection turns
on a mistaken reading of Contessa’s account. Some analytic interpretations will li-
cence more truths than others. But that there exist some that don’t licence falsehoods
does not entail that the interpretational account of epistemic representation cannot
deal with misrepresentation.86
This shows that the interpretational account can deal with misrepresentation where
properties that are instantiated somewhere in the target system are represented as
being instantiated elsewhere in the system. But this does not exhaust all instances
of misrepresentation, and Shech is right to point out that Contessa’s account, as pre-
sented, cannot deal with inferences where the model represents the target as having
properties that it does not have, i.e. that are not instantiated anywhere in the target
system. For these properties cannot feature in the relevant set of relations in the target
to be denoted. For example, it cannot be the case that an ideal pendulum represents
the string of the actual pendulum as having no mass. Surprisingly, this is the very
example that Contessa uses to illustrate his interpretational account. He claims that:
‘[O]ne does not need to believe that the string from which a certain pen-
dulum hangs is massless in order to adopt an interpretation of the ideal
pendulum according to which the string is massless. The knowledgeable
user knows perfectly well that, since no real string is massless, the infer-
ence, though valid, is not sound’ (Contessa, 2007, 59-60).
Now it is clear that the property masslessness does not exist in the target system. But
this means that the property cannot be taken to be a member of PT, the set of rele-
vant properties the user identifies in the target system when setting up her analytic
85 Here I distinguish between properties and their extensions, but this is not necessary for my argument to
go through.
86 Consider for example the analytic interpretation exhausted by letting A denote A′. The only inference
this will licence is that A′ is in the target, which is true. Such an interpretation is accurate in the sense
that the conclusion of every inference it licences is true, but this isn’t problematic for the interpretational
account, it’s just not a very informative instance of epistemic representation.
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interpretation, since as stated, these properties are properties present in the system.
So since Contessa is explicit that the inference from the masslessness of the pendulum
string in the model to the masslessness of the actual string is a valid, but unsound
inference, his definition of an analytic interpretation requires amendment.
Shech (2014, 14) suggests, and I agree with him, that we can interpret Contessa’s
definition of an analytic interpretation more liberally. When identifying the relevant
sets of objects, relations, and functions in the target system, we do not have to restrict
ourselves to those that are actually exist in the system. Instead, we can appeal to the
idea that objects, relations, and functions are purportedly in the system: hypothesised
to exist in the system even if they ‘are not semantically true’ (Shech, 2014, 14) of the
target.
With this in mind, we can now make sense of the claim that the inference from the
masslessness of the model string to the masslessness of the actual string in the follow-
ing way. The model user identifies a string in the model and collects it in ΩV and a
string in the target and collects it in ΩT. Further, the user identifies masslessness as
being in the model, and collects it in PV , and identifies masslessness as being purport-
edly in the target, and collects it in PT.87 Then, from the fact that the model string
instantiates masslessness, and the fact that the analytic interpretation adopted means
taking the model string to denote the actual string, and masslessness in the model to
denote masslessness in the target, the model user can validly infer that the string in the
target instantiates masslessness. And this is a valid, but unsound inference.
Shech rejects this approach since ‘by the same account we could adopt an interpre-
tation of a target in terms of a vehicle in which both are identical, and still extract
inferences that are valid but not sound’ (Shech, 2014, 14).88 To see why this is the case
he utilises the idea of using the vehicle diagram above as an epistemic representation
of itself. This time let the vehicle (the equilateral triangle) be an epistemic representa-
tion of itself, and adopt an analytic interpretation such that A, B, C, α, β,γ all denote
themselves, but let the equality between angles (in the vehicle) denote a purported in-
equality between angles (in the target). From this analytic interpretation we can infer
from the fact that β = γ = α that β > γ > α. Shech concludes:
‘This is a valid inference that is not sound. But since the vehicle and the
target are identical this is not a case of misrepresentation. How can a
vehicle misrepresent a target if the two are identical?!’ (2014, fn.23).
87 I do not suggest that these objects and properties exhaust the relevant ones of either the vehicle or the
target.
88 As a terminological issue, Contessa presents his account as interpreting the vehicle in terms of the target,
not the target in terms of a vehicle, I assume this is a typographical mistake on Shech’s part.
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One person’s modus tollens is another’s modus ponens. Why should we think that if an
object represents itself, it must be an accurate representation of itself? As a counterex-
ample consider the sentence ϕ = ‘this sentence is written in italics’. ϕ represents itself,
but does so inaccurately. It asserts, of itself, that it is written in italics, and this is not
the case.89 For another example we can consider an appropriately altered example of
Goodman’s.
First consider the picture of Obama (Figure 11). It’s standardly taken to represent
Obama (and represents him as wearing a dark suit and tie against a light shirt). Now
consider the coloured inverted picture of Obama (Figure 12). Assume that it is known
that this picture is colour inverted. Then I take it that it still represents Obama as
wearing a dark suit and tie against a light shirt: a competent interpreter of the picture
would be able to infer this if they knew how the colour inversion mapped shades to
shades. Both Figure 11 and Figure 12 are equally accurate representations of Obama.
The sort of interpretation that we apply to the former (where colours are mapped to
themselves) are more entrenched than the sort we would have to apply to the latter
once we were aware of the colour inversion software, but increased entrenchment
doesn’t make the representation any more accurate. The two pictures, appropriately
interpreted, licence the exact same inferences.
Now mix things up a bit. First suppose that Figure 11 was taken to represent it-
self, rather than Obama. Hopefully this is fairly straightforward. Under a standard
interpretation (where colours are mapped to themselves), the picture would serve as
an excellent representation of itself. However, suppose that the same picture were
taken to represent itself, but an onlooker thought that it was doing so under a colour
inversion interpretation. In this case, the model user would infer that the picture itself
had been colour inverted and would infer entirely different facts about that which it
represents (in fact in such a situation it would be correct to say that Figure 11 is a more
accurate representation of Figure 12, than it is of itself). So we have another example of
something that represents itself, but does so inaccurately, and I take it as an attribute
of Contessa’s account that it explains how this sort of thing can come about.
So it seems like Shech’s objections fail. Appropriately amended, Contessa’s account
does allow for the possibility of misrepresentation. The problem with Contessa’s ac-
count is not that it is false, but rather than it leaves things unsaid. For example, Inter-
89 Although if ‘is written in italics’ were taken to denote was typeset in LATEX then ϕ would be an accurate
representation of itself. This would amount to adopting an alternative analytic interpretation, and again,
that one allow for only sound inferences is not a problem for the interpretational account.
89 Available here https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Official_portrait_of_Barack_Obama.
jpg#/media/File:Official_portrait_of_Barack_Obama.jpg.
91 The image was generated using Apple Preview.
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Figure 11: Obama (public domain)90 Figure 12: Obama Inverted91
pretation has nothing to say about target-less models, and Contessa tells us nothing
about either how the relevant systems (models and targets) are cleaved into objects,
relations and functions, nor how these are associated with one another. Moreover, his
demand on one-to-one denotation relations seems rather strict, even when restricted
to ‘relevant’ sets of these things. Other interpretations could be appealed to here, but
Contessa provides no insight about what these look like.
A variant on Contessa’s account is offered by Ducheyne. The details of the account,
which I won’t state precisely here for want of space, can be found in Ducheyne (2012,
83-86). The central idea is that each relevant relation (or function) specified in the
interpretation, holds precisely in the model, and corresponds to the same relation (or
function) that holds only approximately (with respect to a given purpose) in the target.
For example, the low mass of an actual pendulum’s string approximates the massless-
ness of the string in the model. The one-to-one correspondence between (relevant)
objects, relations, and functions in the model and target is retained, but the notion of a
user taking relations in the model to denote relations in the target, is replaced with the
idea that the relations in the target are approximations of the ones they correspond to.
Ducheyne calls this the Pragmatic Limiting Case account of scientific representation
(the pragmatic element comes from the fact that the level of approximation required
is determined by the purpose of the model user).
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However, if this account is to be an improvement on Contessa’s, then more needs
to be said about how a target relation can ‘approximate’ a model relation. Ducheyne
relies on the fact that relations are such that ‘we can determine the extent to which [they
hold] empirically’ (2012, 83, emphasis added). This suggests that he has quantifiable
relations in mind, and that what it means for a relation R (or function) in the target
to approximate a relation R′ (or function) in the model is a matter of comparing nu-
merical values, where a model user’s purpose determines how close they must be if
the former is to count as an approximation of the latter. But whether this exhausts
the ways in which relations can be approximations remains unclear. Hendry (1998),
Laymon (1990), Liu (1999), Norton (2012), and Ramsey (2006) among others, offer dis-
cussions of different kinds of idealisations and approximations, and Ducheyne would
have to make it plausible that all these can be accommodated in his account.
More importantly, Ducheyne’s account has problems dealing with misrepresenta-
tions. Although it is designed to capture models that misrepresent by being approxi-
mations of their targets, it remains unclear how it deals with models that are outright
mistaken. For example, it seems a stretch to say that Thomson’s model of the atom is
an approximation of what the Schro¨dinger’s model tells us about atoms, and it seems
unlikely that there is a useful sense in which the relations that hold between electrons
in Thomson’s model ‘approximate’ those that hold in reality. Similarly, I take it that
no one would take a Ptolemaic model of the solar system to be an ‘approximation’ of
the actual solar system, and yet it still seems that such a model would genuinely count
as a scientific representation (albeit a poor one). But this does not mean that they are
not scientific representations of the atom or solar system; it’s just that they are incor-
rect ones. It does not seem to be the case that all cases of scientific misrepresentation
are instances where the model is an approximation of the target (or even conversely,
it is not clear whether all instances of approximation need to be considered cases of
‘misrepresentation’ in the sense that they licence falsehoods about their targets). So it
seems as though Contessa’s account fares better as it stands, where the relations and
functions of models can be associated as conventionally as the model user likes with
relations and functions (purportedly) in the target system, without Ducheyne’s added
constraint that they be related via approximation.
8.4 ddi
The penultimate account I want to discuss in this chapter is Hughes’ Denotation,
Demonstration, and Interpretation account of scientific representation (1997; cf. Hughes
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2010, Chapter 5). This account inspired both the inferential (see Sua´rez 2004, 770; 2015)
and interpretational accounts (Contessa, 2011, 126) discussed above.
Quoting directly from Goodman (1976, 5), Hughes takes a model of a physical sys-
tem to ‘be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it’ (Hughes, 1997, 330). Presumably the
idea is that a model denotes its target in the same way that a proper name denotes its
bearer, or, stretching the notion of denotation slightly, a predicate denotes elements in
its extension.92 This is the first ‘D’ in ‘DDI’. What makes models epistemic representa-
tions and thereby distinguishes them from proper names, are the demonstration and
interpretation conditions.
The demonstration condition, the second ‘D’ in ‘DDI’, relies on a model being a
‘secondary subject that has, so to speak, a life of its own. In other words, [a] represen-
tation has an internal dynamic whose effects we can examine’ (1997, 331).93 The two
examples offered by Hughes are both models of what happens when light is passed
through two nearby slits. One model is mathematical where the internal dynamics are
‘supplied by the deductive, resources of the mathematics they employ’ (1997, 331), the
other is a physical ripple chamber where they are supplied by ‘the natural processes
involved in the propagation of water waves’ (1997, 332).
Such demonstrations, on either mathematical models or physical models, are still
primarily about the models themselves. The final aspect of Hughes’ account – the ‘I’
in ‘DDI’ – is interpretation of what has been demonstrated in the model in terms of
the target system. This yields the predictions of the model (1997, 333). Unfortunately
Hughes has little to say about what it means to interpret a result of a demonstration
on a model in terms of its target system, and so one has to retreat to an intuitive
(and unanalysed) notion of carrying over results from models to targets. Now Hughes
is explicit that he is not attempting to answer the ER-problem, and that he does not
even offer denotation, demonstration and interpretation as individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions for scientific representation. He prefers the more ‘modest
suggestion that, if we examine a theoretical model with these three activities in mind,
we shall achieve some insight into the kind of representation that it provides’ (1997,
339).
I’m not sure how to interpret Hughes’ position in light of this. On one reading, he
can be seen as describing how we use models. As such, DDI functions as a diachronic
account of what a model user does when using a model in an attempt to learn about
a target system. We first stipulate that the model stands for the target, then prove
what we want to know, and finally ‘transfer’ the results obtained in the model back
92 Hughes (1997, 330) notes that there is an additional complication when the model has multiple targets
but this is not specific to the DDI account and is discussed in more detail in Part iii.
93 That models have an ‘internal dynamic’ is all that Hughes has to say about the problem of ontology.
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to the target. Details aside, this picture seems by and large correct. The problem with
the DDI account is that it does not explain why and how this is possible. Under what
conditions is it true that the model denotes the target? What kinds of things are models
that they allow for demonstrations? How does interpretation work; that is, how can
results obtained in the model be transferred to the target? These are questions an
account of scientific representation has to address, but which are left unanswered by
the DDI account thus interpreted. Accordingly, DDI provides an answer to a question
distinct from the ER-problem. Although a valuable answer to the question of how
models are used, it does not help us too much here, since it presupposes the very
representational relationship we are interested in between models and their targets.
An alternative reading of Hughes’ account emerges when we consider the devel-
opments of the structuralist and similarity conceptions discussed previously, and the
previous discussion of deflationism: perhaps the very act of using a model, with all
the user intentions and practices that it brings with it, constitutes the scientific repre-
sentation relationship itself. And as such, perhaps the DDI conditions could be taken
as an answer to the ER-problem:
ddi-er : A scientific model M represents a target T if and only if M denotes T, an agent
(or collection of thereof) S exploits the internal dynamic of M to make demon-
strations D, which in turn are interpreted by the agent (or collection thereof) to
be about T.
This account comes very close to Interpretation as discussed in the previous subsec-
tion. And as such it serves to answer the questions set out in Chapter 1 in much the
same way. But in this instance, the notions of what it means to ‘exploit an internal
dynamic’, and ‘interpret the results’ of this to be about T, need further explication.
If ‘interpretation’ is cashed out in the same way as Contessa’s analytic interpretation,
then the account will be vulnerable to the same issues as those discussed previously.
In another place Hughes endorses Giere’s semantic view of theories, which he char-
acterises as connecting models to the target with a theoretical hypothesis (1998, 121).
This suggests that an interpretation is a theoretical hypothesis in this sense. If so, then
Hughes’s account collapses into a version of Giere’s.
Given that Hughes describes his account as ‘designedly skeletal [and in need] to
be supplemented on a case-by-case basis’ (1997, 335), one option available is to take
the demonstration and interpretation conditions to be abstract (in the sense of ab-
stract minimalism discussed above), which require filling in each instance, or type of
instance, of epistemic representation. As Hughes notes, his examples of the internal
dynamics of mathematical and physical models are radically different with the demon-
strations of the former utilising mathematics, and the latter, physical properties such
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as the propagation of water waves. Similar remarks apply to the interpretation of
these demonstrations, as well as to denotation. But as with Sua´rez’s account, the def-
inition sheds little light on the problem at hand as long as no concrete realisations of
the abstract conditions are discussed. Despite Hughes’ claims to the contrary, such an
account could prove a viable answer to the ER-problem, and it seems to capture much
of what is valuable about both the abstract minimalist version of Inferentialism 2 as
well as Interpretation discussed above.
8.5 keys
A final account that can be described as inferential in flavour is Frigg’s discussion
of what he calls ‘t-representation’ (2010a, 126-132). His discussion of modelling is
tied up with discussing their ontology. He distinguishes between the notion of p-
representation – i.e. the way in which model descriptions present model systems –
and t-representation – i.e. the way in which models systems represent their target
systems. The latter is my interest here. Frigg defines it as follows:
t-representation : ‘A [M] t-represents [T] if and only if: (R1) [M] denotes [T] [and]
(R2) [M] comes with a key K specifying how facts about [M] are to be translated
into claims about [T]’ (2010a, 126).
I don’t want to discuss this account in huge amounts of detail here, since aspects of it
also feature in my own account of representation presented in Part iii. However it is
worth briefly sketching how it fares with respect to the problems introduced earlier.
The condition (R1) introduces a directionality in the account, since models denote
their targets but not the other way around. (R2) allows for the possibility of surrogate
reasoning, since investigating a model supplies a model-fact that can be translated into
a purported target-fact by means of the key. Since the result of this process is explicitly
a claim about the target, which could be true or false, the account allows for the pos-
sibility of misrepresentation. Relatedly, the standards of accuracy that naturally drop
out of this account are that the resulting claims actually hold in the target system. Since
Frigg illustrates the account with the example of a map, I suppose that he thinks that
t-representation applies to non-scientific epistemic representations as well, thereby
rejecting the demarcation problem. And it seems as though the account naturally al-
lows for mathematical models, since facts about those can be translated into claims
about the target in some way or another. With respect to the problem of ontology, like
Levy and Toon, Frigg invokes Walton’s account of make-believe to defend the idea that
models are fictional (2010a; 2010b) But unlike those two, Frigg still thinks that models
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can be thought about as systems in their own right. Levy and Toon’s criticisms of Frigg
concern a tension between this ontological story and t-representation. According to
Walton, fictions are just imaginative activities of players of games of make believe, and
thus it remains unclear what the ‘facts’ about models keys are supposed to apply to.
Like Hughes’ account, t-representation seems to capture much of what is valuable
about the previously discussed accounts in this chapter. Frigg is explicit that these
conditions are abstract in the sense that they need to be filled in in each instance of
scientific representation (and thus looks like a version of abstract minimalism above),
and moreover, it allows for a conventional association between facts about models
and purported facts about the target (in a manner similar to Interpretation), via the
introduction of a key. The problem again is not that the account is false but that it
leaves too much unsaid. Are all facts of the model translated (probably not); are there
any constraints on the nature of a key? How are the facts chosen? And so on. Without
further detail it is difficult to assess the account any more than this.
So to briefly summarise. In this section I have discussed accounts of scientific repre-
sentation associated with Sua´rez, Contessa, Hughes, and (briefly) Frigg. For the most
part I think each of these accounts gets something right about scientific representa-
tion. But none of them is completely successful at explicating the notion (because,
for example, they are hampered by a commitment to deflationism, or alternatively
leave too much unsaid). That being said, it will become clear in Part iii that each of
these accounts has played a significant role in influencing my own account of scientific
representation.
Part III
A P O S I T I V E P R O P O S A L
9
D E K I
The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to detailing my preferred answer to the
ER-problem. The account is inspired by Goodman (1976) and Elgin’s (1983; 1996;
2009; 2010) discussions of representation-as in the context of pictorial, or more generally,
aesthetic representation. In this chapter I revisit their discussions and argue that they
need amending if representation-as is to underpin scientific representation. I then
provide the details of the Phillips-Newlyn machine that functions as an economic
model and use it to illustrate my account (the other models introduced in Chapter 1
are discussed in the following chapter).94
9.1 goodman and elgin
Many works of art represent their subjects as thus or so. A famous cartoon of Winston
Churchill represents him as a bulldog. Less charitably, another represents Tony Blair
as George Bush’s lapdog. But this type of representation is not limited to caricature:
Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait with Two Circles represents the artist wearing a white hat.
The statue of Augustus of Prima Porta represents the Roman emperor as raising his
right hand in the adlocutio pose. The statue of Arnold Schwarzenegger in Columbus,
Ohio represents the former bodybuilder as having a particular musculature. Goodman
and Elgin term this sort of representational relationship representation-as (Elgin 2010, 3;
Goodman 1976, 27). In its general form: a representational vehicle X (e.g. a picture or
statue) represents a target or subject Y (e.g. a politician or bodybuilder) as Z (e.g. a
bulldog or posing in a particular manner).
Representation-as is a complex form of representation that combines denotation and
exemplification (Elgin, 1983, 141-142). It’s worth outlining what Goodman and Elgin
have to say about these notions before discussing how they can be combined.
94 This chapter is based on a manuscript in preparation co-authored with Roman Frigg.
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9.1.1 Denotation
Denotation is the two-place relation between a symbol and the object to which it ap-
plies. Although usually restricted to proper names, one of Goodman and Elgin’s
crucial insights is to apply it more widely:
‘A picture that represents [...] an object refers to and, more particularly
denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation’ (Goodman 1976, 5 cf.
Elgin 1983, 19-35).
A number of qualifications about how Goodman and Elgin view denotation need
to be added here. First, as noted, they do not restrict it to language. Pictures and
statues denote their subjects, photographs denote what they are of, and as I discuss
below, scientific models denote their target systems. Secondly, even in the linguistic
context, denotation is often restricted to proper names; expressions denoting a singular
object. The name ‘Arnold Schwarzenegger’ denotes the man. As such denotation is
distinguished from predication, which deals with general terms. This restriction is
unnecessary:
‘A predicate denotes severally the objects in its extension. It does not de-
note the class that is its extension, but rather each of the members of that
class’ (Elgin 1983, 19 cf. Goodman 1976, 19).
The predicate ‘red’ denotes all red things and a picture of an apple in a child’s colour-
ing book denotes all apples.
Thirdly, notice that there can be a number of denotational relationships between a
picture and its subject:
‘What a picture is said to represent may be denoted by the picture as a
whole or by a part of it [...] Consider an ordinary portrait of the Duke and
Duchess of Wellington. The picture (as a whole) denotes the couple, and
(in part) denotes the Duke’ (Goodman, 1976, 28).
Presumably a part of the picture also denotes the Duchess, another part denotes the
Duke’s nose, yet another part denotes the Duchess’s dress, and so on. In fact, there
may, in principle, be an indefinitely large number of denotational relationships that
hold between parts of the picture and parts of the situation it denotes.95
95 This is not to say that there must be part-part denotational relationships to establish the primary one that
holds between the picture and its subject. Examples from modern art provide plausible instances where
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What establishes denotation is a more vexing question. The question has a rich
history in the philosophy of language, where there are two broad families of ap-
proaches.96 According to the descriptivist approach (which goes back to Frege (1892/1952)
and Russell (1905)) names function as disguised definite descriptions (or have senses
attached to them that can be identified with a definite description), and as such de-
note whatever it is that satisfies them. According to so-called direct reference approach
(which goes back to Mill (1843), Marcus (1961), and Kripke (1980)), names directly pick
out their bearers without going via any descriptive content (where, at least in Kripke’s
formulation of the account, the mechanism of denotation is an initial baptism and a
causal chain from this to every future use of the name). Which, if either, of these
approaches is appropriate for establishing the denotation relation that holds between
pictures and their subjects is an interesting question, which Goodman and Elgin do
not discuss in detail. In Goodman’s words: ‘routes of reference [including, but not
limited to, denotation] are quite independent of roots of reference’ (1984, 55) and he
is concerned with the former, rather than the latter. I take it that ‘routes’ of reference
concern distinguishing between the different types of representational relationships I
discuss in this chapter, and ‘roots’ of reference concern what actually establishes each
of them. In the next section I revisit the roots of reference (denotation in particular) in
the context of scientific representation.
Goodman and Elgin take X denoting Y as a necessary but insufficient condition on
X representing Y as Z (Elgin 2010, 2; Goodman 1976, 28). It is necessary because it
establishes that representational vehicles are about their subjects. Denotation picks out
the subject and ensures that the vehicle points to it. The statue of Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger represents Schwarzenegger because it denotes him. Following Goodman and El-
gin I call this kind of representation representation-of: X is a representation-of Y if
and only if X denotes Y.97 But denotation is insufficient for representation-as because
the sort of representational relationship involved there is richer than the relation that
holds between a denoting symbol and its denotatum. The statue does not just denote
Schwarzenegger; it represents him as having a particular musculature, and nothing in
the concept of denotation would help explain how the statue manages to do so.
there is only one such relation. We can imagine a uniformly red canvas captioned ‘Kierkegaard’s Mood’
which as a whole denotes Kierkegaard’s mood (Danto, 1981). It’s hard to imagine what it would take
for a part of the canvas to denote a part of the philosopher’s mood. So, whether or not there are such
part-part relationships, and how many of them there are, can only be established on a case-to-case basis.
96 For discussions and surveys see Lycan (2000, Chapters 4,5) and Reimer and Michaelson (2014).
97 To sharply distinguish between different kinds of representation I use the hyphen where appropriate.
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9.1.2 Z-representation
If denotation is a necessary condition on representation-as, then what are we to say
about pictures that fail to denote? Are we to deny that they are representations at all?
At first blush, it looks as if Bo¨cklin’s Isle of the Dead represents an islet dominated by
cypress trees, with a boatman rowing a white figure into the cove. But there is no such
islet, and thus, there is no such islet to be denoted. But if the painting fails to denote,
and denotation is a necessary condition on representation, then why do we think it
represents? Goodman and Elgin respond by distinguishing between being a picture
of a soandso, and being a soandso-picture.
‘Saying that a picture represents a soandso is thus highly ambiguous be-
tween saying that the picture denotes and saying what kind of picture it
is. Some confusion can be avoided if in the latter case we speak rather of a
‘Pickwick-representing-picture’ of a ‘unicorn-representing-picture’ [...] or,
for short, of a ‘Pickwick-picture’ or ‘unicorn-picture’ [...] Obviously a pic-
ture cannot, barring equivocation, both represent Pickwick and represent
nothing. But a picture maybe of a certain kind – be a Pickwick-picture [...]
– without representing anything’ (Goodman, 1976, 22).
Just as a unicorn-picture is not a representation-of a unicorn, Bo¨cklin’s painting is
an islet-picture despite not being a representation-of any islet. This observation goes
beyond pictures. Statues of Greek gods, despite not being representations-of anything
are still god-representations. The statue of Rocky outside the Philadelphia Museum
of Art is not a representation-of anything, because Rocky doesn’t exist and therefore
cannot be denoted, but it is still boxer-representation. And although many maps are
representations-of a target terrain, there are some that are not because the terrain does
not exist. Maps of fantasy worlds, like Jon Roberts’ maps depicting the countries and
regions that feature in G.R.R Martin’s Game of Thrones, provide illustrative examples.
They are terrain-representations, they portray the geographic and sociopolitical make
up of Westeros and Essos, but they are not representations-of anything.
This leads to the introduction of a Z-representation – e.g. Pickwick-representations,
god-representations, terrain-representations – and the crucial distinction between be-
ing a Z-representation and being a representation-of a Z. The former is an unbreakable
one-place predicate; the latter is a two-place relation that holds between a representa-
tional vehicle and its subject. This is a crucial distinction because there is a complete
disconnect between what kind of representation X is and what X is a representation
of: the kind of X does not determine what X denotes, and the denotation of X does
not determine its kind. Not every islet-representation denotes an islet (Bo¨cklin’s), and
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islets can be denoted by representations that aren’t islet-representations (for instance
when a travel agency uses a palm-tree-picture to advertise a trip to the Maldives).
Such representational practices are common in different contexts. In Dutch still life a
snail-picture denotes humility and a skull-picture denotes mortality, and in Bollywood
movies a two-intertwined-roses-representation denotes the couple being intimate.
What does it take to be a Z-representation? In the case of pictorial representation this
is a much discussed issue. A widely held view is that a picture X is a Z-representation
(in virtue of portraying a Z) if, under normal conditions, from the appropriate vantage
point, an observer would see a Z in X. This idea is developed in so-called ‘perceptual
accounts’ of pictorial representation, associated, among others, with Gombrich (1961),
Schier (1986), Wollheim (1987, 1998), and Lopes (2004).98
Goodman and Elgin take a different route and explain Z-representation in terms of
genres. A genre is a class of representation with the same ostensible subject matter.
‘[W]e readily classify pictures as landscapes without any acquaintance with
the real estate – if any – that they represent. I suggest that each class of
[Z]-representations constitutes a small genre, a genre composed of all and
only representations with a common ostensible subject matter [...] And we
learn to classify representations as belonging to such genres as we study
those representations and the fields of inquiry that devise and deploy them’
(Elgin, 2010, 3).
These genres are habitual ways of classifying and as such they are neither sharp nor
historically stable, and they typically resist exact codification (Goodman, 1976, 23).
How pictures represent is a fascinating and important question, but it isn’t one that I
will discuss in any detail here. My concern is how scientific models work, and theories
of pictorial representation do not directly carry over to the scientific case, irrespective
of what these views are. I develop my own account of categorising Z-representations
in science in the next section.
9.1.3 Exemplification
An item exemplifies a property if it at once instantiates the property and refers to it:
‘Exemplification is possession plus reference. To have without symbolising
is merely to possess, while to symbolise without having is to refer in some
other way than by exemplifying’ (Goodman, 1976, 53).
98 It bears noting that there are alternative accounts available; see Kulvicki (2006) for a review.
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An item that exemplifies a property is an exemplar (Elgin, 1996, 171). The paradig-
matic example of an exemplar is a sample. The swatches of cloth in a tailor’s booklet
of fabrics (Goodman, 1976, 53), the chip of paint on a manufacturer’s sample card,
and the bottle of shampoo we receive as a promotional gift (Elgin, 1983, 71) all refer to
relevant properties – a pattern, a colour, a particular hair treatment – and instantiate
them.
The formula ‘exemplification is possession plus reference’ stands in need of qualifi-
cation. The point to emphasise is that the ‘plus’ ought not to be read as a conjunction
of two logically distinct conditions. Goodman and Elgin do not use ‘refer’ as a syn-
onym for ‘denote’. Rather, denotation and exemplification are themselves basic modes
of reference (Elgin, 1996, 71).99 Reference is thus seen as a determinable for which
denotation and exemplification are determinants. So, exemplification cannot literally
be reference with something else added to it. Rather, exemplification is the kind of
reference that employs instantiation of a property to achieve reference to that property.
This can be encapsulated by altering the formula as follows: an item exemplifies a
property P if and only if it instantiates P and thereby refers to P.
Exemplification requires instantiation: an item can exemplify a property only if it
instantiates it (Elgin, 1996, 172). Only something that is red can exemplify redness. But
the converse does not hold: not every property that is instantiated is also exemplified.
Exemplification is selective (Elgin, 2010, 6). An exemplar typically instantiates a host
of properties but it exemplifies only few of them. Consider the example of a chip of
paint:
‘a chip of paint on a manufacturer’s sample card. This particular chip is
blue, one-half inch long, one-quarter inch wide, and rectangular in shape.
It is the third chip on the left on the top row of a card manufactured in
Baltimore on a Tuesday. The chip then instantiates each of these predicates
in the previous two sentences, and many others as well. But it clearly
isn’t a sample of all of them. Under the standard interpretation, it is a
sample of “blue”, but not of such predicates as “rectangular” and “made
in Baltimore”’ (Elgin, 1983, 71).100
99 Denotation and exemplification are not mutually exclusive. A symbol does not have to be either
purely denotational or purely exemplificational. Indeed, some symbols combine denotational and ex-
emplificational functions to procedure different kinds of ‘complex reference’, like, as I discussed below,
representation-as.
100 Notice that Elgin talks about predicates being exemplified, whereas I prefer to talk about properties.
Nothing hangs on this; the account of representation that emerges is compatible with nominalist or
platonist accounts of properties (cf. Goodman, 1976, 46).
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Which properties are exemplified and which properties are merely instantiated is not
dictated by the object itself. Turning an instantiated property into an exemplified one
requires a deliberate act of selection, and this depends on the context and is carried out
against a certain set of background assumptions. The same sample card can exemplify
rectangularity if used in geometry class, and it ceases to be an exemplar for colour if
the painted wall fails to have the colour of the sample card. The specific details of
how this works varies from case to case, but at the level of a general theory nothing
depends on these details.
One aspect, however, is crucial: exemplars provide epistemic access to the properties
they exemplify (Elgin, 1983, 93). So to be exemplified a property has to be selected and
be epistemically accessible. A property that satisfies these criteria is salient. The paint
chip makes a particular shade of red salient because the context of a paint shop selects
red as the relevant property and the nature of the card is such that red is epistemically
accessible (a sample card too small to see with the naked eye would not exemplify red).
An exemplar is therefore not merely an instance of a property but a telling instance
(Elgin, 2010, 5)
9.1.4 Representation-as
A key insight on the way to a definition of representation-as is that Z-representations
can, and often do, exemplify properties associated with Zs. The Churchill caricature
is a bulldog-picture and it exemplifies bulldog-properties like aggressiveness and re-
lentlessness. Rembrandt’s self-portrait is a man-representation and it exemplifies the
man-property of wearing a white hat. The Schwarzenegger statue is a bodybuilder-
representation and exemplifies bodybuilder-properties, like being in a particular pose
or having well defined muscles.101
But for X to represent Y as Z it is not enough for X to denote Y and also be a Z-
representation exemplifying certain Z-properties. To represent Churchill as a bulldog
it is not sufficient that the caricature denotes Churchill and is bulldog-representation
exemplifying certain bulldog properties. Elgin writes:
‘Evidently, it takes more than being represented by a tree-picture to be
represented as a tree. Some philosophy departments can be represented
101 One may worry that pictures and statues cannot instantiate properties like aggressiveness or having a
particular musculature (since they don’t, technically speaking, have any muscles whatsoever). Goodman
and Elgin acknowledge this and say that these are examples of ‘metaphorical exemplification’, a notion
that requires metaphorical instantiation. A painting may literally instantiate darkness while it metaphor-
ically instantiates being disturbing (Elgin 1983, 81; Goodman 1976, 50). I discuss my preferred take on
this issue in the next section.
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as trees. But to bring about such representation-as is not to arbitrarily
stipulate that a tree picture shall denote the department’ (2010, 4).
And she goes onto to identify a crucial last step involved in representation-as; the
exemplified properties need to be imputed onto the subject:
‘I said earlier that when [X] represents [Y] as [Z], [X] is a [Z]-representation
that as such denotes [Y]. We are now in a position to cash out the “as such”.
It is because [X] is a [Z]-representation that [X] denotes [Y] as it does. [X]
does not merely denote [Y] and happen to be a [Z]-representation. Rather
in being a [Z]-representation, [X] exemplifies certain properties and im-
putes those properties or related ones to [Y] [...] The properties exempli-
fied in the [Z]-representation thus serve as a bridge that connects [X] to [Y].
This enables [X] to provide an orientation to its target that affords epistemic
access to the properties in question.’ (2010, 10).
Thus we arrive at the following definition of representation-as:
representation-as (ra) : X represents its subject Y as Z if and only if:
1. X denotes Y,
2. X is a Z-representation and exemplifies properties P1, ..., Pn associated with
Z, and
3. P1, ..., Pn are imputed to Y.
Consider the bodybuilder statue as an example (Figure 13). The statue denotes Arnold.
It is a bodybuilder-representation and exemplifies properties associated with body-
builders, like its musculature and pose. These properties are imputed onto Arnold,
and as a result, the statue represents him as having such a musculature (or being in
such a pose).
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Figure 13: A statue of Arnold Schwarzenegger (public domain) 102
9.2 from art to science
The question then, is whether RA would work as an answer to the ER-problem. Prima
facie it seems that it would. Scientific models and pictures have in common that they
represent their targets as being thus or so. Just as the statue of Schwarzenegger rep-
resents him as having a particular musculature, an ideal pendulum model (with a
specific length, weight, and amplitude) might represent a clock’s pendulum as having
a particular period. Indeed pictures and statues meet at least some of the conditions
of adequacy on scientific representation provided in Chapter 1: they can be used to
reason about their subjects and they can misrepresent them.103
If there is no strict demarcation between how models represent, and how other
epistemic representations, including statues and pictures, represent, then this would
suggest that RA would double as an account of scientific representation if we take
X to be a model, Y a target system and Z a specification of what kind of model X
102 Available here https://roadtrippers.com/us/columbus-oh/points-of-interest/
statue-of-arnold-schwarzenegger?lat=40.80972&lng=-96.67528&z=5.
103 Indeed Hughes (1997), van Fraassen (2008) and Elgin herself (2010), have all urged that we think about
scientific representation in a Goodmanian way (although with the exception of Elgin, they don’t elaborate
this in any detail).
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is. Analysing the ideal pendulum in these terms yields: (1) the model denotes the
clock pendulum (2) the model is a pendulum-representation that exemplifies proper-
ties like its length and period of oscillation; and (3) these properties, or related ones,
are imputed onto the actual clock.
This is a good start. But each of the three conditions stands in need of either articu-
lation or revision (or both) in order to operate successfully in the context of scientific
modelling. Before doing so, it is worth discussing in a specific instance of scientific
representation in terms of representation-as, and then thinking about these conditions
with an eye on applying it to that instance.
9.2.1 Introducing the Phillips-Newlyn machine
The first example introduced in Chapter 1 is the Phillips-Newlyn machine, sometimes
called the MONIAC (MOnetary National Income Analogue Computer). It is a hy-
draulic machine built by Walter Newlyn and Bill Phillips in the middle of the 20th
Century. The machine consists of a system of reservoirs connected by pipes. Water
flows circularly through the machine; being pumped up from a reservoir at the base
of the machine, dividing and recombining at various places, and filling various tanks
to certain depths as it does so. The water’s flow through the pipes and tanks is deter-
mined by a series of valves whose behaviour is determined by ‘slides’ that a user of
the machine can alter at will.
The machine is pictured below (Figure 14), but its workings are better appreciated
through viewing diagrams that highlight how the different reservoirs are connected to
each other. Let’s start with a simplified version.
Figure 15 is a schematic representation of the machine. Starting at the the bottom
of the machine, there is a tank labelled ‘transaction balances’. Water flows out of that
tank and is pumped to the top of the machine. Some water leaves the flow (via the
‘tax’ pipe) and rejoins the flow lower down the machine via the ‘government spending’
pipe. Further down, some water leaves the flow (through the ‘savings’ pipe) and
enters the ‘idle balances’ tank. Water from that tank rejoins the central flow further
down through the ‘investment’ pipe. The ‘imports’ pipe then takes some water out of
the main flow into the ‘foreign owned balances’ tank, and from there water can rejoin
the flow through the ‘exports’ pipe. The resulting flow goes back to the ‘transaction
balances’ tank, from which the water gets recirculated through the machine.
The way that the water flows through the machine depends on numerous, some
relatively complex, mechanisms. These are best appreciated by looking at a more
complex diagram of the machine (Figure 16).
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Figure 14: The Phillips-Newlyn machine (public domain)104
As the diagram illustrates, the flows through the pipes are determined by valves
that open and close depending on the curves on the ‘slides’ that the model user in-
puts, and which specify relationships between various aspects of the machine. These
slides are made out of perspex and determine how water levels in one reservoir affect
how water flows in and out of the others via manipulating size of the valves. The
underlying economic relationships are as follows (Barr, 2000, 102-103). Saving, at a
given level of taxation, is determined by the level of income (the flow of water in the
top of the machine) and the interest rate (the level of water in the ‘idle balances’ tank).
Consumption is what is left of disposable income after saving has taken place; con-
sumption and saving are thus determined simultaneously by the level of income and
the interest rate. Investment is determined by the interest rate (level of water in the
‘idle balances tank’) and the rate of change of income (the flow of water at the top of
the machine). Taxes and government spending are determined by the level of income.
Imports and exports are determined by domestic expenditure and the exchange rate
(the level of water in the ‘foreign owned balances’ tank).
The machine can be manipulated in various different ways. The relationships be-
tween the flows can be altered via changing the ‘curves’ (the square boxes in Figure
16) which specify the relationships between different aspects of the machine (and cor-
respond to macroeconomic variables). The levels of water in the tank at the bottom
104 Available here https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MONIAC.jpg#/media/File:MONIAC.jpg.
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Figure 15: A simple diagram of the Phillips-Newlyn machine (Barr, 2000, 101)
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Figure 16: A detailed diagram of the Phillips-Newlyn machine (Barr, 2000, 102)
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can be increased, leading to an increased ‘income flow’ and the knock-on effects that
would have on the rest of the machine. The ‘surplus balances’ and ‘foreign-owned bal-
ances’ tanks are connected to a spare tank which allows a model user to keep the levels
of water in those tanks constant (by water overflowing to, or in flowing from, the spare
tank as appropriate). In turn, this means that the effect of expanding or restricting the
flows out of those tanks on the rest of the machine can also be investigated.
In effect, the machine can be used to solve the IS-LM equations for an open econ-
omy.105 The solutions are given quantitatively; the water levels in each of the three
tanks are connected to various graphs that record their height through time. The
higher the water in the ‘transactions balances’ tank, the more water flows through
the income pipe and this is recorded in the graph at the top left of the diagram. The
higher the level of water in the ‘ideal balances’ tank the lower the interest rate. And the
‘foreign owned balances’ tank records the difference between the import and export
flows.
The machine is an ‘economic model’ insofar as it illustrates the (purported) relation-
ship between various macroeconomic variables. But the machine was also customised
to represent specific economies as well. In the original version the tank to the right
was labelled ‘sterling balances’, indicating that it represented the British economy; in
other versions of the machine the central bank was labelled the ‘Federal Reserve’ in-
dicating that it represented the US economy (Morgan, 2012, 178). And the flexibility
of the machine means that it can be personalised to represent very specific economic
circumstances.
Let’s now return to the example mentioned at the beginning of the thesis. It’s 1953
and economists in the Central Bank of Guatemala are topping up the water tank in
their Phillips-Newlyn machine. The economists are worried about a politically mo-
tivated decrease in foreign demand for Guatemalan goods, and want to know what
effect such a decrease would have on the national economy. They adjust the ma-
chine to account for the macroeconomic conditions in Guatemala, and let the machine
reach equilibrium. This requires setting the initial amount of water in the machine,
specifying the relationships between each variable by means of a slide, and, since
the Guatemalan quetzal is (was) pegged to the US dollar, opening up the valve to the
spare tank in order to keep the water level in the tank marked ‘foreign-owned balances’
(which corresponds to the interest rate) constant.
105 The IS equation specifies the relationship between the interest rate and the level of income that arises
in the goods and services market. The LM equation specifies the relationship between the interest rate
and the level of income that arises in the market for money balances. An ‘open economy’ is one with
imports and exports. Mankiw (2012, Chapters 11,12) provides an accessible introduction to the details of
the IS-LM model.
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They then close a valve marked ‘exports’ and watch what happens. To compensate
for the fact that more water is flowing into the ‘foreign-owned balances’ tank than was
leaving it, water flowed into the spare tank. Moreover, since less water flows out of the
‘export’ pipe, the flow marked ‘income’ falls as well. This provides the sought-after
indication of the effects of falling exports on the Guatemalan economy; the economy
would contract.106
The machine provided this indication in virtue of being an economic model that
represented the Guatemalan economy. The question I’ve been addressing throughout
this thesis is: what makes this the case? Per se it’s a hydraulic machine; a collection of
pipes, valves and reservoirs, with water flowing through it. What on earth has it got to
do with economics, or the Guatemalan economy in particular? According to RA, the
answer is the following. (1) The machine denotes the Guatemalan economy; (2) it is
a economy-representation that exemplifies economic properties corresponding to the
effect of a decrease in exports,such as leading to an economic contraction; and (3) these
properties are imputed onto the Guatemalan economy. As in the case of the pendulum
example above, this is a good start. But each of the conditions needs revision or
further explication (or both) in order to explain how the machine represented the
economy. How does it denote? What makes it an economy-representation? How can
it exemplify these properties? And so on. Answering these questions is my next task
here.
9.2.2 Interpretation
It is a crucial element of RA that the Phillips-Newlyn machine is an economy-
representation just as Bo¨cklin’s Isle of the Dead is an islet-representation and the
Schwarzenegger statue is a bodybuilder-representation. In the case of paintings, one
could appeal to what a picture portrayed in establishing whether or not it was a Z-
representation, or, following Goodman and Elgin, perhaps this categorisation could
be done according to genre conventions. Irrespective of how these approaches fare in
the case of pictorial representation, they are a non-starter in a scientific context. The
Phillips-Newlyn machine does not look like an economy under normal conditions and
from the appropriate vantage point (or indeed under any conditions and from any van-
tage point); and if hydraulic machines form an economy-representation ‘genre’ then
106 This example should be taken with a pinch of salt. There are records that the Guatemalan Central
Bank did purchase a machine (Aldana, 2011; Stevenson, 2011). However there are no (publicly available)
records of the exact uses the machine was put to. This is no detriment to my argument because none of
the points I want to make about representation in general, and about the machine in particular, depend
in any way on what exactly happened in Guatemala in 1953.
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more needs to be said about what establishes this categorisation. And the machine
is no exception. The problem is endemic to models. Caenorhabditis elegans, mice,
oval containers, equations, and mathematical structures do not engender visual expe-
riences that are similar to the experiences produced by their respective targets; and
if they are members of scientific genres then we need to understand what establishes
this. An alternative approach to understanding Z-representation is needed.
The first step towards understanding what makes models Z-representations is to get
clear on what kind of object a model in itself is. In fact such specifications are often
part of the naming of models. Economists refer to the Phillips-Newlyn machine as a
hydraulic model. Likewise we speak of ball-and-stick models, electric-circuit models,
and animal models. The material base of a model matters. To assign this a systematic
place in an account of representation I introduce a term of art: O-objects. As used
here, ‘O’ is simply a specification of what kind of thing an object is.107 Derivatively,
we can speak of O-properties to designate properties that X has qua O-object. The
Phillips-Newlyn machine is a water-pipe-object and having a flow of one litre of water
through its central hose per unit of time is one of its O-properties; the brain model is
an electric-circuit-object and having a voltage of 1.5V at certain time over its condenser
is one of its O-properties; and so on. It’s important to note that X does not dictate O.
The Philips-Newlyn machine could also be described as a metal and plastic object, or
as post-war production object. Any kind of property that X instantiates could ground
O. But once it’s classified as an O object, then it’s O-properties that are the relevant
ones.
Classifying something as an O-object does not turn it into an O-representation.
Categorising the Phillips-Newlyn machine as a pipe system does not turn it into
a pipe-representation. This observation generalises: O-objects do not have to be O-
representations; in fact O does not determine Z at all, and in general O and Z are dis-
tinct (although there are special cases where O = Z). There is nothing in water pipes
or electric circuits that makes them economy-representations or brain-representations,
and the cat object sleeping in the sun isn’t a representation at all. Classifying some-
thing as an O-object does not regulate how, and indeed whether, the object functions
symbolically.
What, then, turns an O-object into a Z-representation? One might reply that some-
one simply decides to use it as such. Phillips and Newlyn simply decided to use
their machine as an economy-representation. This is not false, but merely pushes the
question one step back: what does it take to use an O-object as a Z-representation?
To answer this question it is illustrative to see how Phillips describes the workings of
107 There is no expectation that O be a natural kind, and the classification of objects into Os does not demand
a rigid classification schema.
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(technically a precursor of) his machine when introducing it to the wider economics
community:
‘the production flow of a commodity is represented by the flow of water
into a tank. This flow is controlled by a valve, consisting of a flat plate slid-
ing horizontally over a narrow parallel slot [...] The production flow goes
into the tank containing stocks, from which is drawn the consumption flow,
controlled and measured by a second valve similar to the first [...] Price is
assumed to be determined at any instant by the quantity of stocks, repre-
sented by the quantity of liquid in the tank, and the demand schedule for
them, represented by the capacity of the tank at different levels’ (Phillips,
1950, 284).
And then later in the paper, when describing how, given the dimensions of the tanks
and valves, scales for relevant quantities are constructed, he describes the relationship
between the properties the model has qua O-object in terms of Z properties as follows:
‘Assume that the price scale is so chosen that the required relation between
stocks and price of a commodity is reproduced on the model when one cubic
inch of water is made equivalent to one hundred tons of the commodity’ (1950, 285,
emphasis added).
So Phillips turns a pipe system into an economy-representation by taking properties
of the machine to ‘represent’, or be ‘equivalent to’ economic properties. This is the
crucial idea behind what I call an ‘interpretation’ (not to be confused with Contessa’s
(2007) ‘analytic interpretations’ discussed in the previous chapter): certain properties
of the model are isolated, and they are appropriately related with some other set of
properties. In the above, the properties of the model include the flow of water, the
capacity of tanks, and so on. These are then associated with economic properties:
the production flow of a commodity, and a quantity of stocks for example.108 Once
this interpretation is established, Phillips switches from talking about ‘flow of water’
to talking about ‘the production flow goes into the tank containing stocks’. In fact,
with the interpretation in place, he describes the entire machine explicitly in economic
terms despite the fact that those properties don’t literally apply to the model object.
The notion of ensuring that properties are ‘appropriately related’ with another set of
properties can be made precise in the following way. Let O and Z be sets of relevant
O properties and Z properties respectively. One could then define an interpretation
108 Morgan and Boumans (2004, 383) specify the physical properties of the machine that Phillips used to
represent different economic elements.
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as a bijective function I : O → Z . Whilst correct in principle, this definition does
not capture all that is important, because it doesn’t explicitly distinguish between
quantitative and qualitative properties.109 Properties like ‘being a reservoir’ and ‘being
directly connected to the disposable income flow’ are qualitative properties: they are
all-or-nothing properties in that they either are or are not instantiated. In contrast,
properties like ‘the flow of water is x litres per minute’ are quantitative properties: they
come in certain degrees. In the case of such properties it’s important to distinguish
carefully between the property and its values. To make this distinction explicit I refer
to the property ‘itself’ as the variable and to the specific quantity as the value. The
former are denoted by upper-case letters and the latter by lower-case letters. I further
adopt the convention that the members of O and Z are either qualitative properties or
variables. So O1 could be ‘the flow of water’ and o1 would be a specification of how
many litres exactly are flowing through at a given time. An interpretation can then be
defined as follows:
interpretation : Let O and Z be sets of O properties and Z properties respectively,
so that all members of either set are qualitative properties or variables. An inter-
pretation is a bijection I : O → Z such that:
1. Properties are mapped on to properties of the same kind (that is, qualita-
tive properties are mapped onto qualitative properties and variables onto
variables).
2. For every variable Oi, and Zi, there is a function fi that associates every
value of Oi with a value of Zi.
In specific cases further restrictions on allowable functions could be imposed. In the
case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine, for instance, the function associating the flow of
water with flow of a commodity is assumed to be linear. However, such restrictions
are idiosyncratic to the context and should not be built into a general definition.
An interpretation is what turns an O-object into a Z-representation.
z-representation : A Z-representation is a pair 〈X, I〉 where X is an O-object and
I and interpretation from O to some set of Z properties Z .
Returning to the example, X is the Phillips-Newlyn machine; Z is an economy; I
is an interpretation mapping qualitative pipe-system properties onto qualitative econ-
omy properties (‘the reservoir on the right corresponds to the foreign trade sector’)
109 A more detailed study of both kinds of properties is a worthwhile enterprise in many ways, but for
my current purposes an intuitive characterisation is sufficient. See Eddon (2013) for a discussion of
quantitative properties.
9.2 from art to science 164
and quantitative pipe-system properties onto quantitative economic properties by as-
sociating variables (‘the flow of water corresponds to the flow of commodity’) and
specifying a function associating quantities of those variables (‘one cubic inch of water
is equivalent to one hundred tons of the commodity’).
Colloquially X itself might be called a Z-representation and as long as it is under-
stood that this assumes that there is an interpretation in the background no harm is
done. It is important, however, that in a final analysis a Z-representation is a pair
〈X, I〉. What kind of representation X is crucially depends on I, and different inter-
pretations produce to different representations. One could, for instance, interpret the
reservoirs as schools and universities and the flow of water as the movement of stu-
dents through the system. Under that interpretation the same machine would be an
education-system-representation.110
A model, then, is a Z-representation that is based on an object X that has been
chosen by a modeller to be a model object. In the context of modelling X is the material
substratum of the model, variously referred to as ‘model-object’, ‘vehicle’ and ‘source’.
When I refer to the object itself, rather than the object-interpretation pair, I use the
term the ‘base’ of the model. A ‘mere’ object X is turned into the base of a model if an
agent, or more generally a scientific discipline, chooses it as such and endows it with
an interpretation.
model : A model is a Z-representation: M = 〈X, I〉.
Sometimes the object that serves as the base of a representation is a ‘ready made’
object. Worms, mice, and electric circuits predate their use as models and came into
existence independently of any modelling enterprise. Other times the base is tailor-
made for the situation, as is the case with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. To understand
representation the provenance of these objects is irrelevant. The choice of suitable
object is the creative act of a modeller and although the choice may be informed by
interpretations that one would like to impose on an object, it is in no way determined
by it – economies can be modelled with things other than pipe systems.
The claim that everything can be a model of anything else drops out as a corol-
lary of this definition.111 There are no restrictions imposed on what X can be cho-
110 Indeed, an artistic reinterpretation of the machine happened in Michael Stevenson’s 2006 art installation
Answers to some Questions about Bananas. The installation showed a reconstruction of the machine that
was deliberately left unattended throughout the duration of the exhibition. This lead to it rusting and
falling apart, and, given the intentions of the artist, plausibly being interpreted as a failure-representation.
See http://www.michaelstevenson.info/projects/answers_to_some_questions_about_bananas/ for
information about the exhibition.
111 This claim is found, for example, in Callender and Cohen (2006, 73), Frigg (2010a, 99), Giere (2010, 269),
Sua´rez (2004, 773), Swoyer (1991, 452), and Teller (2001, 379).
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sen as the base of a model. Another immediate corollary is that models need not
be representations-of anything. Far from being an unwelcome eccentricity, this is an
advantage of the account. It provides a natural answer to how models without tar-
gets represent: they are Z-representations that are not also representations of a Z (or
indeed any target whatsoever). The Phillips-Newlyn machine would be an economy-
representation even if it had never been used as a representation of an actual economy
(Guatemalan or otherwise). Architectural models showing buildings that have never
been built are not representations-of anything but they are building-representations
nevertheless. And these models can be used to investigate how Z properties work,
despite the fact that they are not representations of any particular target system.
A few clarifications about Z-representations are in order. Firstly, the definition does
not require that all of the O object’s properties are collected in O, nor does it require
that Z contain a complete list of Z properties. Compiling complete lists of all of a
model object’s, or target system’s properties, is neither possible nor desirable. Nor
is it necessary for an interpretation. All that is required for an interpretation is that
there is least one property in each set. In fact, an interpretation can be highly selective
in the properties that it considers. Which properties go into O and Z is determined
by contextual factors, like the research question at hand, the purpose of the model,
and the ability of the model user. Some interpretations are richer than others and the
richness of an interpretation is at least in part a function of how many O properties
are interpreted. But richness is not part of the notion of an interpretation.
Secondly, and in light of the above remarks, interpretations are not set in stone.
In different contexts, where the model user has different purposes for example, the
properties that feature in O and Z (and the interpretation function itself) may change.
One nice example of this is that the Phillips-Newlyn machine often leaked water onto
the floor when it was run. Originally this was seen as a technical problem of the
machine that needed to be fixed, and as such it wasn’t part of the interpretation given.
However, at some point economists realised that it was actually an interesting feature
and interpreted it as the flow of money from the regular economy into the black
economy (Morgan and Boumans, 2004, 397, fn.14). This amounts to a property being
added to O, and a corresponding one to Z , and the interpretation function being
expanded in the appropriate way.
Finally, consider again the choice of O and Z. In the case of the Phillips-Newlyn
machine they do not coincide, the machine is a hydraulic system, and it functions as
an economy-representation. But this isn’t the case in all scientific models; in some in-
stances they coincide. The architect’s cardboard house is a house object that is used as
a house-representation; when studying ships floating-metal-vessel objects are used as
floating-metal-vessel-representations; and when investigating the aerodynamic proper-
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ties of cars, small car-shaped objects are put into wind tunnels and used as car-shaped-
object-representations. These are usually considered to be iconic models (Black, 1962;
Peirce, 1932). The definition of a Z-representation offered above affords a ready defi-
nition of an iconic model: a model M is an iconic model if and only if O = Z. Scale
models, then, are a special kind of iconic models, namely ones in which some desig-
nated Oi are spatial dimensions and the fi are linear functions with respect to those
spatial dimensions. A small car, for instance is a scale model of a large car if measure-
ments of features in the three spatial dimensions scale with the constant factors given
by the scale, for instance 1:50.112
9.2.3 Scientific exemplification
Goodman and Elgin’s notion of exemplification was introduced in the previous section.
An item X exemplifies a property P and thereby refers to P. In order for this to occur, P
must be selected as salient in the context under consideration, and this requires that it
is epistemically accessible. This holds in the scientific context, as in art. In the case of
the Phillip-Newlyn machine, the research context selects how the water flows through
the machine, and the relative height of the liquid in its various tanks through time as
salient properties. It doesn’t select being made of Perspex, or being 2.5m tall. And
it’s not just properties that are irrelevant to the workings of the machine that are not
selected as salient. In order for the water to move around the model at all, it requires
a motor that pumps water from the floor level tank up to the top of the machine, and
the force of gravity that draws the water downwards through the various pipes and
reservoirs. Although these aspects of the machine are essential to its workings, they
do not correspond to any economic features. Thus, they are not selected as relevant
features of the machine in the context of using it as an economic model.113
These considerations motivate the following definition:
exemplification : X exemplifies P in a context C if and only if
1. X instantiates P, and
2. P is salient in C.
where P is salient in C if and only if
112 Of course, a scale model is defined by linear scaling in designated dimensions. For many other quantities
the scaling relations may be different. It is often not the case, for instance, that the air resistance of 1:50
car model also scales linearly with 1:50. See Sterrett (2006) for a useful discussion of scaling relations.
113 Morgan and Boumans (2004, 386) stress this, and emphasise that one shouldn’t take these two to be the
economic ‘analogue’ of the principle of effective demand, since this would negate the idea of a circular
economic flow with no clear separation between the upstream (the pump) and downstream (gravity).
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i. C selects P as a relevant property, and
ii. P is epistemically accessible in C.
The sample card exemplifies a certain shade of red because it instantiates that shade
of red, and in a paint shop context, that shade is epistemically accessible and selected
as a relevant property.
I am steering towards an account according to which a model M = 〈X, I〉 exempli-
fies certain properties. But M does not seem to be the right kind of object for exem-
plification: the instantiation condition is mostly unattainable, while salience is mostly
trivial once an interpretation is in place. I consider both of these considerations in
order.
Do scientific models instantiate the properties that they refer to? The problem is
that if O 6= Z, then the model object X does not instantiate properties associated with
Z, and thus cannot exemplify them. The Phillips-Newlyn machine instantiates water
flows but not commodity flows, and so it can never exemplify the latter. But the
intuition remains that the machine makes economic properties salient; it can be used
to learn about the various relationships between macroeconomic variables. So what
are we to make of sentences like ψ = ‘the Phillips-Newlyn machine exemplifies an
economic contraction after a decline in exports’. Since the machine doesn’t instantiate
this property, and since, at least as it stands, by definition it must if the machine is to
exemplify it, in what sense, if any, is that sentence true?
I can think of two strategies, broadly construed, to account for this using the notion
of exemplification (and I discuss a third option later in this section). The first is to grant
that sentences like ψ are, strictly speaking false. But this doesn’t make them entirely
useless; there is still a sense in which when Phillips described his machine in terms of
‘consumption flow’ and interest rate’, he wasn’t saying something which was blatantly
false. Their truth value seems analogous to the truth value of sentences like ‘Sherlock
Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street’. There is still a sense in which they are true, despite
the fact that, strictly speaking, they are false. Various different options are available for
cashing out the sense in which those sentences could be true (see Sainsbury (2010) for a
review). But two seem particularly promising from the perspective of making sense of
sentences like ψ. Firstly, we might appeal to Sainsbury’s notion of truth-relative-to-a-
presupposition (2010, 143-151, 2011). The idea is that when a speaker utters a sentence
like ‘Sherlock Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street’ they presuppose that Sherlock, and
221b Baker Street, exist. And then relative to this presupposition, the uttered sentence
is true. Notice that this does not require that the speaker believe the presupposition.
Sainsbury also takes his account to apply to conversational contexts like the following:
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‘Violinist: A disturbed patient is recounting his (entirely fictitious) early
history to his therapist:
When I was young, I played the violin. I performed Beethoven’s
sonata in E flat at the Wigmore Hall.
The therapist knows this is false, but decides it’s best to roll with her pa-
tient’s delusions and says:
Did you play an encore?’ (Sainsbury, 2011, 143-144).
The question presupposes that the patient played at the Wigmore Hall, but the thera-
pist explicitly does not believe this. Instead, Sainsbury invokes Stalnaker’s (1970; 1984;
2002) propositional attitude of acceptance to explain what’s going on.114 The therapist
accepts that the patient played such a recital, and this makes sense of the question ‘did
you play an encore’, relative to the presupposition, despite the fact that therapist does
not believe that the patient played at Wigmore.
This approach could also work for cases like Phillips describing his machine in
economic terms, uttering sentences like ψ for instance. Despite the fact that he could
not plausibly believe that they were literally true, one could invoke the idea that he
accepts such sentences, and takes them to be true-relative-to-an-interpretation. In
this instance, the interpretation provides the presupposition that the machine is an
economy, and specifies its properties in a rigid way (based upon the actual properties
of the machine, and the specific interpretation in play).
An alternative approach would be to appeal to Walton’s notion of pretense (1990). In
a game of make believe we pretend that stumps are bears. And this allows us to make
sense of sentences like ‘there are four bears in the garden’ despite the fact that such
a sentence is not literally true. Relative to the props and rules of generation, players
of the game are prescribed to imagine that there are that many bears in the garden
(assuming, for example, that there were four stumps in the garden that were props
for the principal of generation that prescribes the imagining of bears). Analogously,
one could also treat interpretations as principles of generation, and model objects as
props. In the case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine, the machine itself is a prop, and
depending on its hydraulic properties, the interpretation prescribes us to imagine that
foreign exports decrease and the economy contracts.115 So although sentences like ψ
114 Notice that Stalknaker’s acceptance is not the same as van Fraassen’s, discussed in Chapter 6 previously.
At least as Sainsbury uses it, acceptance won’t generate any cases of Moore’s paradox, since a presupposi-
tion can be granted and then retracted in the same sentence without pragmatic contradiction (Sainsbury,
2011, 146-148).
115 It should be emphasised that such an account would not be the same as the direct view accounts dis-
cussed in Chapter 7. According to this proposed use of Waltonian pretense, it explains how an object
becomes a Z-representation, not an epistemic representation-of a target system.
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are strictly speaking false, they are true-relative-to-an-interpretation in the sense that
they are prescribed to be imagined by players in the specific game of make believe.
Although I think that the above strategies are worthy of further research, I adopt an
alternative strategy here in order to aid exposition throughout the rest of the thesis.
The key thing to notice is that what was important about the notion of exemplification
was that when X exemplifies P it makes it salient, i.e. the context C selects P as a
relevant property and P is epistemically accessibly in C. The question, then, is whether
this can be the case despite the fact that the property is not, strictly speaking, instan-
tiated. And it’s plausible that it can. In the case of the Guatemalan economists using
the Phillips-Newlyn machine, it is clear that a decline in foreign exports leading to
an economic contraction is selected as a relevant property. It was precisely what they
were trying to find out. Similarly, the property does seem to be epistemically accessi-
ble in this context, albeit in a more roundabout way than how redness is epistemically
accessible in the context of using a sample card in a paint shop. By investigating the
hydraulic properties of the machine, and considering them with respect to the inter-
pretation offered, the economists could access the relevant economic property; not in
a direct sensory manner, but access it nevertheless.
So it’s the properties that the object actually instantiate qua O object, combined
with the interpretation, that provides this epistemic access to Z properties. This in-
sight allows the introduction of the idea of instantiating-under-an-interpretation, or
I-instantiation for short:
i-instantiation : Let X be an O object and I an interpretation. A model M = 〈X, I〉
I-instantiates a property P if and only if X instantiates an O property P’ which
satisfies the following condition: I(P′) = P, and if P and P’ are variables then
the value of P I-instantiated by M is equal to p, where p = f (p′).
The definition of exemplification can then be liberalised accordingly, by replacing the
term ‘instantiates’ with ‘instantiates or I-instantiates’. So the Phillips-Newlyn machine
I-instantiates properties like a decline in exports leading to an economic contraction
(under the appropriate interpretation), and sentences like ψ come out as true according
to the new definition of exemplification.
The worry with instantiation was that it was too hard to come by; the opposite prob-
lem seems to beset saliency. Interpreting O properties in terms of Z properties seems
to involve selecting these properties and selecting them seems to presuppose them
being epistemically accessible. If this were true then all the Z properties that feature
in the interpretation would automatically be exemplified, and this would trivialise the
notion of exemplification. Fortunately, interpretations don’t seem to work that way.
An object can exemplify only those properties that are covered by an interpretation,
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but this does not imply that every property covered by an interpretation is ipso facto
exemplified. This is because interpretations can, and often do, cover O properties we
are unaware of, or not interested in, in a given context. Suppose there was a small
pipe in the top right corner of the machine. We haven’t paid any attention to that pipe,
and the pipe is made from white plastic so that we cannot see how much water flows
through it (or whether any water flows at all). The flow of water (if any) is covered
by the interpretation, but it has not been made salient and so is not exemplified. Or
consider again the case of the Guatemalan economists using the model to represent
the impact of a decrease in foreign demand for Guatemalan goods; they may have
been particularly interested in the change in the equilibrium values once the appro-
priate change had been made to the valve marked ‘foreign exports’. This means that
the machine would exemplify this property. But in other contexts, this property might
not be exemplified at all. For example, when explaining the working of the machine,
Phillips himself ignores the impact of foreign imports and exports until the end of
his paper (1950, Section III). Which means that, although I-instantiated, the relevant Z
properties would not be made epistemically salient and thereby would not be exem-
plified (in Section I and II) even though they have been covered by the interpretation
all along.
Whether or not a Z property covered by the interpretation is also exemplified de-
pends on whether we have epistemic access to the corresponding O property and on
whether the context selects that O property as a focal point of investigation. The adop-
tion of an interpretation in no way determines that this has to be the case. X, together
with the interpretation, provides a ‘menu’ of Z properties that the model I-instantiates.
Whether or not any of these properties is exemplified depends on the context in which
the Z representation is used in a way that is sensitive to the purposes and interests of
the model user.
9.2.4 Imputation and Keys
So far I have focused on what turns an ordinary object into a Z-representation. And
Goodman and Elgin’s observation that Z-representations do not have to represent any
Z, or indeed any target system whatsoever, remains true in the context of scientific
representations. I take this to be a significant attribute of my account. But at least
some models do represent particular targets. RA stipulates two conditions for this to
happen: X has to denote Y and X has to exemplify properties that are imputed to Y. I
discuss this latter condition first, before turning to denotation in the next subsection.
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Imputation can be analysed in terms of stipulation. The model user may simply stip-
ulate that the properties exemplified by the model hold in the target system, and this
is what establishes that the model represents the target as having those properties.116
In this way models allow for surrogative reasoning; imputing a property onto a target
generates a hypothesis: Y has whatever property was imputed to it. And notice that
nothing in this discussion requires that the target actually has the property imputed;
the result of the imputation can be right or wrong in a way that allows for models to
misrepresent their targets.
However, in many cases of representation-as the properties exemplified by a Z-
representation aren’t transferred to a target unchanged. In fact in her discussion of
imputation, Elgin posits that a representation imputes the exemplified properties ‘or
related ones’ to Y (2010, 10). This observation is particularly pertinent in scientific
contexts. The properties of a model are rarely, if ever, taken to hold directly in their
target systems and so the properties imputed onto targets may diverge significantly
from the properties exemplified in the model.
The problem with invoking ‘related’ properties is not its correctness, but its lack of
specificity. Any property can be related to any other property in some way or another,
and as long as nothing is said about what this way is, it remains unclear what proper-
ties X ascribes to Y. So what connects the properties exemplified by a Z-representation
and those that are imputed to the target system? I do not think that there is a uni-
versal answer to this question. In some cases the connection could be described as
‘de-idealisation’. In the Phillips-Newlyn machine – which was known to have a mar-
gin of error compared to Hick’s equations on which it was based – the connection was
to move from exact properties (like the interest rate being x) to intervals around those
properties (like the interest rate being x± 4 %), or the property imputed could be even
less specific, like an imputed positive correlation between foreign investment and total
output, without any precise specification of the correlation. In other cases of scientific
representation the connection might be quite arbitrary.
One could put faith into context and believe that it determines what properties are
imputed to the target. I’d rather not. It remains unclear what a model says about its
target as long as the relation between the properties exemplified by the model and the
116 One worry might be that this allows for radically non-standard uses of models, where arbitrary proper-
ties are imputed onto arbitrary target systems. This objection relates to the Humpty-Dumpty problem
discussed in Chapter 2, as it seems as though, for example, a pendulum model could impute properties
like having a particular period onto a target system like the human brain, which seems counter-intuitive.
I think these sorts of cases are ruled out by the denotation condition discussed below, but for those with
residual worries I would not be adverse to building some ‘stability conditions’ into the definition of im-
putation. Perhaps model properties are only imputed onto targets if they do so in a way that is stable
across multiple uses of those models. This is a question deserving of further research.
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properties imputed to the target remain unclear, and so it is crucial to make explicit in
every case of modelling what that relationship is. I therefore prefer to write an explicit
specification of the relation between the two sets of properties into my account of
scientific representation. Let P1, ..., Pn be the Z properties exemplified by the model,
and let Q1, ..., Qm be the ‘related’ properties that the model imputes to Y (n and m
are positive natural numbers which can, but need not, be equal to allow for the fact
that not every exemplified property might correspond to an imputed one). Then the
representation must come with a key K specifying how exactly P1, ..., Pn are converted
into Q1, ..., Qm:
key : Let M = 〈X, I〉 be a model, and let P1, ..., Pn be Z properties exemplified by M.
A key K associates {P1, ..., Pn} with a set {Q1, ..., Qm} of properties that are can-
didates for imputation on the target system: K can thus be treated as a mapping
(not necessarily a function117) from {P1, ..., Pn} to {Q1, ..., Qm}.
The third clause in RA then becomes: X exemplifies P1, ..., Pn and imputes some of the
properties Q1, ..., Qm to Y, where the two sets of properties are connected to each other
by a key K.
The idea of a key, which is clearly influenced by Contessa (2007) and Frigg (2010a),
comes from maps, paradigmatic examples of epistemic representation. Consider a
map of the world. It exemplifies a distance of 29cm between the two points labelled
‘Paris’ and ‘New York’. The map comes with a key, which includes a scale, 1:20,000,000
say, and this allows us to translate a property exemplified by the map (the 29cm dis-
tance between dots marked ‘New York’ and ‘Paris’) into a property of the world (that
New York and Paris are 5,800km apart). Or consider the case of a scale model of a ship
being used to represent the forces an actual ship faces when at sea. The exemplified
property P in this instance is the resistance the model ship faces when moved through
the water in a tank. But this doesn’t translate into the resistance faced by the actual
ship in the same way in which distances in a map translate into distances in reality.
In fact, the relation between the resistance of the model and the resistance of the real
ship stand in a complicated non-linear relationship because smaller models encounter
disproportionate effects due to the viscosity of the fluid (cf. Sterrett, 2006). The exact
form of the key is often highly non-trivial and emerges as the result of a thoroughgo-
ing study of the situation. Determining how to move from properties exemplified by
models to properties of their target systems can be a significant task, and should not
go unrecognised in an account of scientific representation.
117 Using ‘mapping’ rather than ‘function’ allows for one-to-many relationships between P properties and Q
properties.
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K is a blank to be filled. What key a given model is based on depends on myriad
factors: the scientific discipline, the context, the aims and purposes for which the
model is used, the theoretical backdrop against which X operates, etc. Building K into
the definition of scientific representation does not prejudge the nature of K, much less
single out a particular key as the correct one. In some instances the key might be the
identity key: the properties exemplified by the model are imputed unchanged onto
the target. In such cases my definition of scientific representation captures all that the
more nuanced similarity based accounts got right (and without the need to invoke the
notion of similarity at all). The ‘relevant’ properties discussed there are, according to
my account, relevant because they are exemplified. The hypothesis that M and T are
similar (in the sense of partial identity) with respect to them amounts to the identity
key. If similarity in the sense of likeness is preferred instead, then the key will map
properties exemplified by the model to ‘similar’ properties as demanded. And since I
place no restriction on the nature of the properties exemplified, or imputed, this allows
for structural properties to be exemplified and imputed onto targets as well.118
But in keeping with my concerns about treating similarity, structural or otherwise,
as a universal style of scientific representation, introducing the notion of a key allows
the account to capture cases where similarity plays no role. In some cases the key
might take the form of an ‘ideal limit key’ (cf. Laymon 1990; Frigg 2010a, 131-132),
or ‘approximation key’ (Ducheyne, 2008). And keys might also associate exemplified
properties with entirely different properties to be imputed onto the target (for exam-
ple, colours with tube lines as is the case in the London Underground map). The
requirement is merely that there must be some key for something to qualify as a scien-
tific representation. The above examples show that introducing keys does not amount
to smuggling in a mimetic conception of representation via the back door. On the
contrary, keys can be as conventional as they like.
The introduction of a key raises a third possibility for answering the problem dis-
cussed above; that the Phillips-Newlyn machine, and models where O 6= Z more
generally, do not instantiate properties they are taken to exemplify. Recall the sen-
tence ψ = ‘the Phillips-Newlyn machine exemplifies an economic contraction after a
decline in exports’ and the concern that it could not be true, strictly speaking, since
the machine doesn’t instantiate any economic property whatsoever. Rather than ap-
pealing to a weaker notion of truth, or redefining exemplification, we could instead
grant that the sentence is completely false, but acts as shorthand for ‘the Phillips-
Newlyn machine exemplifies a decrease in water in the machine after a close in the
118 Although one might want to rule these out for reasons strictly speaking external to the account of rep-
resentation I am developing here, the questions concerning the ‘structure’ of models and targets for
example. I discuss this in the next chapter.
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valve marked “exports”’ combined with a specification of a key translating hydraulic
properties into economic ones. In general, the idea would be to ensure that models
only exemplify properties that they instantiate, and the role of the interpretation gets
shifted into the notion of a key. So the machine would exemplify a hydraulic property
that gets translated by a key K into an economic property (either in the strict sense
engendered by the interpretation with its function associating values of quantifies of
water, or in a weaker sense in line with the idea that economists might only take them
to be correlated without assigning a specific function to the correlation). Again, with
further development this might serve as a successful alternative to my own preferred
account, but I won’t explore it in any more detail here.
9.2.5 Denotation
The final condition on a model M representing its target T as thus or so is that M
denote T. As mentioned above, the use of denotation in this context follows Goodman
and Elgin’s liberalisation of the notion to allow it to include the relation that holds
between pictures, or statues, and their subjects, as well as allowing a vehicle (picture,
model, predicate) to denote multiple subjects, targets, or elements in its extension.
So what establishes this kind of relation? Recall the two broad approaches: the
descriptivist approach, according to which the vehicle denotes whatever satisfies its
‘content’, and the direct reference approach, whereby the vehicle directly picks out the
denotatum without going via any descriptive content whatsoever. How might these be
developed in the case of scientific models? How do scientific models come to denote?
This question has received little to no attention in the literature on scientific mod-
elling.119 So it is useful to return to the context of pictorial representation. Lopes (2004,
Chapter 5) develops both the approaches to denotation in that context. According to
a descriptivist about pictorial denotation, just as a name denotes its bearer in virtue
of the bearer satisfying description(s) associated with the name, a picture denotes its
subject in virtue of the latter satisfying the picture’s ‘pictorial content’, i.e. the visual
properties it represents its subject as having. So, a descriptivist account of pictorial de-
notation would claim that a Z-picture denotes a Z (or Zs) in virtue of being a Z-picture.
This is something that Goodman and Elgin explicitly deny, and is the target of Lopes’
criticism.
I want to remain agnostic about how denotation in the context of scientific modelling
is established (or at least leave it as a topic for future research). But some suggestions
119 As I have discussed, by and large philosophers of science have helped themselves to the notion of ‘deno-
tation’ (Contessa, 2007), or the even harder to understand notion of ‘representational force’ (Sua´rez, 2004)
without expanding on what establishes them.
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are in order. Firstly, I think that in many cases, denotation is borrowed from language.
In the London Tube map, we see a circle with ‘Brixton’ marked next to it. The circle
denotes Brixton and it does so by borrowing the denotation of the proper name. Many
models seem to work in this way as well. The Phillips-Newlyn machine denotes what-
ever the word ‘Guatemalan economy’ denotes. And parts of the machine denote parts
of the economy in virtue of stickers printed next to them. This is to hand over the
problem of uncovering the roots of denotation to the philosophy of language, and any
account of linguistic denotation is compatible with the account of representation I am
developing here (since, even if it is a descriptivist account, denotation isn’t established
via the ‘content’ of the model, but rather the ‘content’ of words used in the modelling
context).
Secondly, it bears noting that there is an inherent tension between my account of
representation and a descriptivist account that claims that every instance of a model
M denoting a target T is established via T satisfying M’s content. To see why, recall
how important it is to distinguish between representation and accurate representation.
The former is my primary interest throughout this thesis, and my account of repre-
sentation is designed to allow for the possibility of misrepresentation. Now, we can
define the ‘content’ of the model as everything that a model imputes, after the exem-
plification and keying up processes have occurred. And if the model denoted anything
and everything that satisfied that content, and didn’t denote anything else, then it’s
difficult to see how misrepresentation could enter the picture. If the model’s target(s)
included all and only those systems that satisfied what the model imputed this would
preclude a model misrepresenting any target.
One could respond by invoking Searle’s (1958) ‘cluster theory’ in the account of
model denotation. The idea, which remains to be developed, would be that a model
denotes any target that satisfies an appropriately weighted proportion of the model’s
content. And this would allow for the possibility of models misrepresenting targets,
at least in some respects (i.e. as long as a system satisfied ‘enough’ of the properties
that the key delivered, then the model would denote it, but this allows the system
to fail to satisfy at least some of them). But the problem with such an approach is
that it would preclude total misrepresentation; cases where everything that a model
‘tells us’ about its target system is false. Although such models would be complete
failures in representational accuracy, my inclination is to treat them as representations
nevertheless. With these observations in mind, I think that if it turns out that there
are cases where what a model denotes is not parasitic on whatever the model users’
words denote, then either a pluralistic account (i.e. one where model-target denotation
relationships can be established in different ways in different cases), or an account
developing the direct reference view is more appropriate in the context of scientific
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representation. This, of course, would require expanding on whether models can
‘baptise’ their targets, and whether the appropriate causal chains between different
uses of models can be established. I think this is a viable avenue for future research.
9.3 the deki account
It’s now time to tie together the previous discussion into a fully fledged account of
scientific representation. With the aforementioned notions in mind we can define
what it takes for a scientific model to represent its target as thus or so in the following
manner. In short, the claim is that a model represents its target as thus or so if and
only if M is a Z-representation that denotes T and imputes properties Q1, ..., Qm onto
T. In more detail:
deki : Let M = 〈X, I〉 be a scientific model, where X is an O object and I is an inter-
pretation from O properties to Z properties. Then M represents a target system
T as thus or so if and only if:
1. M denotes T (and in some cases parts of M denotes parts of T),
2. M exemplifies Z properties P1, ..., Pn,
3. M comes with a key associating the set {P1, ..., Pn} with a set of (possibly
identical) properties {Q1, ..., Qm}, and
4. M imputes at least one of {Q1, ..., Qm}.
For obvious reasons, I call this the DEKI account of scientific representation. Figure
17 provides a schematic representation of the account.
So let’s provide a complete analysis of how the Phillips-Newlyn machine repre-
sented the Guatemalan economy in 1953. The machine (X) is a hydraulic object (O)
that was constructed by Phillips and Newlyn to be the base of a model. Z is an econ-
omy. They endowed the machine with an interpretation (I) which maps O properties
onto Z properties. The machine so interpreted is an economy-representation, and as
such is a model M. The economists in the Guatemalan Central bank used M as a
representation-of the Guatemalan economy, by making it denote the economy. They
did so by borrowing the denotation of the linguistic expression ‘Guatemalan economy’
(and parts of the machine denoted parts of the economy in virtue of the stickers next
to the tanks). The machine instantiates a number of hydraulic machine properties, and
via I it I-instantiates a number of economy properties. Some of them – the effect that
a decrease in foreign exports had on income for instance – are exemplified because
they were made salient by focusing on them and making sure they were epistemically
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Figure 17: The DEKI account of scientific representation
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accessible. In this instance we can suppose that the economists were so confident
in the underlying mathematical theory that they used an interval-valued key, which
moved from specific changes in value for income before and after the change in for-
eign exports to values 4% around them, and imputed the result onto the Guatemalan
economy.120
I think that this is the correct analysis of how models represent. But it bears noting
that the account is stated at such a level of generality that it needs to be concretised
in every particular instance of representation. In every concrete case of a model rep-
resenting a target one has to specify what the O object is, how it is interpreted, what
sort of Z-representation it is and what properties it exemplifies, how denotation is
established, what translation key is used, and how the imputation is taking place. De-
pending on what kind of representation we are dealing with, these ‘blanks’ will be
filled differently. But far from being a defect, this degree of abstractness is an ad-
vantage. Scientific modelling is an umbrella term covering a vast array of different
activities in different fields, and a view that sees representations in fields as diverse
as elementary particle physics, evolutionary biology, hydrology, and rational choice
theory work in exactly the same way is either mistaken or too coarse to make impor-
tant features visible. My own account is stated at the right level of generality: it is
general enough to cover a large array of cases and yet it highlights what all instances
of scientific representation have in common.
Before moving on it is worth pointing out that the ordering of the conditions is
not supposed to introduce a temporal element into either scientific representation or
the process of constructing the model; nor is it meant to indicate logical priorities. It
needn’t be the case that a model user first establish denotation, before determining
which properties are exemplified by the model and only then translating them and
imputing them to the target system. None of the four conditions has to be established
prior to the others, and the model could exemplify the properties even before being
used to represent a target by the model user. The user could equally well start off
with the target system and a set of properties of interest. She could then construct an
‘inverse’ key associating those properties with ones that we have firmer grasp on in the
context of model building. She could then construct a model that exemplifies those
properties, in the appropriate manner under the appropriate interpretation, before
taking the model and establishing the denotation relation between it and the target.
Such a process is not ruled out by the above conditions. The account does not function
as a diachronic account of scientific representation. It is synchronic: as long as the
120 Alternatively, if the economists were more sceptical about the precise numbers to impute, they could just
have imputed a directional correlation.
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conditions are met, in whatever order, a model represents its target system as thus or
so.
10
A P P L I C AT I O N A N D A N A LY S I S
To further illustrate the account of scientific representation I am proposing it is worth
applying it to further instances of scientific representation. In this chapter I investigate
how the account explains how Kendrew’s ‘sausage model’ represented myoglobin as
having a particular tertiary structure, and how Volterra’s model represented fish in
the Adriatic Sea. I take it that Bak et al.’s sand pile model would receive an analogous
treatment to Volterra’s so I do not provide a detailed case study of SOC models here.
I then explain how my account fares with respect to the problems and desiderata laid
out in Chapter 1, and compare the account with those discussed previously.
10.1 models of molecules
Recall the scenario. It’s 1957 and John Kendrew threads a ‘sausage’ of plasticine
through a system of vertical rods. He looks at the resulting shape and observes that it
twists and turns back on itself forming a pattern that is highly difficult to explain in
English. He concludes that myoglobin, a globular protein smaller than haemoglobin
that is found in many animal cells, has a particular tertiary structure, and remarks that
‘the arrangement seems to be almost totally lacking in the kind of regularities which
one instinctively anticipates, and is more complicated than has been predicated by any
theory of protein structure’ (1958, 665).
Proteins are chains of amino acids covalently bonded together by peptide bonds.
Specifying their primary structure simply requires specifying the sequence of amino
acids. Specifying their secondary structure requires describing the three-dimensional
form of local segments of the chain (a common example is an α-helix: a right handed
spiral). Specifying their tertiary structure requires describing how the local segments
of the chain are folded together in three-dimensional space.121 The chemical and
physical properties of a protein depend on all three of these types of structure.
121 Molecules made up of multiple polypeptide chains have a quaternary structure as well.
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Figure 18: Kendrew’s ‘sausage model’
of myoglobin (Science Mu-
seum)122
Figure 19: Kendrew with his ‘forest of
rods’ model (MRC Lab of
Molecular Biology)123
Determining tertiary structure is a difficult task, and Kendrew’s work on myo-
globins led him to win the 1962 Nobel Prize in chemistry. Kendrew’s investigation
contained two important elements. Firstly, through the process of X-ray diffraction
and complex calculations on the results, he and his team in the Cavendish Laboratory
at the University of Cambridge were able to determine the electron density throughout
the molecule.
Using these data, Kendrew set about building a physical ‘sausage’ model of a myo-
globin molecule. The first model was built at a resolution of 6A˚ (Figure 18). It con-
sisted of a series of vertical supporting rods, around which was wrapped a sausage of
plasticine, which twisted, turned, and folded back on itself. The sausage model was
constructed from the electron density data. But it wasn’t a simple summary of these
data. The model provided epistemic access to the tertiary structure of the molecule in
a way that the electron density alone could not (de Chadarevian, 2004, 344).
Describing this structure is very difficult. From observing his model, Kendrew states
the following:
‘[The polypeptide chain] is folded to form a flat disk of dimensions about
43A˚ x 35A˚ x 23A˚. Within the disk the chains pursue a complicated course
turning at large angles and generally behaving so irregularly that it is dif-
ficult to describe the arrangement in simple terms; but we note the strong
tendency for neighbouring chains to lie 8-10A˚ apart in spite of the irreg-
ularity. One might loosely say that the molecule consists of two layers of
chains, the predominant directions of which are nearly at right angles in
the two layers’ (Kendrew et al., 1958, 665).
121 Available here http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/HoMImages/Components/799/79987_3.png.
122 Available here https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:KendrewMyoglobin.jpg#/media/File:
KendrewMyoglobin.jpg.
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The model played a serious role in both discovering this structure, and communicating
it by means of photographs. Moreover, in the models he developed later, like the so-
called ‘forest of rods’ model (Figure 19) representing myoglobin at a 2A˚ resolution,
Kendrew used observations from plumb lines on the model to deduce specific atomic
coordinates of the atoms in the polypeptide chain.124,125 Although relatively simple,
models such as this played a significant role in developing our understanding of the
structure of proteins, and their importance should not be underestimated.
In virtue of what does the sausage model – a system of rods and a folded length
of plasticine – represent its target: myoglobin, a protein molecule found in muscle
tissue? Moreover, what is it about the model that allows us to learn about myoglobin
by investigating the model? Here we can apply the account of representation discussed
in the previous chapter to answer this question: the plasticine object is interpreted in
such a way as to become a protein-representation, which represents myoglobin as
having a particular shape in three-dimensional space. So, let’s see how the conditions
are met.
The first question to address is what makes the plasticine-wrapped-around-rods-
system a Z-representation, in this instance a protein-representation (or ‘protein model’
for short)? What distinguishes it from the result of a child aimlessly playing with
plasticine? As in the case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine, the point that needs empha-
sising is that the model is itself a physical object, with an associated set of properties:
being such and such a size; being made out of such and such materials; being folded
in such and such a way; and so on. The material properties of the model qua physi-
cal object are important to how the object functions as a model. The model can thus
be characterised as an O object, in this case a plasticine-around-rods object with a
particular shape and size in three dimensional space.
In order to turn the O object into a Z-representation, there needs to be an interpreta-
tion I that associates some properties of the object (collected into a set of O properties
O) with properties of proteins (collected into a set of protein properties Z). For ex-
ample, the plasticine sausage is associated with an amino acid chain, and the shape
of the sausage is associated with the shape of the chain, and so on. Notice that not
all properties of the object are collected into O. Although the rods played a vital role
in keeping the plasticine in the shape that it is, they do not correspond to any protein
property. Similarly, not all protein properties are collected into Z . The model, for
instance, does not have the resources to tell us anything about the primary structure
124 For further examples about the use of these models as research tools see de Chadarevian (2004, 345-349).
125 A full specification of the tertiary structure of protein would require specifying an atomic coordinate
for every atom in the polypeptide chain (and side chains). Although the ‘sausage model’ doesn’t quite
provide this, it was the closest anyone had come at the time.
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Figure 20: A photograph of the model in Nature (Kendrew et al., 1958, 665)
of myoglobin (since the plasticine rod is a continuous chain and thus lacks the ability
to represent different amino acids in the chain).
Quantitative properties have to be dealt with carefully again here. In this example
we have quantitative properties like the angles of curves in the length of plasticine and
its overall length. Here, I has to include a function that associates the values of the
appropriate quantitative properties in O with values of quantitative properties in Z .
In this case, the function associating the bend angles is the identity function. But the
function associating lengths in the model with lengths in proteins is a scaling function
determined by the size of the model and our knowledge about the size of proteins.
Kendrew makes this scale explicit in his picture of the model, which includes a series
of white dots that are specified to be 1A˚ apart (Figure 20). Obviously the white dots
themselves are not 1A˚ apart, but with the interpretation in place we can understand
what he means.
In the research context in question, where Kendrew was trying to determine the
tertiary structure of myoglobin, the properties that the model exemplifies are those
that relate to its shape in three dimensional space. It exemplifies being a 300A˚ long
polypeptide chain folded to form a flat disk of dimensions about 43A˚ x 35A˚ x 23A˚,
whose chains within the disk turn at large angles, that neighbouring chains lie 8-10
A˚ apart, and consisting of two layers of chains with a heme group (the site where
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oxygen bonds to the molecule) connected in at least four distinct locations. The model
only, strictly speaking, instantiates some of these properties (angles between the chains,
number of connections...). The rest it I-instantiates.
As in the case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine, I-instantiation can be used to estab-
lish exemplification, since what’s important about exemplification is that the exempli-
fied properties are made epistemically salient. And in the case of the sausage model,
the property of being a polypeptide chain, that is 300A˚ long, and is folded in such and
such a way are both salient, and epistemically accessible.
The final thing to emphasise about how exemplification relates to being a Z-
representation is that there is no reason to suppose that all properties in Z are ex-
emplified. The interpretation provides a ‘menu’ of properties, which context selects
as salient in certain cases. For example, in a context where Kendrew only cared about
the protein length, rather than tertiary structure, the latter would not be exemplified
despite being covered by the interpretation.
So, Kendrew’s ‘sausage’ model is a pair M = 〈O, I〉, where O is a plasticine-around-
rods model, and I an interpretation function mapping properties of of the model qua
object to protein properties in a tightly constrained way. Notice that, other than the
specification that it is protein properties that occur in the codomain of I, no reference
here is made to any target system. The next step in establishing that the M represents
myoglobin is that M denote myoglobin. The important thing to notice here is that
the sausage model differs in an interesting way from the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In
the latter case we had a particular target system; the Guatemalan economy. In the for-
mer case M features much more like a predicate; it denotes all and every myoglobin
molecule. Here recall the way that I have been using denotation throughout this the-
sis. Following Goodman and Elgin, it doesn’t need to be ‘singular’; just as a name
denotes its bearer, a predicate denotes everything in its extension, and the ‘sausage’
model denotes all myoglobin molecules. This better be the case in any account of scien-
tific representation that includes denotation as a necessary condition, since numerous
models denote multiple target systems.
What establishes denotation in the case of the ‘sausage’ model is a more troubling
question. Again, in my opinion it is natural to think that the denotation of the model is
parasitic on the denotation of the word ‘myoglobin’; the model denotes whatever the
word denotes. However, there is an interesting second option available as well. In this
case, the model was constructed from the electron density data, which itself was the
result of a measurement procedure on a sample of whale myoglobin (Kendrew et al.,
1958).126 If one were of a Kripkean bent regarding denotation then one could attempt
126 The measurement procedure and mathematical manipulation of the result was a complex process that
played a highly important role in Kendrew’s investigation.
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to develop an account according to which the myoglobin model represents myoglobin
in virtue of a causal chain that holds between myoglobin and the model; a causal chain
that goes via the electron density data and Kendrew’s use of that data in constructing
his model. As before, I think this would be a useful avenue of future research (useful,
not just from the perspective of the philosophy of science – ‘how do models denote?’
– but also from the perspective of philosophers more generally – ‘once denotation is
liberalised outside of the linguistic framework, can we learn anything about the roots
of denotation?’).
The final steps in establishing that the model represents the protein as thus or so,
is that the exemplified properties of the model are keyed up with a a set of proper-
ties, and the latter are imputed onto the target system. In the case of the plasticine
model, the key allows some flexibility between the properties directly exemplified by
the protein model and those that are imputed onto myoglobin itself.
For example, although the length of plasticine in the model is a rope of uniform
width throughout the model, Kendrew explicitly imputed a different property onto the
molecule ‘as it is at corners that the chain must lose the tightly packed configuration
that makes it visible at this resolution’ and proposed that perhaps 70% of the chain
was an α-helix whilst the rest was fully extended (Kendrew et al., 1958, 665). Likewise,
it is unlikely that Kendrew was confident that the 43A˚ x 35A˚ x 23A˚ dimensions exactly
corresponded to the dimensions of the molecule. There were clear margins for error
in the process leading to the construction of the molecule, so it is more likely that
something like ‘being a flat disk of 43A˚±10% x 35A˚±10% x 23A˚±10% dimensions’
was imputed.
With the aforementioned discussion in mind, how the plasticine-around-rods object
came to represent myoglobin as having the particular tertiary structure that it does
can now be tied together. The plasticine-around-rods system X is endowed with an in-
terpretation I associating plasticine-properties with protein properties. The interpreta-
tion associates quantitative properties of the model, like angles between bends, or the
length of the chain, with quantitative protein properties, like angles between bends,
and the length of a polypeptide chain. X and I together form a model, a protein-
representation. The model denotes myoglobin, which makes it a representation-of
myoglobin. The model also exemplifies protein properties in virtue of the research
context selecting them as salient, for instance consisting of two layers of chains (P1),
forming a flat disk of dimensions about 43A˚ x 35A˚ x 23A˚ (P2), and having a uniform
configuration throughout (P3). These properties are related to other properties with
key K: identity in case of P1, applying with a tolerance threshold of around 10% in the
case of P2 and only applying to straight lengths of the polypeptide chain in the case of
P3. So the model imputes consisting of two layers of chains (Q1); being a flat disk of
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dimensions 43A˚±10% x 35A˚±10% x 23A˚±10%; and having a uniform configuration in
only 70% of the chain (Q3) to the target. These conditions establish how the plasticine
model (M), represents myoglobin (T), as being a protein with such and such a tertiary
structure (Z).
10.2 models of fish
Recall the scenario. Volterra is interested in the change in relative fish populations in
the Adriatic Sea. Before the First World War there was a certain proportion of predator
to prey fish sold in the Italian fish markets, and he supposes that the proportions in
the markets match the proportions in the sea itself. During the war fishing decreased
significantly, which led to a higher proportion of predator to prey (i.e. light fishing
favoured the predators). After the war, where fishing increased to pre-war levels, the
proportion of predator to prey returned to its pre-war level.127 He writes down the
following coupled non-linear differential equations:
dV
dt
= αV − (βV)P (1)
dP
dt
= γ(βV)P− δP (2)
He lets t denote time; V denote the size of the prey population; P the size of the
predator population; α the intrinsic growth rate of the prey; δ the intrinsic death rate
of the predators; and β and γ denote prey capture rate and rate at which each predator
converts captured prey into more predator births respectively. He notices that the
equations have two solutions where dVdt =
dP
dt = 0. First where P = V = 0, and
second where αV = (βV)P and δP = γ(βV)P. The second is his primary interest.
He calculates that although it is unstable, it corresponds to the mean values of P and
V over an indefinitely large amounts of t. Letting Pˆ and Vˆ denote these values and
ρ = Pˆ
Vˆ
he derives the following equation:
ρ =
αγ
δ
(3)
He argues that heavy fishing is a general biocide, i.e. something that harms both
predators and prey, and corresponds to lower values of α (it is harmful to the prey so
it lowers their birth rate) and higher values of δ (it is harmful to the predators so it
increases their death rate), which means, by equation 3, that heavy fishing corresponds
127 See Volterra (1926, 1928) for his original discussion. See Weisberg (2007); Weisberg and Reisman (2008);
Weisberg (2013) for useful philosophical discussions that I draw upon here.
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to lower values of ρ. Given that ρ is defined as the ratio of long term average size of
of the predator population to the long term average size of the prey population, lower
values of ρ mean higher relative size of prey population with respect to predator
population. He thus concludes that pre-First World War fishing activity led to higher
prey to predator ratios, and thus more prey in the Adriatic fish markets, and the
decrease in fishing activity associated with the First World War led to higher predator
to prey ratios.
The first thing to get clear in this instance is what the model is. In the previous
cases the the model object, O, was a physical object: a hydraulic machine or a length of
plasticine wrapped around some rods. This isn’t the case here. There was nothing that
Volterra was ‘holding in his hands’ that represented the fish population. This example
concerns a non-physical model. By and large, I want to remain non-committal about
the ontological status of of such models. However there are two pertinent options
available that I briefly outline, since the approach adopted has implications for how
DEKI is to be understood as applied to this case. Firstly, the O object could be taken
to be a mathematical structure that satisfies equations 1 and 2 above. Secondly, it could
be taken to be a fictional system in some sense. I discuss both in turn, and then explore
how the rest of DEKI’s conditions could be met in each instance.
The equations above are coupled non-linear differential equations. Equation 1 tells
us how the value of V changes with respect to the value of t, and equation 2 tells us
how the value of P changes with respect to the value of t. So V and P are both real
valued functions on t, which itself takes real values. The equation is thus satisfied by
a mathematical structure S .128 Figure 21 shows how the functions V and P evolve
through time.
The equations also have a phase space, which is constructed by eliminating the
independent variable t from equations 1 and 2. This is done as follows. Since V is a
function whose value depends only on the value of t and P, and P is a function whose
value depends only on t and V we can use the chain rule to derive the following:
dP
dV
=
dP
dt
dV
dt
=
γ(βV)P− δP
αV − (βV)P = −
P
V
(γ(βV)− δ)
(βP− α) (4)
The solutions to equation 4 are the closed curves illustrated in figure 22. Each curve in
the phase space corresponds to how the values of V and P change for each set of the
initial conditions, i.e. initial values of V and P in equation 4 (keeping the parameters
fixed). We can treat this phase space as a mathematical object, where points in the
128 I do not have the space to spell out the details of the sorts of structure that satisfy differential equations.
For my current purposes it suffices that they are mathematical objects, but see Balzer et al. (1987) for
useful examples of these sorts of structures.
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Figure 21: Oscillations in the Lokta-Volterra model (Weisberg and Reisman, 2008, 112)
Figure 22: Phase space of the Lokta-Volterra model (Weisberg and Reisman, 2008, 133)
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space are pairs of real numbers; points on the curves are pairs of values of V and P
(for each value of t) compatible with equation 4; and a function is defined on the space
relating each point with the ‘next’ one (as t increases). One option then, is to identify
the model object X of the Lotka-Volterra model with the phase space represented in
figure 22 (or the set theoretic structure Sabove; the difference between the state-space,
or phase-space, and set-theoretic approach doesn’t matter for my current purposes).
It is important to note here that, if this approach is taken, then the only properties
instantiated by the model object X are, strictly speaking, mathematical ones, like ‘a
decrease in α and increase in δ entails a decrease in ρ, i.e. a decrease in the relative
value of Pˆ with respect to Vˆ’.129
An alternative option is suggested when we consider Volterra’s own presentation of
his model. Accompanying his presentation of the equations he writes things like the
following:
‘The first case I have considered is that of two associated species, of which
one, finding sufficient food in its environment, would multiply indefinitely
when left to itself, while the other would perish for lack of nourishment if
left alone; but the second feed upon the first so the two species can co-exist
together’ (1926, 558).
‘If we try to destroy individuals of both species uniformly and proportion-
ally to their number, the average number of the eaten species grows and
the average number of the eating species decreases ... But increased pro-
tection of the eaten species increases the average number of both’ (1926,
558-559).130
‘Let [V] and [P] be the numbers of individuals of the two species. Let [α]
represent the coefficient of increase which the first would have if the other
did not exist. Let us suppose that the second would die out because of lack
of food if it were alone ... ’ (1928, 9).
The equations are explicitly accompanied by a description of what we might take to be
an ‘imaginary’ target environment: containing only two types of species; who multiply
and die continuously; where there is unlimited food for the prey; and so on.
If we interpret these descriptions at face value, then rather than taking the model
object to be a mathematical structure that satisfies the equations, we could instead
129 Strictly speaking, the mathematical object that instantiates this property will be a higher dimensional
phase space corresponding to allowing the values of the parameters to vary, as well as the initial values
of V and P.
130 This is a statement of the so-called ‘Volterra Principle’ as derived from equation 3 above.
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take X to be an imaginary system, containing predators and prey such that the ide-
alisation assumptions introduced by Volterra are ‘true’, in some sense, of them. This
approach of identifying models with imaginary systems was originally suggested by
Godfrey-Smith (2006) who compared models to works of fiction. Cashing out the
details of the ontological status of such systems is a significant task. Frigg (2010a,b)
provides a careful analysis of how Walton’s account of fictions can be developed in
the context of an indirect view of scientific representation (as opposed to Levy and
Toon’s use of Walton’s framework in Direct View). According to Frigg, in the case
of non-physical models, the equations and descriptions presented by scientists, like
those written by Volterra above, should be seen as props in a Waltonian game of make-
believe. Principles of generation prescribe the reader to imagine a fictional system
such that statements like ‘the intrinsic growth rate of the prey is α’ are ‘true’ in the
relevant game of make-believe. Under this approach, we can allow that the model
system X instantiates physical properties like ‘a general biocide favours the prey’.131
So we have at least two options, the model object X could be identified with a math-
ematical structure or with a fictional system. In the former case, the object instantiates
purely mathematical properties; in the latter, the object instantiates physical ones as
well. The next question is what turns the model object into a Z-representation. Accord-
ing to DEKI, the object must be imbued with an interpretation I that maps properties
of the model system with, in the case under consideration, properties of predator-prey
populations. Let’s now consider what the interpretation would look like under each
of the aforementioned ways of identifying O.
If X is taken to be a mathematical object then the relevant properties it instantiates
are mathematical. The interpretation then maps mathematical properties, like ‘a de-
crease in α and increase in δ entails a decrease in ρ, i.e. a decrease in the relative
value of Pˆ with respect to the value of Vˆ’ to properties of predator-prey systems like
‘a general biocide favours the prey’. In this case, since the mathematical property is a
quantitative one, specific changes to the value of α and δ will yield specific changes to
the value of ρ, the interpretation also includes a function mapping these values onto
values of the predator-prey population property, something for the form ‘a biocide that
reduces the prey birth rate and increases the predator death rate by y, will increase
the ratio of prey to predator populations by x’. Specific changes to the values of α and
δ will be mapped to specific changes to the value of y, and the implied changes to the
value of ρ will be mapped to values of x. Similarly, the mathematical property of the
131 I don’t mean to imply that Frigg’s approach is the only way we can make sense of a non-physical model
nevertheless instantiating physical properties. Contessa (2010) provides an account of the ontology of
models in terms possible objects. Thomasson (forthcoming) provides an account where they are epistemic
artifacts.
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solutions to equations 1 and 2 being periodic, and out of phase, as displayed in figure
21, will be mapped to physical properties relating to how the size of the predator and
prey fish populations change with respect to one another through time. Thus, under
this construal of the model object, the interpretation function will map mathematical
properties to physical ones.132
If, on the other hand, X is taken to be a fictional system that can itself instantiate
physical properties, then the interpretation function will be very different. Here many
of the physical properties of the fictional system will be mapped to themselves by the
interpretation function. The role of the interpretation function will be to specify which
of the many properties of the fictional system could be potentially relevant in some
research scenario. For example, the property of ‘being originally imagined by Volterra’
will not be included as an argument of the interpretation function, but the property
of ‘a general biocide favours the prey’ (along with more specific formulations of the
principle) will be.
So the two options available are to define the Lotka-Volterra model as either the
pair 〈X, I〉, where X is a mathematical object and I an interpretation function map-
ping mathematical properties to predator-prey system properties, or alternatively as
a pair 〈X′, I′〉, where X′ is a fictional predator-prey system and I′ highlights which
properties of the X′ could be potentially useful in a research context, and maps them
to themselves as an ‘identity interpretation’. The outcome of both is that the value of
I and I′ provides the ‘menu’ of Z properties available to be exemplified for the rest of
the DEKI conditions to be met. So I don’t think anything internal to DEKI favours one
approach over the other.
External considerations might tell them apart however. For instance, if one hoped
for a austere ontology – Quine’s (1948) ‘desert landscape’ – then this may provide inde-
pendent reasons to favour one approach over the other. I take it that philosophers of a
Quinean bent are happier (even if reluctantly) to accept the existence of mathematical
structures, than they are to accept the existence of fictional systems.
Moreover, one attribute that the mathematical approach has over the fictional one
is that it provides a clear explanation of cases where the same mathematical model is
been used to represent different types of target systems. For example, the mathemat-
ics that underpins the Lotka-Volterra model have been reinterpreted as an economic-
model, where V denotes the employment and P denotes workers’ share of national
output (Goodwin, 1982). In the context of DEKI, this amounts to constructing an
132 It does bear nothing that there is an alternative option available. X could be taken to be a mathematical
structure that, strictly speaking, exemplifies only mathematical properties. The key then translates these
into physical proprieties to be imputed onto the target system. I discuss this option more in the following
subsection.
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alternative model that consists of the same mathematical object as that used in the
predator-prey case, but introducing an alternative interpretation function. The mathe-
matical construal of model objects allows us to clearly see how the same object can be
used in a variety of different models, by varying the interpretation function, something
that the fictional approach has trouble making sense of.
On the other hand, although the fictionalist approach has difficulty dealing with the
applicability of mathematics, it’s plausible that it better matches scientific practice in
other respects. For example, it accords a systematic role for Volterra’s descriptions
accompanying the mathematical equations, and in addition, can readily accommodate
non-mathematical models (Godfrey-Smith (2006) points out that many models in bi-
ology are not as mathematised as the Lotka-Volterra model). It could also be argued
that there are some model ‘reinterpretations’, in contrast to the example in the previ-
ous paragraph, where the story accompanying the model stays the same whereas the
mathematics changes. For example, we can think of the two-body model of a celestial
orbit as a fictional system involving a planet orbiting the sun. The mathematics used
to describe the orbit of the planet can change, Newtonian to relativistic mechanics for
example, even though the system stays the same.
Regardless of how these details are worked out, we are left with a model that in-
cludes an interpretation function that delivers predator-prey properties as values. The
next questions to address when establishing in virtue of what the model represents
fish in the Adriatic Sea are the denotation, exemplification, keying up, and imputa-
tion, conditions in DEKI. Let’s now turn to them.
I think that what establishes denotation in the Lotka-Volterra case can again be un-
derstood as parasitic on the denotation of the phrase ‘fish populations in the Adriatic
Sea’, or if the model is taken to have multiple target systems – multiple predator-prey
systems – then it is parasitic on the phrase ‘predator-prey system’. Volterra makes it
explicit that his model was originally developed to explain D’Ancona’s observations
about the proportion of predator to prey in the Adriatic fish markets, and states that
his model demonstrates that ‘that Man in fisheries, by disturbing the natural condition
of proportion of two species, one of which feeds upon the other, causes diminution
in the quantity of the species that eats the other, and an increase in the species fed
upon’ (1928, 4). And, as in the case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine denoting the
Guatemalan economy, there are multiple denotation relationships to consider (for ex-
ample, Volterra writes ‘let t denote time’, and so on with respect to the other variables
and parameters). Again, I don’t take these observations as firmly demonstrating what
establishes the denotation relation between models and their targets, and I take it that
this is an important avenue for future research.
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The interpretation function delivers a number of predator-prey properties. The spe-
cific properties exemplified by the model are sensitive to the research question at hand.
In the first instance, the model exemplifies the Volterra Principle, ‘a biocide that re-
duces the prey birth rate and increases the predator death rate by y, will increase
the ratio of prey to predator populations by x, for some specific values of x and y’
(P1), since this corresponds to the empirical observation that Volterra was trying to ex-
plain. But Volterra also notes multiple different properties exemplified by his model,
including, for example, the specific oscillations of the predator and prey populations
(P2), and that, for fixed parameters, the average size of each of the populations tend
towards specific values, regardless of their initial values (P3). Notice that some of the
properties covered by the interpretation function are not exemplified. For example,
for a given set of initial conditions and values of the parameters in the equations 2
and 1, there exists specific values of V and P for a given value of t. This could prove
useful if one wanted to accurately predict the actual size of a given population at a
given time. But from Volterra’s perspective, where he was not interested in predicting
specific population sizes, this property is not exemplified.
The key involved in this case is similar to the key involved in the Phillips-Newlyn
machine case. If Volterra were very confident in his model, he could have taken the
exemplified property P1, ‘a biocide that reduces the prey birth rate and increases the
predator death rate by y, will increase the ratio of prey to predator populations by x’
and imputed that directly onto the target system (which would amount to a key that
mapped P1 to Q1 = P1), and similarly for the specific constant values that the average
predator and prey populations sizes tended towards (P2 = Q2), and the specific oscil-
lations of the populations (P3 = Q3). However, it is clear from his writing that Volterra
didn’t impute these specific properties, but rather imputed the more abstract prop-
erties, which he calls ‘laws’ (1928, 558), such as: ‘a general biocide favours the prey’
(Q1); average predator and prey populations tend towards constant values regardless
of their initial sizes (Q2); and ‘predator and prey populations oscillate out of phase’
(Q3). So we have a key which takes real-valued, specific, properties exemplified by the
model, to more general correlations or tendency properties which were then imputed
onto the target system(s).
We are now in a position to explain how the Lotka-Volterra model represented fish
in the Adriatic Sea in terms of the DEKI conditions. Either the model consisted of
a mathematical structure, with an interpretation function taking mathematical prop-
erties to predator-prey properties, or the model consisted of a fictional predator-prey
system with the interpretation function highlighting ones that that might be useful
in a representational context. Either way the the interpretation function yields a set
of predator-prey properties instantiated, or I-instantiated, by the model object. In the
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context in which Volterra introduced his model he was interested in how different lev-
els of fishing related to different proportions of predator to prey fish in the Adriatic
Sea. As such, by stipulating that the model concerned these fish, he established that
the model denoted them. In such a context, the property exemplified by the model
was the following: ‘a biocide that reduces the prey birth rate and increases the preda-
tor death rate by y, will increase the ratio of prey to predator populations by x’ (P1).
Since Volterra wasn’t too interested in the specific values of x and y, he used a key
that took this to the more general property ‘a general biocide favours the prey’ (Q1).
He then imputed this property onto the fish in the Adriatic Sea. In this instance, since
this matched D’Ancona’s empirical data concerning the relative numbers of predator
and prey fish sold in the Adriatic fisheries, the model was an accurate representation,
at least with respect to the purpose it was used for.
10.3 analysing my account
I hope that I have demonstrated the value of my account of scientific representation in
understanding its instances. I now turn to how it answers the questions discussed in
Chapter 1 before comparing it to some of the accounts discussed in Part ii.
10.3.1 Problems and desiderata
Recall the problems of scientific representation I distinguished earlier:
er-problem : Provide necessary and sufficient conditions of a model representing its
target.
demarcation problem : Demarcate scientific models from other epistemic repre-
sentations (or motivate why they should not be so demarcated).
problem of style : Account for the fact that different scientific models seem to rep-
resent their targets in different ways.
standards of accuracy : Provide standards of accurate epistemic representation.
problem of ontology : Help us understand what (specifically non-physical) mod-
els are, ontologically speaking.
And the conditions of adequacy I provided:
surrogative reasoning condition : Account for the fact that models, and epis-
temic representations more generally, can be used to attempt to learn about their
targets.
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possibility of misrepresentation : Allow for the fact that a model may misrep-
resent its target system, i.e. represent it inaccurately.
applicability of mathematics : Help us understand how mathematical models
represent their target systems.
The account is explicitly designed as an answer to the ER-problem. It meets the sur-
rogative reasoning condition in a straightforward way. When a model user imputes a
property Qi onto the target the user provides a hypothesis concerning the target. The
hypothesis can be coarse grained (‘T has Qi’), or more fine grained (‘a specific part
of T has Qi’) depending on the denotation relationships that hold (if a part of M, m,
denotes a part of T, t, and m exemplifies a property that the key maps to Qi, then Qi
can be imputed onto t, rather than T more generally.
The account, as stated, has little to say about the standards of accuracy, but I take
it that these are pragmatic features in the context of using a model. Sometimes the
hypotheses may be required to be perfectly accurate, at others, it may allow them to
be ‘true enough’ (Elgin, 2004). I think this provides an interesting avenue for future
research, but I want to point out a pertinent point here. Both Elgin (2004) and Teller
(2001) have pushed to reorient what we require of our scientific representations. Ac-
cording to the former, as long as what they tell us is ‘true enough’, then we can arrive
at understanding just fine. According to the latter, an expectation that models should
be ‘perfect’ will never be met; the only perfect model of the world is the world itself.
I think that, by and large, I am in agreement with both of them. But I want to stress
that as stated, my account of representation is independent of such a position. The in-
troduction of a key allows for models that only provide hypotheses about their target
systems that are ‘true enough’, but it is also compatible with further refining the key
in such a way that everything a model tells us about its target comes out as accurate.
In fact, keys provide a way of accounting for the motivations of Elgin and Teller’s
positions, without giving up the idea that models can be accurate representations in
virtue of licencing truths (not Elgin’s (2004) ‘felicitous falsehoods’) about their targets.
The idea is the following. Teller’s (2001) argument against the ‘perfect model model’
is that we should not expect our scientific models to tell us everything about target sys-
tems, in such a way that all of the properties of a model perfectly match the properties
of its targets. This is clearly not required by DEKI. Not all of the properties of a target
system are represented by the model, and those that are, needn’t be related to model
properties via identity. And although I agree with Teller that striving towards perfect
models is a misguided enterprise, they are not ruled out by my account of scientific
representation.
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Elgin (2004) argues against the traditional epistemological position where under-
standing requires truth, and draws on examples from science where scientific models
provide us with understanding about their target systems by licencing felicitous false-
hoods about them. But if models also come with keys then there is another way that
they can provide understanding without invoking falsehoods. What I have in mind is
where the key takes a perfectly precise property of the model, and maps it to a vaguer
property to be imputed onto a target. For example, if it is the case in the model that
‘[a] freely falling body falls at a rate of 32 ft./sec’ (Elgin, 2004) the key needn’t map
this identically onto the claim that ‘a freely falling body in the target system falls at a
rate of 32.ft/second’. Rather, the key can map it to vaguer property, such as ‘a freely
falling body in the target system will fall at a rate of 32±e.ft/second’, where e is some
number small enough not to matter, given the purposes of using the model. Whether
or not the idea of relaxing precise properties of the model to vaguer properties to be
imputed onto the target will work in all of the cases that Elgin has in mind remains an
open question. Discussing this in any more detail goes beyond my current purposes,
and as I noted above, keys need to be investigated on a case-by-case basis.
However this question is resolved, the account allows for misrepresentation in at
least two places. It needn’t be the case that target systems possess any of the imputed
properties. M can represent T as possessing properties Q1, ..., Qm and T might not
instantiate a single of them. If M represents T as having properties that it doesn’t have
it misrepresents it. The other place where ‘misrepresentation’ can enter is denotation.
Denotation can fail in various ways – a representation can purportedly denote a target
that does not exist or it can denote the wrong target – such a failure would be an
instance of missed (or failed) representation, rather than misrepresentation proper
(which requires a representation relation, albeit an inaccurate one).
The abstract character also accounts for different styles of representation. Style, on
this account, is not a monolithic concept; instead it has several dimensions. Firstly,
different O objects can be chosen. So we can speak of, say, the checkerboard style (in
the case of Schelling style models of social segregation) and of the cellular automaton
style. In each case a specific kind of object has been chosen for various modelling
purposes. Secondly, the notion of an interpretation allows us to talk about how closely
connected the properties of the model are to those that the object I-instantiates. The
Phillips-Newlyn machine is an economy-representation, despite the fact that hydraulic
properties are completely unrelated to economy properties (prior the introduction of
the interpretation). In other cases, scale models for example, the interpretations will
connect much closely connected properties. Thirdly, different types of keys could be
used to characterise different styles. In some instances the key might be the iden-
tity key, which would amount to a style of modelling that aims to construct replicas
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of target systems; in other cases the key incorporates different kinds of idealisations,
approximations, or abstractions, which gives rise to idealisation, approximation, and
abstraction keys. Different keys may be associated with entirely different representa-
tional styles.
With respect to the demarcation problem, it should be obvious that by invoking
the notion of representation-as, my inclination is that there is no sharp distinction
between scientific and non-scientific epistemic representations. Just as the Phillips-
Newlyn machine represented the Guatemalan economy as having particular proper-
ties, a map represents its target terrain as having such and such features, and the statue
of Schwarzenegger represents him as being in a particular pose with a particular mus-
culature. However, if a distinction is to be made between scientific and non-scientific
epistemic representations, then the account would allow for it in multiple places. Just
like the problem of style, its abstract nature would allow for a distinction to be drawn
between different types of epistemic representations in terms of the kinds of objects,
interpretation functions, and keys used. It’s plausible that the sorts of interpretation
functions and keys used in the case of scientific representation are more constrained
than those used in that case of non-scientific epistemic representation. For example,
the requirement that interpretation functions associate quantitative properties with
quantitative properties, and include a function specifying the relation between their
values, seems distinctly scientific.
Many details in the account still need to be spelt out. But I think the most interesting
way to develop the account into a complete philosophical package is to focus on the
problem of ontology and the applicability of mathematics. The discussion of the Lotka-
Volterra in the previous subsection indicated what I have in mind. The model object X,
in the model 〈X, I〉, could be taken to be a mathematical structure. Then, according to
DEKI, it could I-instantiate physical properties to be imputed onto the target system.
Thus, the applicability of mathematics depends on model users being able to interpret
the mathematical properties of mathematical objects as physical. This requires further
investigation into how interpretation functions can map mathematical properties to
physical properties. Alternatively, if X is taken to be a fictional system, then we need
an account of the ontological status of fictional systems, and importantly, an account
that allows us to make sense of the fact that they instantiate physical properties. I take
it that Frigg’s (2010a; 2010b) approach is a step in the right direction here, but it does
bear noting that it is not without its problems (most pertinently, the deflationary aspect
of the Waltonian account, that fictions are just products of scientists’ imaginations,
coupled with the requirement of DEKI that models instantiate properties (cf. Levy,
2015)).
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10.3.2 How it compares to others
I mentioned in Chapter 9 that the use of an identity key would allow model users to
impute a model’s exemplified properties onto a target system. It’s worth expanding
on this claim in a little more detail, as well as examining how my account compares
to the others discussed in Part ii.
Recall that according to Similarity 3 a model M represents a target T if and only
if a model user provides a theoretical hypotheses specifying that M and T are similar
in the relevant respects and to the relevant degree. I argued that not all cases of
scientific representation work in this way, and that in many cases, the accuracy of a
scientific representation does not turn on such a similarity. This is not to say that
none do however, and these need to be captured by my account. Fortunately, such
cases are easily covered by DEKI. Consider a theoretical hypothesis specifying that
M and T are similar in respects P1 through to Pn. According to my account, the
respects are relevant because those are the properties exemplified by the model, and
the theoretical hypothesis that specifies this similarity corresponds to using an identity
key, and then imputing properties P1 through to Pn onto the target system. If likeness is
to be preferred, then the key maps P1 through to Pn onto properties Q1 through to Qn,
where each Pi is ‘similar’ to Qi, under whatever understanding of similarity between
properties is offered. Of course an account of the ontology of scientific models that
allows them to exemplify physical properties would still be required (which could be
done through models I-instantiating them, or if non-physical models can somehow
come to instantiate physical properties, then through instantiation alone).
A more interesting comparison arises when we compare DEKI with Structuralism
2. Recall that according to the latter, a scientific model M is a mathematical structure
that represents its target T in virtue of a model user specifying an appropriate mor-
phism from M to T. This approach could be captured in the DEKI framework in at
least three distinct ways. Firstly, the model object X could be taken to be a mathemat-
ical structure, as discussed above, but which exemplifies its mathematical, structural,
properties. The key would then take the form of a morphism (isomorphism, homo-
morphism, ...) which maps the structure to an appropriately morphic structure. The
model imputes this structure onto the target system.133
Secondly, and I think more plausibly, the key could map purely mathematical prop-
erties exemplified by the model to physical ones, and these could then be imputed
onto the target. Such an approach is suggested by Elgin when she writes:
133 Such an approach would have to make sense of how a physical system could enter into a morphism with
X, cf. the discussion in Chapter 6.
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‘Since exemplification requires instantiation, if the model is to represent the
pendulum as having a certain mass, the model must have that mass. But,
not being a material object, the model does not have mass. So it cannot
exemplify the mass of the pendulum. This is true. Strictly, the model does
not exemplify mass. Rather it exemplifies an abstract mathematical prop-
erty, the magnitude of the pendulum’s mass. Where models are abstract,
they exemplify abstract patterns, properties, and/or relations that may be
instantiated by physical target systems. It does no harm to say that they
exemplify physical magnitudes. But this is to speak loosely. Strictly speak-
ing, they exemplify mathematical (or other abstract) properties that can be
instantiated physically’ (2010, 8-9).
Thirdly, and I think most plausibly, the interpretation function itself could map
mathematical properties to physical ones. This was the approach outlined in the
previous section, and it allowed us to make sense of claims like ‘predator and prey
populations oscillate out of phase’ despite the fact that the model is a purely mathe-
matical entity. The model M would exemplify physical properties, despite the fact that
nothing in it instantiates such a property. Rather, the property is I-instantiated, but still
relevant and salient in the research context under consideration, so still exemplified.134
Developing any of these approaches would make significant inroads in answering
the applicability of mathematics question. The central idea is that X can be a mathemat-
ical structure, and mathematical structures can represent physical systems in virtue of
exemplifying properties (mathematical structural properties, or physical properties
that it instantiates under an interpretation), which can be keyed up with other proper-
ties (if all the model user imputes is ‘structure’ onto the target system then the key can
be a morphism, if the model user imputes physical properties then the key can relate
the exemplified properties with physical properties in some rigid way). Allowing the
X in the definition of DEKI to range over mathematical objects thus opens up inter-
esting questions for future research. But again, it is important to bear in mind that
DEKI’s flexibility does not require that all cases of scientific representation function in
this way; it can make room for non-mathematical models as well.
Finally then, DEKI can be compared to the accounts discussed in Chapter 8. To start
with Inferentialism 2. I take it that denotation is what satisfies Sua´rez’s ‘represen-
tational force’ condition, and the cases he worries about, where models lack targets
and thus don’t denote, are better explained by them being Z-representations but not
representations-of any target system, rather than claiming that their ‘representational
134 This account of the ontology of mathematical models shares some similarities with Weisberg’s notion of
an ‘interpreted structure’ (2013, 39-43).
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force points’ towards a non-existing target system. Moreover, although DEKI is stated
at a high level of generality, it is not a deflationary account, and thus the fact that mod-
els allow competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding their
targets is better explained as a symptom of the fact its conditions are met, rather than
building this into the definition of scientific representation itself (cf. Contessa, 2007,
67).
DEKI and Interpretation share some interesting features. Firstly, both select rele-
vant properties of the model and associate them with properties that are purportedly
in the target, and secondly, both take denotation as a necessary condition on scien-
tific representation. The main difference, I take it, is that DEKI provides an elegant
account of what happens in the case of target-less models; adds more detail about
how the properties are selected as relevant; and is more liberal in its understanding
of how properties of models are correlated with properties to be imputed onto the
target. Contessa’s analytic interpretations, suitably enriched in the DEKI framework,
thus drop out as a specific type of key.
Compared to DDI-ER, DEKI again takes denotation as a necessary condition on
scientific representation, and we can see how agents exploit the internal dynamics of
models to make demonstrations which are interpreted to be about their targets. The
demonstrations are in terms of investigating the properties exemplified by a model;
finding the connections between them, determining their values in specific cases, and
so on, and these are interpreted to be about target systems by means of a key. Com-
pared to t-representation, again we find denotation in common, and now we know
that the facts about models concern the properties they exemplify, and the key plays a
similar role in transforming these into claims to be imputed onto their targets.
So in sum, I think that DEKI captures everything that the previous accounts of sci-
entific representation got right, whilst at the same time avoiding the difficulties facing
those accounts that were discussed in Part ii. Similarity, structural or otherwise, can
play a role sometimes, but not in every instance of scientific representation. Math-
ematical structures can function as scientific representations. Target-less models are
dealt with in a way that doesn’t require invoking suspicious ‘fictional’ or ‘generalised’
targets. And the inferential capacity of models is explained in terms of the conditions.
Moreover, I think its abstract character – the fact that each of the conditions requires
further specification in each instance of scientific representation – makes it a highly
useful framework in thinking about scientific representation, and epistemic represen-
tation more generally. Great insight could be gained by thinking about the use of
mathematics, or different styles of scientific modelling, with reference to how each of
the conditions are satisfied.
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C O N C L U S I O N
I want to conclude with some programmatic suggestions about what I take to be the
most promising ways of further developing the DEKI account of scientific representa-
tion, and how the account can be put to use in further philosophical research.
As should be clear from my discussions in the previous section, there remain impor-
tant questions to be addressed within the DEKI framework.
Denotation. The first question is what establishes the denotational relationships be-
tween models and their targets. I cautioned against taking a descriptivist approach to
this sort of denotation, and suggested that, at least in some cases, it’s plausible that
it is parasitic on linguistic denotation: the Phillips-Newlyn machine denotes whatever
‘economy’ denotes; the Lotka-Volterra model denotes whatever ‘predator-prey system’
denotes; and so on. It remains to be seen whether this can be a general answer to
model-target denotation, and whether it suffices to account for cases where models
are used to denote target systems other than the ones they denoted when there were
originally introduced. Cases where the denotation of words change through time are
particularly relevant in the discussions of denotation in the philosophy of language,
and I expect that similar concerns will arise in the context of model denotation. I hope
that a thorough investigation into how models denote would also shed light on deno-
tation in general, and thus should be of interest to philosophers of language as well as
philosophers of science.
Ontology and the Applicability of Mathematics. The second question is to firm up what
the Xs are when it comes to non-physical models. I suggested two potential answers:
take them to be mathematical objects; or take them to be fictional objects. Both ap-
proaches have their pros and cons. If the former route is taken then understanding the
applicability of mathematics becomes more tractable, but questions remain whether
it can account for models that are not as mathematised as the Lotka-Volterra model,
and whether it captures scientific practice. If the latter is taken, then understanding
how mathematics gets involved, and telling a full story about the ontology of scientific
fictions is required. I take it that the DEKI framework provides a novel, and poten-
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tially highly useful, framework in which to explore the connections between scientific
representation, the applicability of mathematics, and the ontology of fictions.
Realism vs. Anti-realism. I motivated this thesis by arguing that without an account
of scientific representation, the notions of scientific realism and anti-realism, usually
phrased in terms of the truth of descriptions, remain opaque in the context of model-
based science. Since I’ve provided DEKI as an account of scientific representation, it’s
natural to ask what it entails about scientific realism and anti-realism. One suggestion
would be to define it in terms of the truth of the imputed claims that result from
applying a model. But whether or not this linguistic notion adequately captures model
representation remains unclear.
Idealisation and Standards of Accuracy. Relatedly, as noted in the previous chapter,
Elgin (2004) and Teller (2001) both champion an account of scientific understanding
that does not require that our models are perfectly accurate representations of the
world. Such an account of understanding is compatible with, but not entailed by, the
DEKI account of scientific representation. However, the question remains: do the keys
used by scientists deliver claims about target systems that are, strictly speaking, true?
If so, must this be at the cost of precision with respect to what is imputed? If not,
should we recalibrate what we expect from our scientific representations in terms of
how they contribute to our understanding of the world?
Style and Demarcation. I suggested that there was no difference in kind between scien-
tific epistemic representation and non-scientific epistemic representation. I think that
both can be accounted for within the DEKI framework. However, a question remains
as to whether there is anything particularly characteristic of scientific representation,
and whether different styles of scientific representation can be distinguished from one
another using the DEKI conditions. As discussed below, this would require a detailed
analysis of further cases, which would prove fruitful in its own right.
I think that by further investigation into the types of keys associated with various
different scientific models, we will be better positioned to address the questions raised
in the previous three paragraphs.
Since the notion of representation is so central to our understanding of, and inter-
action with, the world, I take it that DEKI not only furthers our understanding of
scientific representation, but could moreover be used to illuminate additional ques-
tions in the philosophy of science. The questions I have in mind are the following:
Further cases. The DEKI conditions are deliberately stated at a general level, and
require further specification in each instance. I suggest that if we are to fully under-
stand how scientists represent the world, then a detailed study of scientific practice
is required. DEKI provides the relevant questions to ask in every instance: what is
the model object? How is it interpreted? Which properties does it exemplify? How
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is denotation established? What is the key used? Investigating cases in the DEKI
framework would provide greater understanding of the cases themselves, as well as
deepening our understanding of how scientific representation works in general.
The Hole argument. A recent argument in the philosophy of physics concerns whether
or not two isometric Lorentzian manifolds can represent different spacetimes (Weather-
all, forthcoming). Weatherall attempts to diffuse the ‘Hole argument’, which is usually
taken to show that substantivalism, the view that spacetime exists independently of
its contents, introduces indeterminism into general relativity (Norton, 2015). Crucially,
he does so by arguing that as long as we are careful in how we understand how math-
ematical structures like Lorentzian manifolds represent, we cannot make sense of the
idea of two isometric manifolds such that one accurately represents some spacetime
(constructed using a so-called ‘hole transformation’) and another doesn’t. This turns
on his premise that ‘interpretations of our physical theories should be guided by the
formalism of those theories ... [and] ... insofar as they are so guided, we need to be
sure that we are using the formalism correctly, consistently, and according to our best
understanding of the mathematics’ (Weatherall, forthcoming, 3). This sounds plausi-
ble, but in using this premise to argue for his conclusion, he ends up arguing that
there is no context in which isometric Lorentzian manifolds can be interpreted differ-
ently (Roberts, 2014). In the DEKI framework we can see how to resist Weatherall’s
premise, and therefore his conclusion. Even the very same object can be interpreted
differently, so it should come as no surprise that the substantivalist is free to adopt
different interpretations to isometric Lorentzian structures, such that one is an accu-
rate representation of spacetime resulting from a hole transformation, and the other
isn’t.135 Whether or not this is a useful position to take is a another question, but
it’s not ruled out by the nature of representation, or interpretation, themselves. Re-
gardless, I think that this demonstrates that analysing how models represent will shed
light on questions in the foundations of physics, as well as answering more general
questions in the philosophy of science.
Theoretical equivalence. The previous point indicates a more general issue. There have
been heated recent discussions regarding what makes two theories ‘equivalent’ to one
another (Halvorson, 2012, 2013; Glymour, 2013; Barrett and Halvorson, 2015). But
these have focused solely on the formal properties of theories and mathematical struc-
tures. In terms of the DEKI framework, the focus has been restricted to relationships
between model objects. This misses important additional aspects of scientific repre-
sentation: the interpretations; exemplified properties; keys used; and so on. Since it
seems plausible that theoretical equivalence is related to, what might be called ‘repre-
135 Compare this to the discussion of the colour inverted picture of Obama in Chapter 8.
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sentational equivalence’, investigating how DEKIs conditions are met in, for instance,
Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of mechanics, could shed light on theoreti-
cal equivalence.
All of this yields a hefty research programme to be developed from the ideas dis-
cussed in this thesis. I think that this tells in favour of the account. I hope to have
provided an account of scientific representation that deepens our understanding of
how scientific models represent. But the fact that this opens up avenues for future
research just serves to highlight how central the notion of representation is to our
philosophical projects, and our understanding of the world. As such, since DEKI pro-
vides a novel answer to the question of scientific representation, it provides a novel
framework in which to think about philosophical questions that turn on the nature
of scientific representation. Since these are many, the potential fruit of the account is
significant.
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